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Abstract
Australia’s desire to support the development of functioning and effective governments in 
the small island developing states of the South Pacific poses it with a number of unique 
challenges. Weak public sector capacity and limited institutional resources have amplified 
the costs of the bureaucratic burden of aid, limiting its overall effectiveness at improving 
government performance. Weak budgetary and financial management systems have also 
meant that aid flows have tended to replace rather than augment domestic resources. This 
has contributed to a state of aid dependency and meant that aid has been less effective at 
making improvements in key welfare outcomes such as health, education and 
infrastructure.
This dissertation finds that foreign aid has had a positive impact on government 
effectiveness but this effect is shown to decline as recipients decrease in population size. 
This effect is particularly pronounced within the Australian aid program, reflecting the large 
portion of its aid given to small island developing states. A Papua New Guinea case study 
then analyses how aid has impacted on the recipients bureaucratic and government 
behaviour. Aid is shown to have eroded the government’s incentive to collect domestic 
revenue. Aid has also failed to support improved sectoral expenditure outcomes because 
successive governments have treated it as being highly fungible across sectors. In many 
instances, aid intended for key development sectors has simply replaced domestic 
resources. Finally, aid, and in particular technical assistance, is shown to have reduced the 
efficiency of the domestic bureaucracy in being able to translate public sector expenditures 
into improved social welfare outcomes. Australia’s growing concern over the stability and 
security of the region indicate that new delivery approaches are required which try and 
circumvent many of these adverse effects of aid. A number of policy options are offered in 
the concluding section.
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C hapter 1: In troduction
1.1 Overview
1.1.1 The Question
The central questions which this study seeks to address are what are Australia’s motivations 
in giving aid to the small island developing states (SIDS) of the South Pacific and how has 
this aid impacted the performance of recipient governments in these countries. In 
particular, why have Australia’s efforts to establish functioning and effective states within 
the region not been more effective?
1.1.2 The Thesis
This thesis argues that Australia’s desire to support the development of functioning and 
effective governments in the SIDS of the South Pacific poses it with a number of unique 
challenges. Low public sector capacity and limited institutional resources in recipient 
countries have amplified the costs of the bureaucratic burden of aid, limiting its overall 
effectiveness in improving government performance. The weak budgetary and financial 
management systems present within most SIDS of the South Pacific have also contributed 
to aid flows being poorly managed. In many cases this has meant that aid flows have 
replaced rather than augmented domestic resources. These factors have contributed to a 
state of perpetual aid dependency and meant that aid has been less effective at making 
improvements in key welfare outcomes such as health, education and infrastructure.
1.1.3 The Method
To investigate these claims this study adopts a variety of methods. Firstly, it evaluates 
Australia’s motivations for choosing to now give almost half of its aid program to SIDS— 
and what implications these motivations have had on the aid programs ability to pursue 
positive development outcomes in the region. This study then draws on cross-country 
evidence to determine how global efforts to improve government effectiveness have been 
impacted by the size of recipient countries. This global analysis is compared against 
evidence of Australian efforts to achieve these outcomes. Cross-country evidence is then 
augmented with a SIDS case study, Papua New Guinea (PNG). The case study investigates 
a number of aspects of how aid interacts with domestic financial management to impact on 
its effectiveness at achieving improved fiscal and social outcomes. In the first instance, this 
investigation examines how aid has impacted aggregate fiscal policy settings. The study 
then analyses the ability of aid to improve sectoral expenditure outputs and finally 
concentrates on the impact of aid on the PNG Government’s ability to translate these 
expenditures into improved social welfare outcomes.
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1.1.4 The Conclusion
In general, aid is shown to have a posidve impact on government effectiveness but this 
effect is shown to decline as recipients decrease in population size. These effects are 
particularly pronounced for the Australian aid program, reflecting the large portion of its 
aid given to SIDS. For the PNG case study, aid is shown to have eroded the government’s 
incentive to collect domestic revenue. Aid has also failed to support improved sectoral 
expenditure outcomes because successive governments have treated it as being highly 
fungible across sectors. In most instances aid intended for key development sectors has 
largely replaced domestic resources. Finally, aid, and in particular technical assistance, is 
shown to have reduced the efficiency of the domestic bureaucracy in being able to translate 
public sector expenditures into improved social welfare outcomes. Australia’s growing 
concern over the stability and security of the region indicate that new delivery approaches 
are required which try and circumvent many of these adverse effects of aid. A number of 
policy prescriptions are offered in the concluding section.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Small Island Developing States of the South Pacific
The countries of the South Pacific are diverse. O f the 14 which are members of the Pacific
Islands Forum, PNG is the largest with a population of 6 million and land mass of 460,000 
square kilometres. In contrast, Niue has the smallest population of the region’s numerous 
microstates with 2,000 residents, whilst Nauru has the smallest land mass covering just 21 
square kilometres. All of these countries are, however, members of a group of 51 countries 
classified by the United Nations (UN) as SIDS.1 Whilst no exact definition exists, 
membership of the SIDS network relies on each of these states sharing either some, or all, 
of a number of common characteristics relating to their low to middle income status, 
remoteness, low-lying coastal land mass, small populations, a lack of domestic resources, 
susceptibility to natural disasters as well as a number of common economic challenges 
which shall be discussed shortly (UN DESA 2008).
Whilst success in overcoming these challenges which face the SIDS of the South Pacific 
has varied, overall economic performance has been poor. Countries such as PNG, 
Solomon Islands and Nauru have all recorded long term declines in their per capita 
incomes since they each gained independence in 1975, 1978 and 1968 respectively. These 
countries have also made limited progress on social indicators. PNG and the Solomon
1 A full list of these 51 SIDS and the members from the South Pacific is provided in Appendix 1.1.
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Islands now have infant mortality rates more than twice as high as other countries in the 
region at 55 deaths per 1,000 births. PNG also has the worst educational statistics in the 
region with a 56 per cent gross enrolment rate for primary education in 2006 (World Bank 
2008). More progress has been made in countries such as Vanuatu and Fiji which have, for 
example, reduced levels of infant mortality well below the lower to middle-income country 
average of 40 deaths per 1,000, with rates of 15 and 29 respectively. However, slow and 
volatile rates of growth have meant per capita income levels have increased only by an 
average 0.4 per cent per annum in Vanuatu and 0.5 per cent per annum in Fiji since 1980. 
Even the relatively successful Polynesian states such as Tonga and Samoa2 are still heavily 
reliant on remittance and aid income, and face significant economic and social challenges 
(World Bank 2008) highlighted by the 2006 riots in the Tongan capital, Nukualofa.
Deteriorating governance and public service delivery have also contributed to a number of 
these countries now being classified as ‘fragile’ according to the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Officially this list includes Solomon Islands, 
PNG, Kiribati, Tonga and Vanuatu as they are all within the bottom two quintiles of the 
ranking system. However, many other countries in the region which the CPIA does not 
cover suffer from equally weak bureaucracies and poor governance environments (Feeny 
2005a:l).
It is unsurprising then that the South Pacific region continues to make slow progress 
towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) espoused in the 2000 UN 
Millennium Declaration (UN 2000)3, particularly in the areas of health, HIV and AIDS, 
water and sanitation, and educational outcomes. Indeed, as the 2008 UN MDG Monitoring 
Report highlights, ‘of the five sub-regions of Asia-Pacific the success of Pacific Island 
developing countries in implementing the MDGs has been the least impressive’ (UN 
2008:12).
1.2.2 Economic Challenges of Small Island Developing States
The lack of economic development in the South Pacific highlights many of the unique
economic challenges which a number of authors have shown face SIDS (Briguglio 1995;
2 Both these countries have, for example, almost 100 per cent primary school enrolment and have more than halved their infant mortality 
rates over the last two decades to approximately 20 deaths per 1,000 births by 2006.
3 The eight MDGs break down into 21 quantifiable targets that are measured by 60 indicators. These goals include Goal 1: Eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education; Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality; Goal 5: Improve maternal health; Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; Goal 7: 
Ensure environmental sustainability, and; Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development.
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Streeton 1996; Armstrong et al. 1998; Armstrong and Read 2002; McGillivray et al. 2008). 
These authors highlight that whilst diverse in nature, SIDS tend to be categorised by 
undiversified production capacity due to a limited availability of domesdc resources. 
Limited domestic production bases have made SIDS vulnerable to external and domestic 
shocks and they are highly dependent on imports for both consumption and investment 
goods. A reliance on volatile agricultural exports and resource extraction has also tended to 
make these countries vulnerable to trade imbalances and volatile foreign exchange reserves. 
Multiplying these effects is the frequency of natural disasters such as cyclones, floods and 
earthquakes, which have large detrimental effects on domestic economic activity and 
export revenues. A large reliance on foreign trade is also frequently undermined by higher 
than normal transportation costs as they are often in remote locations, with limited scale 
economies and generally have poor infrastructure.
Compounding the economic challenges of SIDS are also the unique pressures these states 
face in developing well-functioning bureaucracies. Farrugia (1993), for example, describes 
how in small states public sector managers are exposed to a much higher degree of 
conflicting pressures arising from close interpersonal relations, limited promotion 
opportunities and senior officials having to act in multifunctional roles. Streeton (1993) 
also illustrates how in small states it is often much more difficult to recruit and maintain 
high quality civil servants because of the limited supply of candidates available and the 
tendency of the most capable individuals to seek employment in larger markets.
Despite these challenges, SIDS are by no means destined for poor economic performance. 
Armstrong et al. (1998:654), for example, find that states with less than 3 million people are 
categorised by the full spectrum of economic success, varying from those with serious 
economic difficulties to some of the highest living standards in the world’. Likewise, 
Armstrong and Read (2002) find that even though small states are exposed to greater levels 
of economic volatility, numerous countries have been able to adopt policy settings which 
countervail these adverse effects and achieve significant economic success. These results 
are supported by Read (2007) who found that neither small size nor ‘islandness’ are 
significant barriers to attracting foreign capital inflows; rather, SIDS are constrained by 
trade policies and income levels. Easterly and Kraay (2000) even find that after controlling 
for location, small states actually outperform larger ones in terms of their productivity 
levels and economic performance.
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These findings give reason for both hope— that the SIDS of the South Pacific are by no 
means condemned to poor economic performance—as well as concern— about why the 
region has consistendy underperformed in recent decades. These findings also highlight 
that it has been government policy rather than economic circumstance which has 
determined the success or failure of countries in the South Pacific, and in SIDS more 
generally (Armstrong and Read 2002; Read 2007). This supports a more general consensus 
within the economic literature of the centrality of institutions and governance in 
determining economic performance (North 1990; North 1994; Acemoglu et al. 2001; 
Rodrik et al. 2004).
1.2.3 Australian Aid in the South Pacific
Australia continues to be the largest aid donor in the South Pacific, and has been central in 
the high levels of per capita financial support received by the region, and in particular to 
Melanesia.4 In terms of total aid receipts since 1974, Australian aid has accounted for 89 
per cent of Nauru’s, 87 per cent of PNG’s, 38 per cent of the Solomon Islands’, 34 per 
cent of Tonga’s, 33 per cent of Fiji’s, 27 per cent of Samoa’s and 21 per cent of Vanuatu’s 
(OECD DAC 2008).
PNG in particular has remained the centrepiece of the Australian aid program, receiving 61 
per cent of total Australian aid flow since 1974 (OECD DAC 2008). Other major 
recipients in the region have included Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and Nauru, which 
have received 4.1 per cent, 3.2 per cent, 1.7 per cent and 0.5 per cent of Australian aid 
flows respectively. In total, 74 per cent of Australian aid was allocated to the South Pacific 
between 1974 and 2006.5
The poor economic performance of the region poses a number of difficult challenges for 
the Australian aid program in the South Pacific. In particular, whilst SIDS status appears 
not to condemn countries to economic stagnation, the continued lack of development 
success in the region despite large aid flows raises serious questions about the contribution 
this assistance has made to fostering functioning and effective states in these environments.
4 Other major active donors in the region include the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank as well as other bilateral agencies 
from Japan, New Zealand, the European Union, the UK, and more recendy, from China and Taiwan. For a full exposition of the high 
levels of per capita foreign aid received by Pacific Island countries see Table 3.1.
5 For the purposes of these calculations, the South Pacific is defined as Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, PNG, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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The subject of whether Australian aid has contributed or hindered the establishment of 
functioning and effective states within the region has remained a contentious issue over the 
last decade. Pavlov and Sugden (2006) and Feeny (2005a; 2005b), for example, argue that in 
the absence of aid, economic growth rates in the South Pacific would have been lower. On 
the other hand, authors such as Hughes (2003) and Hughes and Windybank (2005) have 
pointed to aid as being one of the very causes of the region’s poor economic performance. 
In practice, however, establishing whether aid has fostered faster or slower rates of 
economic growth in the South Pacific has been of little practical policy importance. Even if 
one accepts a priori that aid has led to improvements in economic performance within the 
region, it is clear that aid has not been able to foster a level of state-functioning and 
economic prosperity which is both desired by the people of the South Pacific and, 
ultimately, is acceptable to Australia. From both an Australian and South Pacific 
perspective, maintaining the status quo of past performance is therefore undesirable.
What is also increasingly clear is that it is how aid interacts with the quality of governance 
and bureaucratic decision making that will ultimately determine its success or failure in 
being able to assist in the transformation of the region from an economic laggard to one 
with rising prosperity and widespread wealth creation (Chand 2006).
1.2.4 The Challenge o f‘Scaling Up’
Australia’s commitment to a substantial scaling up of its aid program both to the South 
Pacific and to other developing regions creates a heightened need to understand and 
address these challenges. Total Australian aid is forecast to increase from 0.3 per cent of 
gross national income (GNI) in 2007 to 0.5 per cent by 2015 (AusAID 2008). Increasing 
the impact of aid is, however, not simply related to increasing aid volumes. Donors have 
become increasingly aware about the conditions under which aid is likely to be absorbed 
less effectively by recipient countries. On the economic side, structural constraints such as 
skilled labour shortages, underdeveloped financial markets and infrastructure bottlenecks 
can all raise the marginal cost of aid, diverting limited domestic productive resources away 
from private sector activity (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2006:2).
Higher aid flows may also be undermined by governance and institutional constraints as 
additional resources have the potential to encourage higher levels of rent seeking and 
corrupt behaviour. Higher aid volumes can also impose larger costs on the capacity of the 
recipient bureaucracy to manage and plan for the use of the aid within its own fiscal 
frameworks (Heller 2005). This task is often amplified when the heavy reliance on external
7
assistance creates fiscal uncertainty in the recipient country, making long term expenditure 
planning more difficult (Heller and Gupta 2002:18).
It is for these reasons that the scaling up of the Australian aid program through the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) has been accompanied with a 
growing focus on improving its effectiveness. Following a number of major international 
conferences, Australia became a signatory to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
March 2005 (OECD 2005), and most recently to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 
2008 (AusAID 2009). These agreements commit the aid program to a range of activities 
associated with best practice aid delivery which seek to limit many of the adverse 
consequences of aid. This includes improving the coordination, implementation and 
accountability of its aid disbursements through such measures as aligning aid flows with 
recipient priorities, using local public financial systems, untying aid flows and making aid 
flows more predictable. Greater effort has also been made in implementing results 
orientated monitoring and evaluation frameworks which seek to identify weaknesses in 
existing programs and highlight productive delivery mechanisms (ODE 2006). These 
efforts also led to the establishment of the Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) 
within AusAID in 2006 to monitor the quality and evaluate the impact of the Australian aid 
program as a means of identifying where effectiveness could be improved (ODE 2008a).
1.3 Policy Problems 
1.3.1 Overview
The focus of Australian aid on improving the effectiveness of government bureaucracies 
within the SIDS of the South Pacific highlights the importance now placed on these 
institutions in delivering the range of public goods and policy choices that are required for 
a stable prosperous society. The following section discusses five key policy issues related to 
the effectiveness of Australian efforts to assist in strengthening these institutions. Each of 
these policy issues forms the basis for the analysis presented in the following chapters.
The first policy issue considers the motivations of Australia in giving aid and the impact 
that these motivations may have on the efficiency of foreign resource allocations. The 
second issue considers the impact of foreign aid on overall government effectiveness in 
SIDS environments. The final three policy issues consider how aid may interact with public 
sector behaviour and the domestic budget process to impact fiscal policy outcomes. As 
shall be explained, the budget process is emphasised because of the key role it plays in
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achieving improved social outcomes. It is through the budget process that the government 
aggregates the diverse preferences of society, assesses the redistribudve consequences of 
meeting these preferences and ultimately becomes accountable to its citizens for the quality 
of goods and services it is capable of providing. In particular, the third policy issue 
discusses the impact of foreign aid on aggregate fiscal discipline which supports 
macroeconomic stability and long term economic growth, by equating revenue sources 
with spending commitments. The fourth analyses the impact of aid on spending levels in 
productive sectors of the economy which facilitate an expansion of both human and 
physical capital. The final policy issue discusses the role of aid in improving the value for 
money of these expenditure allocations in terms of maximising their impact on the chosen 
social outcomes for which they have been designated.
These policy problems are considered in turn, in each of the subsequent chapters. Each of 
the chapters has its own conclusions and policy implications. Chapter 8 concludes and 
brings a number of the core lessons from each of these chapters together to offer some 
broad policy proposals for how Australia may leverage greater gains from its assistance 
efforts in the SIDS of the South Pacific, and, in particular, in PNG.
1.3.2 The Arc of Instability and Australian Aid Allocation
The first step in this analysis is to determine why Australia gives aid to the SIDS of the 
South Pacific and the implications that these motivations have had for its approach in 
assisting the region. Australian perceptions of the South Pacific have varied greatly across 
the post colonial period. Once seen as an under-performing yet basically benign region, 
today the SIDS of the South Pacific are described as an ‘arc of instability’ (Dibb 2000; 
Duncan and Chand 2002), a region of weak and failing states prone to illegal activity (Reilly 
2000), and even a potential haven for international terrorists (ASPI 2003). New 
international security concerns following terrorist attacks in the United States and Bali have 
amplified Australia’s anxiety about the economic sustainability and stability of the region 
(ASPI 2004).
Australia’s concern over the proximity of troubled South Pacific states highlights the 
continued importance that it has placed on using the aid program as a means of pursuing 
its own strategic and security interests—in addition to humanitarian objectives. Indeed, 
establishing regional stability and security has continued to be a unifying theme of the aid 
program as it has undertaken its mandate of ‘advancing Australia’s national interest by
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assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development’ 
(AusAID 2005a:8).6
The principal justification for the pursuit of these dual objectives within the aid program 
has been that they are in fact complementary. Promoting functioning and effective states 
and economic growth in the South Pacific is beneficial not only to the Pacific but also to 
Australia (AusAID 2006, Downer 2007). Whether these multiple objectives have had 
adverse effects on the ability of the aid program to achieve large scale reductions of poverty 
in the region has, however, been a subject of debate. For example, a major review of the 
Australian aid program in 1996, the Simons Review, argued that the pursuit of commercial, 
political and security objectives by the aid program had resulted in high cost, high profile 
projects but without any clear analysis of benefit to low income populations (Mullen 
1999:33). As a result, it proposed the Australian aid program needed to develop a clearer 
strategic vision which assisted developing countries to reduce poverty through sustainable 
economic and social development (Simons 1997).
Similarly, Davis (2002:101) argued that the Australian foreign aid program has failed to live 
up to its potential because the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and its 
pursuit of Australia’s national interest, have dominated policymaking about high level aid.7 
The Australian Council for International Development (ACF1D) has also noted that 
Australia’s foreign aid budget has been increasingly diverted to whole of government rather 
than purely developmental priorities, particularly with regard to national security, in turn 
limiting its ability to achieve positive development outcomes (Spillane 2004).8
This highlights the first set of policy problems considered in Chapter 2 of this study. It 
includes how Australia’s national interest and development objectives have influenced its 
aid allocations in the region and more broadly. Furthermore, Chapter 2 will also consider 
whether Australia’s growing strategic and security concerns about the South Pacific have
6 One recent example of this national interest objective being implemented within the aid program has been the emphasis on cross- 
border issues such as support for customs procedures, border control, transnational crime initiatives, and counter-terrorism through 
the strengthening of law and jusdce sectors (AusAID 2003a).
7 This situation has been perpetuated within successive governments by ‘budgetary reporting structures, where nadonal interest 
influences the criteria by which the Australian Parliament assesses the value of foreign aid’ (Davis 2002:102).
8 In a similar light Brown (2005:4) argues that, while important, the humanitarian objecdves of aid in the South Pacific ‘are secondary to a 
range of polidcal, geo-strategic and economic objecdves that influence aid policies. In other words, to a large extent, aid levels are.. .set at 
the polidcal level, for polidcal reasons and fluctuate in step with the polidcal cycles of donor countries.’
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influenced the responsiveness of its aid program to poverty vis-a-vis strategic priorities or 
whether the two objectives have indeed been mutually attainable.
1.3.3 Foreign Aid and Functioning and Effective States in SIDS
The evolving concerns and perceptions of the South Pacific have had a significant impact
on the type of assistance Australia has delivered to the region. During the 1960s and 1970s 
the Australian Government adopted an essentially hands-off approach. This meant that a 
large portion of Australian aid was given either directly as government-to-government 
grants, mainly to PNG, or through the funding of specific projects predominately related to 
service delivery or national infrastructure. This reflected both a desire by post colonial 
Australia not to be seen as meddling in the domestic affairs of its South Pacific neighbours 
as well a strong sense of optimism surrounding the economic potential of these 
neighbours. During the following decades, a growing unease about the misuse of aid led to 
a progressive tightening of its conditionality and accountability mechanisms, and during the 
1990s a phasing out of PNG’s direct budget support was undertaken. Most recently, the 
increasing recognition of the threat of failed or failing states on its doorstep has led 
Australia to adopt a more interventionist approach towards improving institutional 
performance in the region (Chand 2004; Dinnen 2004; AusAID 2007).
Examples of this interventionist approach have included the Australian-led multinational 
peace-enforcement missions under the UN Mission to East Timor (UNMISET) in 2002 
and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003 to restore 
peace and then rebuild government with a substantial institutional support program. In 
addition, the PNG Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in 2004 deployed up to 80 
Australian Government officials as specialist advisers into the PNG bureaucracy.9 A 
similar, but much smaller, program of Australian officials was also initiated with Nauru in 
2001.10 This new interventionist stance by Australia in the region stands in sharp contrast 
to the essentially hands-off approach of recent decades.
9 This intervention also included up to 230 Australian Federal Police however this component of the deployment was scaled back 
following the successful legal challenge over the constitutionality of prosecutorial immunity by the deployed Australian police and 
bureaucratic officers.
10 Callick (2003:1) notes that several factors have contributed to the shift in Australia’s aid policy to the region including: the successful 
military operation in East Timor in 1999; the success of the (unarmed) Peace Monitoring Mission in Bougainville in 2000; media 
coverage of arguments for a more pro-active policy in the region generally and in the Solomon Islands particularly; the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ interventions model used elsewhere, most importandy in Iraq; and a concern that without intervention now, state services in 
the Solomon Islands in parucular could collapse completely.
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Sustained high levels of foreign financial assistance combined with poor economic 
performance have led to a number of cridcisms regarding the contribution of Australian 
aid to the improvement of government performance within the region. In particular, aid 
flows have been associated with the encouragement of rent-seeking behaviour as domestic 
politicians seek to access donor resources whilst resisting any attempts at the imposition of 
conditions on the usage of those resources via accusations of neo-colonialism (Windybank 
and Manning 2003:2; Dinnen 2004:5).11 Aid flows have also been associated with 
perpetuating poorly performing governments in the region by subsidising the costs of 
inefficient economic policies and oversized public bureaucracies. This in turn has delayed 
the need for any wide-scale economic reforms in the region, contributing to a minimal 
relationship between aid flows and economic performance (Duncan 1994; Chand 2004). It 
was these types of criticisms which even prompted authors such as Hughes (2003) to 
suggest that £aid has failed the Pacific’, undermining the effectiveness of government by 
promoting irresponsible and unaccountable policies.12
This set of issues is considered in Chapter 3 of this study. The analysis compares global 
cross-country evidence on the impact of foreign aid on the effectiveness of recipient 
governments against Australian efforts to achieve these outcomes. In particular, it also 
seeks to determine whether these efforts have been impacted on by the unique economic 
characteristics associated with the small size of countries within the South Pacific.
1.3.4 Foreign Aid and Fiscal Aggregates in PNG
One of the most important bureaucratic and administrative activities required for the 
establishment of functioning and effective governments is the budget process and the fiscal 
policy outcomes that this creates (Gupta et al. 2004). At the aggregate level this involves 
the mobilisation and management of both domestic and foreign resources, which in turn 
impact upon macroeconomic stability. Fiscal policy also determines the quantity and quality 
of productive investments made in crucial economic development sectors such as social 
services and infrastructure.
11 Windybank and Manning (2003:2), for example, claim that in PNG ‘generous levels of foreign aid have created “windfall” incomes 
(economic rents) that have led to waste and corruption. Rent-seeking has subsidised the rise of a small political elite and overblown 
central government at the expense of investment in infrastructure and diversification of the economy.’
12 These types of arguments also coincide with Svensson’s (2000) seminal study. He argues that windfalls of foreign aid are on average 
associated with more extensive corruption. The author also finds that these effects tend to be particularly pronounced in countries 
which have weak public-sector capacity and a divided policy process—characteristics which are typical of many of the SIDS of the 
South Pacific.
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The high levels of per capita assistance received by the SIDS of the South Pacific means 
that foreign financial resources have constituted, and continue to constitute, an integral 
part of their total fiscal resources13. However, continued weak public-sector expenditure 
management and poor allocation of domestic resources have led to criticisms that this 
assistance has provided incentives for these governments to adopt adverse behaviours and 
poor fiscal policies.
There are a number of ways in which foreign aid may encourage adverse fiscal behaviour 
from a recipient government. Bauer (1966; 1971) was one of the first to argue that 
continued high levels of financial assistance weaken the economic and social management 
responsibilities of a government. A lack of accountability to domestic constituents can then 
lead to a weakening of budgetary and revenue institutions, which results in poor 
expenditure control, and poor quality public investment such as low levels of financing for 
development oriented activities like health and education (Moss et al. 2006:10).
The delivery of aid has also been associated with the undermining of a government’s 
incentive to expand domestic revenue collection as it finds it easier and more politically 
appealing to extract resources from donors than to increase taxes on its constituents 
(Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Mwenda 2006:4). This has the potential to not only deplete 
domestically generated resources but create a dependency on continued aid flows and 
donor assistance which can support rent-seeking behaviour by the recipient government 
(Easterly 2002; Easterly 2003). The potential for continuous financial bail-outs from donor 
organisations has also been associated with the moral hazard of encouraging less 
responsible debt management and lower levels of public savings (Franco-Rodreiguez et al. 
1998).
Weak public sector bureaucracies, poor accountability mechanisms for government and 
limited staff capacity potentially make the SIDS of the South Pacific particularly susceptible 
to many of these adverse fiscal effects of aid. Collier and Chauvet (2008), for example, 
survey the available evidence on the impact of foreign aid on economic reform in poor 
governance environments, including two countries from the South Pacific—PNG and the 
Solomon Islands. Here, the authors argue, financial aid has favoured the ruling elite by 
postponing necessary structural and microeconomic reforms as it is less inclined to
13 For a full exposition o f the high levels o f per capita foreign aid received by Pacific Island countries see Table 3.1.
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antagonise key political and business allies by reining in anti-competitive business 
legislation or expanding tax collection in lieu of the continued receipt of foreign resources.
PNG in particular offers an insightful case study in this regard. Despite being the largest 
economy and closest to major international trading routes, the PNG business environment 
has continued to be amongst the most expensive, least investment-friendly in the region 
(Batten et al. 2009).14 Moreover, despite receiving very high levels of direct budget support 
from Australia in the decades following its independence, PNG’s fiscal policy was 
characterised by persistent deficit financing and growing public debt. Windybank and 
Manning (2003:12) concluded that sustained financial assistance from Australia encouraged 
successive governments in PNG to ‘live beyond their means, encouraging irresponsible 
policies and postponing the need for reform’. Criticism over the fiscal effects of aid in 
PNG has also focused on the diversion of aid funds from productive investments to 
consumption activities (Hughes 2003:25). In particular, aid flows are commonly believed to 
have contributed to a bloated public sector as freed up domestic resources are transferred 
away from aid-financed sectors (Tulip 2005:1).
Following a historical analysis of the interaction between foreign aid and PNG’s fiscal 
policy since its independence in Chapter 4, this set of issues is analysed in Chapter 5, using 
PNG as a case study. The analysis includes an assessment of how the PNG Government 
has reacted to inflows of foreign financial resources to influence aggregate fiscal outcomes. 
This includes determining whether foreign grants have undermined the PNG 
Government’s incentive to collect domestic revenue and also whether they have 
encouraged less responsible debt management behaviour. In addition, this chapter 
considers whether the delivery of foreign aid has led to an increase in the development 
orientation of government expenditures in PNG, or whether widespread diversion taken 
place towards non development priorities?
1.3.5 Foreign Aid and Sectoral Expenditures in PNG
Switching from untied budget support to earmarking aid funds to the delivery of specific 
activities through project and program aid has been a key method used by Australia to try 
and improve the development impact of its assistance to PNG. As Feeny (2003:91) notes, 
‘[t]he Australian policy of phasing out aid provided as budget support in favour of project 
aid has ensured that aid is now used for important projects in the health and education
14 As Batten et al. (2009) highlight, this environment exists because successive governments have continued to pursue policies granting 
favourable tax concessions, monopoly and anti-competitive trading rights, and trade barriers to numerous domestic industries.
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sectors.’ A problem with this suggestion, however, is that it ignores the ability of the 
recipient government to alter its own spending habits in response to foreign financial 
assistance to certain sectors of the economy. In practice, the response of aid recipients may 
subvert attempts of the aid donor to increase investment in certain productive sectors of 
the economy as recipient governments channel their own resources to other less 
productive, but politically beneficial, expenditure items. In essence, this argument 
highlights that foreign aid is fungible.
To the extent that foreign aid provides additional resources for recipient governments, 
either directly through budget support or indirecdy through fungibility, its effectiveness at 
increasing the quantity of resources available within any specific sector will depend most 
heavily on how the recipient government’s fiscal behaviour responds to this support.13
Once again, PNG offers an insightful case study in this regard. At independence, PNG 
received very high levels of foreign aid in the form of direct budget support. Growing 
criticisms about the domestic government’s usage of these funds, however, led to the 
gradual introduction of project and program aid throughout the 1990s. By 2001, budget 
support had been completely removed, with all grant aid being delivered through specific 
project and program funding mechanisms.
As explained in Chapter 4 however, despite these changing aid modalities, sectoral 
expenditure outcomes in PNG have not improved and have in many cases worsened since 
the introduction of project and program aid. These views were expressed by AusAID 
(2003a:27) which highlighted that ‘analysis of the PNG Government’s own funding for 
different sectors confirms that government funding for key sectors such as infrastructure, 
health and education was higher when PNG was receiving budget support than in more 
recent times.’
This set of issues is considered in Chapter 6, building further on the PNG case study. The 
analysis includes what impact foreign aid has had on total funding levels for three core 
service delivery priorities— health, education and infrastructure—in relation to the funding 
of general government consumption expenditure. Another important relationship which is
15 As highlighted in McGillivray and Ouattara (2005:248), it is essential to recognise that ‘aid is given primarily to the government and 
therefore any macroeconomic impact will depend on public sector fiscal behaviour’. In this sense, the ability of foreign aid to promote 
higher rates of economic development and in providing additional investment resources depends first and foremost on the response it 
elicits from the recipient government.
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considered is the extent to which the shift from general budget support to sector allocated 
project and program aid has improved aggregate expenditure levels in each of these three 
key service delivery sectors.
1.3.6 Technical A ssistance and Public Sector Efficiency in PNG
In addidon to understanding the impact of aid on the overall effectiveness of government 
and its expenditure priorities, donors are also becoming increasingly focused on the impact 
that their assistance has on the efficiency of public spending to achieve improvements in 
social outcomes. At the 18th Australia—Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum in Madang on 
23 April 2008, ministers from both countries agreed to the continued placement of 
approximately 40 Australian government officials in PNG Government departments and 
agencies. This assistance package, now renamed from the ECP to the Strongim Gavman 
Program (SGP), is aimed specifically at strengthening the performance and capacity of 
central government agencies to improve their ability to deliver essential public services and 
infrastructure. This placement of Australian government officials in PNG’s bureaucracy 
complements the pre-existing AusAID-run Advisory Support Facility (ASF). The ASF 
recruits international consultants to work in a range of agencies across PNG’s public 
sector, also with the central goal of enhancing skills and building capacity within the host 
agency (AusAID 2007:12-20).
Following criticism that this technical assistance had become too focused on Port Moresby 
and was having limited impact on the lives of the rural majority, AusAID has also focused 
on linking technical assistance to improved levels of service delivery at the provincial and 
local level. This resulted in the implementation of the Sub National Strategy (SNS) in 2006 
which provided A$100 million over four years to improve public administration and 
governance and to strengthen service delivery at sub-national levels of the government.16
The expansion and increasing diversification of Australia’s efforts to improve the 
functioning of PNG’s bureaucracy have contributed to it now delivering just over half of 
its total foreign aid to PNG in the form of technical assistance (OECD DAC 2008, ODE 
2008b:32). Such a high level of technical assistance raises a number of important issues for 
Australian aid delivery in PNG. Studies such as those by Bräutigam (1999:41) argue that in 
weak public sector environments, technical assistance can actually delay bureaucratic or 
economic reform by allowing the recipient government to continue delivering a base level
16 This has included the placement of co located AusAID officers within the Central Province, East New Britain and Eastern Highlands 
Province and in the Autonomous Bougainville Government.
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of social services required to maintain its polidcal position.1 Chauvet and Collier (2004) 
also highlight that in fragile states such as PNG technical assistance has been an ineffective 
mechanism for encouraging greater levels of economic or bureaucratic reform. Indeed, the 
authors argue that in the absence of a demand for reform, technical assistance is unlikely to 
be of any use at all.
These types of limitations have been receiving growing acknowledgement in PNG. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; 2005:95) argued that 
the high levels of technical assistance provided by Australia had the potential to undermine 
rather than support capacity-building efforts and greatly reduced levels of domestic 
ownership of the development program. Former PNG Prime Minister and now 
Parliamentary Opposition Leader Sir Mekere Morauta has also voiced his concerns over 
Australian technical assistance. Responding to a March 2008 visit by Australian Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd, he claimed that ‘[hjundreds of millions have been spent or are being 
spent on capacity building, but nothing really has eventuated’ (Marshall 2008:1).
AusAID itself is perhaps the body most acutely aware of the challenges it faces in trying to 
improve the function and efficiency of PNG’s public sector in providing improved service 
delivery. ODE (2008c:21) for example highlights that programs such as SGP which have 
traditionally been heavily focused on the ‘doing’ component of their role need to be more 
conscious of the capacity-building imperative to impart sustainable improvements to their 
counterpart agencies. In particular, deployed officers need to limit the cycle of dependency 
which can be created as they often find it easier to, perhaps due to time pressure, complete 
tasks themselves rather than letting locals take the lead.
In a recent review of PNG’s health sector support, the ODE also states that high levels of 
technical assistance have had the potential to create significant problems, particularly in 
fragile states such as PNG where ‘the high volume of support personnel and the 
enthusiasm they have brought has resulted, at national level, in a perception that...there has 
been too much technical assistance, resulting in at best duplication of effort, and at worst, 
suppression of activity’ (ODE 2008b:32).
17 This situation can then reduce the desire of the recipient government to reform and, in particular, reduce its incendve to discontinue 
using public sector employment as a means of generaung political patronage.
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This set of issues is analysed in Chapter 7. Using the PNG health sector as a case study, the 
analysis measures the impact which foreign aid, and in particular technical assistance, has 
had on the effectiveness of public spending allocations to improve outcomes for a range of 
health indicators after PNG’s independence.
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C hapter 2: A ustralian Aid— W hat D eterm ines its Allocation?
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Overview
This chapter analyses both the determinants of Australian aid allocations and how these 
determinants have changed over time. In particular, the analysis focuses on the competing 
influence of both humanitarian and national interest objectives and whether Australia’s 
growing awareness of national interest priorities in the South Pacific has led to a diversion 
of funds away from those countries which have the greatest humanitarian need.
This chapter also seeks to establish what have been the key determinants for Australia’s 
growing focus on delivering aid through technical assistance. In 2005, Australia disbursed 
45 per cent of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the form of technical 
assistance, the highest per cent out of all bilateral donors within the OECD (OECD DAC 
2008). By 2007, this proportion had increased to 51 per cent (OECD DAC 2008). Regional 
security concerns, anti-corruption, and the growing focus placed on improving governance 
as a means of ensuring positive humanitarian outcomes have all been used as justifications 
for technical assistance now playing such a large role in the Australian program. This 
chapter seeks to determine which of these factors, or any others, have bee;n most influential 
in this shift in Australian aid policy.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1.2 provides a historical overview of the 
changing motivations and patterns of Australian aid allocation following a number of major 
government reviews of its objectives. Section 2.2 provides a review of the literature 
assessing the motivations of global and Australian aid allocation. Section 2.3 develops a 
bilateral aid allocation model for Australian aid. Section 2.4 gives the empirical model and 
examines a number of estimation issues. Section 2.5 provides an overview of the data and 
Section 2.6 presents the estimation results. Section 2.7 concludes and discusses some policy 
implications of the results.
2.1.2 History of the Australian Aid Program
The Australian aid program has undergone a number of significant changes in size, focus 
and administration in the post World War Two era. Following the War the program 
focused on a government grant system to the Australian-administered territory of PNG. 
This assistance soon expanded in the late 1940s to other developing British 
Commonwealth countries such as India. From the early 1950s, aid allocation decisions 
were increasingly influenced by other foreign policy concerns, particularly with the
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commencement of the Colombo Plan which was launched by the Bridsh Commonwealth 
to provide assistance to countries in South and Southeast Asia (Lowe 2005:392). Under this 
Plan, Australia expanded its range of assistance to target human capital accumulation, 
including programs such as scholarships, technical training facilities and advisory services 
for recipient governments (ABS 2001).
PNG continued to dominate Australia’s aid program throughout the 1960s, receiving about 
two-thirds of Australia’s foreign assistance (OECD DAC 2008). The period also saw 
Southeast Asia gradually gain more importance than South Asia, with Indonesia overtaking 
India as the second largest recipient of Australian aid (Chart 2.1) (Lowe 2005). Reflecting 
the growing size of the aid program, Australia created the Australian Development 
Assistance Agency (ADAA) in 1974, bringing together a range of programs which at the 
time were being carried out across the Australian public sector.18
The first major assessment of the Australian aid program was then conducted by the 
Jackson Review in 1984 (GoA 1984). Following a period of political disagreement 
regarding whether the objectives of the aid program should be motivated purely by 
humanitarian or self interest concerns, the Jackson Review argued that both should be 
included in the mandate of Australian aid. The Review justified this approach by arguing 
that the two objectives were in fact mutually attainable given that ‘aid complements 
strategic, economic and foreign policy interests, and by helping developing countries to 
grow, it provides economic opportunities for Australia’ (GoA 1984:3). The 
recommendations by the Review then led to the adoption of what came to be known as the 
‘triple mandate’ of Australian aid— aid for commercial, diplomatic and humanitarian 
reasons (Cirillo 2006:35).
18 In 1976 the Australian Government sought to amalgamate the ADAA into the Department of Foreign Affairs as a means of cutting 
administrative costs. However, the Agency remained independent following the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Andrew 
Peacock, submitting a strong defence to Cabinet for the ADAA to remain a separate organisation. In this submission, the Minister 
argued that the removal of this independence would not only actually reduce its ability to have a ‘long term foreign policy impact’ but 
also ‘raise doubts about our aid intentions among our neighbours and other donors’ (GoA 1976).
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Chart 2.1: Australian Aid Allocation by Region (1965—2006) 
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The ADAA was subsequently renamed the Australian Development Assistance Bureau 
(ADAB) in 1987, which then evolved into AusAID in 1995. In 1996, the next major re­
think of the aid program was completed under the Simons Review (GoA 1997a). This 
Review argued that the triple mandate of Australian aid had resulted in high cost, high 
profile projects without any clear analysis of benefit streams to low income populations 
(Mullen 1999:33). As a result, it proposed that the Australian aid program needed to 
develop a clearer strategic vision which should be ‘to assist developing countries to reduce 
poverty through sustainable economic and social development’ (GoA 1997a).19
AusAID implemented a number of recommendations in the Simons Review, such as a 
more vigorous focus on defining strategic and program objectives as well as on allowing 
better performance measurement and reporting on aid quality. However, the mission 
statement of the organisation maintained its dual objectives of pursuing both national 
interest and poverty reduction objectives (GoA 1997b). Once again, the justification for 
this mission statement given by the Australian Government was that the two objectives 
were mutually achievable. As stated by the Australian Foreign Minister (1996—2007), the 
Hon. Alexander Downer, ‘[a]n effective and well-targeted aid program, focusing on the
19 The Simons Review also reflected a growing desire by the government for a more vigorous focus on defining strategic and program 
objectives as well as on allowing better performance measurement and reporting on aid quality.
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alleviation of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development, is clearly in the 
national interest. This view is even more relevant today as the links between regional 
development and Australia’s national interest become increasingly intertwined’ (Downer 
2006:5).
The mid 1990s also saw a significant shift in focus of the aid program away from service 
delivery activities and towards improving bureaucratic and government performance in 
recipient countries (Cirillo 2006:40). One of the most significant consequences of this 
growing governance agenda has been the continued increase in the proportion of 
Australian aid given in the form of technical assistance. As can be seen in Chart 2.2, whilst 
technical cooperation had traditionally played only a minor role in the implementation of 
Australian aid policy, its significance began to expand gradually from the mid 1980s and 
into the 1990s. By 1996 the proportion of Australian aid given as technical assistance had 
reached approximately 40 per cent of total ODA disbursements, which by the early 2000s 
had reached 50 per cent.
Chart 2.2: Australian Grant Aid (1960-2005)
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This shift in aid policy also reflects a growing sense of political and economic instability in
the region and recognition in Australia of the adverse consequences of failed or failing
states on its doorstep (ASPI 2003; ASPI 2004). The scaling-up of the governance agenda
through technical assistance was then pushed even further after the heightened security
environment established by the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and then Bali
in 2002. This led to the belief that for a stable and prosperous region to emerge, Australia
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must play a much more hands-on role in the facilitation of improved governance (Duncan 
and Chand 2002).
This hands-on, or interventionist, approach began in earnest in 2002 when Australia led a 
multinational peace-keeping force under UNMISET initially to quell violence following 
East Timor’s independence from Indonesia and then to assist in the creation of state 
institutions. Following this, Australia led RAMSI in 2003, once again to restore peace 
following the escalation of domestic conflict and then to begin a process of rebuilding the 
Solomon Islands’ weak state institutions. In 2005, Australia then deployed police and 
finance specialists to in-line positions in PNG’s bureaucracy as a means of controlling 
public sector corruption and improving the performance of the national government under 
the ECP Agreement.20 Likewise, a much smaller program of placing Australian officials in 
in-line positions was initiated with Nauru in 2001. As a result of these growing concerns 
over the establishment of functioning, effective and stable countries within its region, 
Australia now has amongst the highest proportion of its aid program delivered through 
technical assistance, and it is more than twice the average for members of the OECD DAC 
(Chart 2.3).
Chart 2.3: Proportion of ODA Disbursed as Technical Cooperation (2002—06)
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Source: OECD DAC (2008). Note: Countries are listed in descending order according to the size of their total ODA. Technical 
Assistance is defined in Appendix 3.4.
20 Notably, the police component of this deployment was scaled back following a successful legal challenge over the constitudonality of 
prosecutorial immunity by the deployed Australian police and bureaucratic officers.
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The most recent major review of the aid program was the 2006 Australian Government 
White Paper (AusAID 2006). The White Paper reiterated the dual objectives of the 
Australian aid program whilst stressing the importance of the mutually serving interests 
which it seeks to achieve. This review also outlined the government’s commitment to a 
scaling-up of aid, projected to double its 2004 level to reach A$4 billion annually by 2010 
(AusAID 2006). Within this expanding aid budget, the White Paper outlined the growing 
desire by the Australian Government to implement what it saw as performance-based 
measures in the aid program. In particular, this included allocating additional aid to those 
countries which it saw as satisfying good governance criteria as a further means of 
promoting better bureaucratic and government performance in the region.
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Past Studies
There exists a large body of literature assessing why donors give foreign aid. These studies 
have focused in particular on determining whether donors are motivated by recipient 
country need, or whether patterns of aid are determined by donors’ own self interest. On 
the recipient need side, the analysis has sought to establish the relative explanatory power 
of measures such as per capita income or other welfare indicators such as child mortality or 
education levels against a variety of self interest variables related to colonial history, trade 
and investment connections as well as security interests such as military aid or arms 
transfers between two countries (some early examples of this literature include 
Montmarquette and Dudley 1976; McKinlay and Little 1977; Maizels and Nissanke 1984).
A core finding from this literature is that, in general, donors have been influenced by both 
types of motivations (ODI 2007).21 Seminal studies such as the one by Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) also find, however, that donors tend to vary in their motivations, with multilateral 
aid being more heavily influenced by recipient need than bilateral agencies which tend to be 
motivated by self interest. In addition, some bilateral agencies generally perform better (for 
example, the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway) than others (for example, US, France or 
Japan). These preferences have also been show to vary over time with authors such as 
Berthelemy and Tichet (2004) and Berthelemy (2006) showing that whilst still limited in its
21 The earliest of this literature was produced by McKinlay and Litde (1977; 1978; 1979), Montmarquette and Dudley (1976) and Maizels 
and Nissanke (1984). McKinlay and Litde (1977; 1978; 1979) subsequendy found that the United States had relied purely on strategic 
and poliucal modvauons to determine its aid allocadons and humanitarian concerns had played an insignificant role. Likewise, Maizels 
and Nissanke (1984:891) concluded that five of the world’s major aid donors—Britain, France, Germany, Japan and US— focused 
solely on political, strategic and economic modvadons in determining how to allocate their aid.
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influence on aid allocations, the needs focus of aid did begin to increase in the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s— a situation which the authors largely attribute to the declining 
strategic motivations of aid associated with the end of the Cold War.
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991) were the first to study how foreign policy priorities 
influenced the distribution of Australian aid flows, focusing on the period 1980 to 1986. 
The authors develop a two-part modelling procedure to first estimate the decision over 
who receives foreign aid and then how much each recipient obtains.22 In measuring both 
the humanitarian needs of the recipient and the commercial interests of the donor, the 
authors follow the broader literature on aid allocation.23 To gauge strategic and political 
priorities, however, their paper justifies new indicators which measure whether a country is 
in a) the South Pacific b) Southeast Asia or c) a member of ASEAN. These measures are 
then said to reflect the strategic importance of these regions to Australia and its desire for 
influence in the ASEAN forum. The authors find that in addition to self interested 
commercial and strategic motivations, humanitarian concerns have played an important 
role in Australian aid allocations during this period.
Gounder (1994) then analysed Australian aid allocations between 1971 and 1992 utilising a 
nested modelling approach originally developed by Maizels and Nissanke (1984). This 
approach, which dominated the literature until recently, focused on the estimation of two 
separate aid allocation models. The first model explained aid allocation decisions based on 
the extent of the needs of recipients whilst the second estimated a separate equation with 
the inclusion of variables capturing the various dimensions of donor self interest. These 
two separate models of aid allocation were then compared against one another to 
determine which set of explanatory factors held the greatest sway in determining aid 
allocations.
Like McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991), Gounder (1994) includes dummy variables for 
whether a recipient country is from the South Pacific or Southeast Asia. However, in this
22 The authors also control for extreme values of the allocation data, removing Australia’s largest aid recipient PNG from the sample as 
well as setting a threshold of A$500,000 for a country to be included as a recipient. PNG is excluded largely because its special posidon 
as an ex-Australian territory meant that the decision process described for the aid allocadon model was unlikely to match that which 
was used for determining levels of PNG support. The authors also argue that the majority of aid given to PNG was in the form of 
direct budget support, which is radically different to other recipients who mainly receive project aid (McGillivray and Oczkowski 
1991:149).
23 This includes per capita income, population levels and a dummy variable for whether the country is classified as a Least Developed 
Country (LDQ, whilst the recipient’s share of total Australian exports is used to measure commercial interests.
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case, the variables are included as part of the recipient need specifications whilst Australia’s 
strategic interests are measured by whether Australia gives military aid to a recipient 
country and if so how much.24 Both models are then estimated to have a significant 
influence on the Australian Government’s allocation decisions, supporting McGillivray and 
Oczkowski’s (1991) results.
Following this, a number of studies began to consider the motivations of Australian aid to 
individual aid recipients to explore within-country as well as cross-country variations in 
allocation behaviour.23 Gounder and Doessel (1997), for example, considered the 
determinants of Australian aid to Indonesia using time series data between 1978 and 1994. 
Using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and time series methods to estimate two nested 
models representing recipient need and donor interest, the results again suggested that both 
concerns had been relevant to Australia’s decisions about giving aid to Indonesia. Unlike 
Gounder (1994), however, in this case the authors also conducted tests where both models 
are combined into a single ‘non nested’ specification, revealing that the recipient need 
model dominated the donor interest. This, the authors argue, suggests a more significant 
role for altruistic motivations of Australian aid to Indonesia.
Using the same methodology and explanatory variables, Gounder (1999) and Gounder and 
Sen (1999) then consider the determinants of Australian aid to PNG and Indonesia 
between 1970 and 1995. In both cases, the nested modelling procedure reveals that both 
recipient need and donor interest have played a significant role in motivating Australian aid. 
In the PNG case, the non nested estimations also reveal, however, that the recipient need 
variables dominate donor interest as the primary motivating factor in Australian aid 
allocations.
McGillivray (2003a) then marked a turning point in the aid allocation literature, providing a 
synthesis of the potentially inaccurate methodologies adopted in many aid allocation 
papers, including those for Australia. The first point raised was the focus on comparing 
competing recipient need and donor interest models in much of the previous literature (as 
per Gounder and Doessel 1997; Gounder 1999; Gounder and Sen 1999). The problem was 
that if both the nested models were posited a priori to influence aid allocations, then each 
of the nested models must also suffer from omitted variable bias. McGillivray (2003a) also
24 Other typical explanatory variables for donor interest are also included, such as investment flows between Australia and the recipient.
25 This has helped to overcome the implicit assumption in purely cross-sectional studies that ‘the observed relationship is homogenous 
across all countries in the regression’ (Gounder 1999:237).
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highlights the failure of ‘the overwhelming majority of aid allocation studies’ to take 
account of the truncated nature of the aid data in the estimation process, with many using 
inappropriate estimation techniques which have the potential to place a significant bias on 
the estimated coefficients (McGillivray 2003a: 12).26
McGillivray and Feeny (2004) contributed further to the modelling approach of Australian 
aid, concentrating in particular on allocations made to PNG. This paper of theirs develops 
a ‘concordance of mandates’ approach, highlighting that aid allocation decisions to one 
country are jointly determined with decisions for all other recipients. The authors develop a 
system of simultaneous equations to control for the interdependency amongst the various 
allocation equations. Using data between 1968 and 1999, the paper finds in contrast to 
previous studies that both Australia and other major donors have allocated aid to PNG on 
the basis of need rather than self interest. The authors argue that this is a welcome result as 
increasing aid flows in response to humanitarian concerns is likely to have a larger ‘growth 
payoff than self interested aid flows.2,
2.2.2 R esearch Gap
One limitation of recent assessments of Australian aid motivations has been the focus 
placed on aggregate estimates over time. Gounder (1999), for example, provides results 
which are aggregated between 1970 and 1996 and the results of Feeny and McGillivray 
(2004) are aggregated between 1969 and 1999.28 As discussed, however, Australia, like other 
aid donors, has been motivated by a range of factors in the distribution of its aid program 
which have changed over time. What impact have these changing motivations had on the 
allocation priorities of the aid program? Are the critics’ suggestions that the effectiveness of 
the Australian aid program has been compromised by its growing national interest priorities 
correct? Or has Australia managed to allocate aid on the basis of national interest without 
compromising its focus on humanitarian need?
26 After discussing these issues, McGillivray (2003) then utilised a two-part sample selection model to esumate the motivauons for US aid 
allocadon for 96 developing countries and found that the shift towards development criteria as a mouvauon for donors has not been as 
large as calculated by the previous literature.
27 One drawback of this approach is the requirement to esumate separate equadons for each Australian aid recipient. Given the 
complexity of compledng this exercise for all Australian aid recipients, the authors concentrate the model on the ten largest aid 
recipients and aggregate all other aid allocations into a residual esumadon. The first 11 of these equadons explain the allocadon 
decisions of Australian and total aid to the largest recipients of Australian aid, whilst the 12th explains total aid flows to all other 
developing countries.
28 Notably, Gounder (1994) does provide yearly results between 1969 and 1992. However, it only uses nested models of recipient need 
and donor interest which, as discussed, are likely to suffer from significant omitted variable bias.
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Another important gap in the literature which this chapter seeks to address is to determine 
which factors have been responsible for Australia’s growing shift towards delivering 
foreign aid through technical assistance. This question holds particular significance for 
Australia given that it now gives more aid in the form of technical assistance than any other 
major bilateral donor. As shall be shown, determining which factors have been responsible 
for changes in the composition as well as the volume of aid distributions gives important 
insights into the motivations of Australian aid.
2.3 A M odel o f A ustralian  Aid A llocation
This chapter augments an aid allocation model of the type originally developed by 
Montmarquette and Dudley (1976) which, as discussed, has provided the foundation for 
much of the subsequent literature on non simultaneous estimation of aid allocation.29 This 
approach hypothesises that the donor nation generates utility from consuming two separate 
goods— foreign aid (F) and other goods (X).
U = g(X, F)  (2.1)
where F is the consumption of foreign aid by the donor i in country j ,  so that F can be 
defined as the sum of expenditures from giving aid to n recipients.
F  = % Fi (2.2)
7=1
The utility obtained by Australia for giving a total amount of aid, Aj t , to a recipient, j ,  at
time t is then assumed to depend upon a number of factors relating to needs of the 
recipient (R ), donor self interest such as commercial motivations (I ) and colonial
heritage (c.)* Australia’s motivations for giving aid are, however, also intrinsically related to
the geographic proximity of the numerous South Pacific states which make up the arc of 
instability. In order to capture the impact that the geographic proximity of these countries 
has on Australian aid allocation, an additional distance term ,/^, is also included in the
utility function. In essence, this variable reflects the additional national interest which 
Australia derives from delivering aid to those countries which are geographically closer to 
itself after controlling for each of the other traditional determinants of aid flows. So 
Equation (2.2) can be re-written as:
29 As discussed, Feeny and McGillivray (2004) extend the literature by modellinginter temporal Australian aid allocations by focusing on 
the bureaucratic decision-making process. Public servants in charge of the aid agency seek to maximise a utility function, where the 
utility obtained from giving aid to one country is joindy determined by the amount of aid that recipient receives from other aid donors. 
Given that this paper is concerned with aid allocadon to all Australian aid recipients as well as all non Australian aid recipients, the 
methodology developed by Feeny and McGillivray (2004) would become excessively cumbersome should it be applied to this 
circumstance.
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(2.3)F = i i F = i ±  F(Rj j , Ij j , Cj , Dj ). Aj ,/=i j=i (=1 j=\
As indicated, the expected effects of marginal changes in each can be represented by:
i L > 0; - ^ > 0; ^ > 0; - ^ > 0 ; ^ < 0
dA dR 3/ dC dD77 j.i i j  77 77
(2.4)
Assuming the functional form of g(.) follows the familiar Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
the utility generated by Australia from giving foreign aid to recipient j  can be written as:
7- „ ArtR * I filC J
p  ___^  ^  j j  j ■' j <‘ j
z=i j—i Z)r (2.5)
where for an interior solution the following parameters are constrained by:
0 < y < 1; 0 < <p < 1; 0 < p < 1; 0<7/<1;0< t <1.
The Walrasian budget constraint of the donor for time t is given by:
Y = X + Y Jp ia
7=1
7 7 (2 .6)
where Pj  is the population of country j  and a j is the per capita aid receipt such that the 
decision by Australia to supply a . dollars of foreign aid to country j  can be found by 
solving:
m a x ^ X .F )  s.t. (2.5) and (2.6)
The Lagrangian can thus be written as:
max e = g(X,F) +MY ~ X - Z I . P l , a',)
/=1 7=1 (2.7)
which gives the following first order conditions:
dt 2 n
ä T * ' - A = 0
(2 .8)
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(2.10)
In this case, the Australian Government chooses a marginal rate of substitution between 
supplying foreign aid to a particular recipient and other goods by:
which solves to:
y p alar-'R*Ip c ,,D:T yApa ar-1/  1 JJ  JJ  JJ JJ  J J _  J r J , t  j j
2 A
— = rpl<
§x
(2.11)
(2.12)
For a utility maximising allocation, Australia has a constant marginal rate of substitution 
between recipient countries, which is determined by:
au D’
J
i-r
where k  is the price (opportunity cost) of Australia’s decision to give foreign aid equal to 
an to country j. For the purpose of estimation, total foreign aid (Ajt) to country j  is then
given by:
a,, ■ Pj,
p a R’ l 'C !r  J.i JJ  J,i J
D\
J
JA
which solves to give:
A
JJ K
p T ’K W
DTj
2.4 E stim ation
2.4.1 T he  E m pirica l M odel
Taking natural logarithms of Equation (2.13) to linearise the model gives:
(2.13)
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M A ,) = ß„ + ß t !n( pi t ) + ß, ln( Rjt) + ß, ln( /„ )
+ ß M c l) -ßMD,)+ ißy»+e„
5=1
(2.14)
where Ysßs is a vector of coefficients for time period dummies to be included in the
5=1
pooled sample. Given Equations (2.13-2.14), the coefficients of the model can then be 
interpreted as:
Ä  = ln(Z > ß
K
1 + a - 7  n <P
\ - y  2 1 - y
_n_
1 - 7
Ä
- T
r - i  ‘
For i = \,...n and where £  j t is an error term with E(£}J) = 0, E(£jt)2 = a 2 and the expected
signs of the coefficients follow the hypothesis of the structural model presented in 
Equation (2.14).
2.4.2 E s tim a tio n  Issues
A principal estimation issue involved in aid allocation studies is choosing which countries 
to include as part of the aid recipient sample. Some previous studies have selected only 
those countries which have received a positive value of Australian aid as their sample (for 
example, Gounder 1994). This approach does, however, exclude a significant amount of 
important information from the model. Australia’s decision not to allocate aid to a 
particular country may be just as informative as its decision to allocate aid to another. 
Estimating this type of model with OLS or dynamic estimation procedures also truncates 
the error term of the estimation to be above zero (McGillivray 2003a:4) which can cause a 
downward bias in the coefficient estimates (Wooldridge 2003:93).30
An alternative method to excluding non aid recipients is to include every developing 
country in the sample. In this case, however, a number of other issues are raised. For small 
aid donors such as Australia this means that zero-value aid flows will account for a large 
proportion of the observations, with bilateral aid observations taking on only strictly 
positive values (Berthelemy 2006:184). The most common method of controlling for this 
situation has been through the Tobit Type I estimation technique (McGillivray 2003a; 
Alesina and Dollar 2005; Canavire et al. 2005). This approach was developed by Tobin 
(1958) and supposes that there is a latent, that is, unobservable, variable which linearly 
depends on the vector of explanatory variables. The observable variable is defined to be 
equal to the latent variable whenever the latent variable is above zero and zero otherwise.
30 As quoted by McGillivray (2003:4): ‘[rjesults will almost always be biased if there is non random self selectivity in the data. This applies 
to not only OLS, but all estimation techniques which do not recognise the limited (non negative, non zero) nature of aid allocadons.’
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This can be written as:
T = Ä V JJ+ ^  (2.15)
\ , = K  iff K  >0 (2.16)
Ajj = 0  iff A /  <0 \ /t  = \, .. .,N (2.17)
where A', is the latent aid allocadon variable at time /, A , is the actual observable aid 
variable, Vjris the vector of explanatory variables and the error terms are assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed such that/r, ~ N(0,a) . This approach assumes there 
is an underlying stochastic index equal to ^ vVjt + ju/t which is observed only when it is
positive, therefore qualifying it as an unobserved latent variable (McDonald and Moffitt 
1980:318).
One disadvantage of the Tobit Type 1 method cited by authors such as Berthelemy and 
Tichet (2004:259) is that it produces only a single set of estimates summarising the overall 
impact of the explanatory variables on aid recipients. This problem emerges because Tobit 
Type I coefficients summarise the effects of three different conditional means within the 
model— those of the latent aid variable (A,), the observed dependent variable (A;I) and 
the uncensored observed dependent variable (An I A, > 0) (Roneck 1992:503).
As a result, the marginal effects of each explanatory variable in Tobit Type I models are not 
clear from the ordinary coefficient estimates (Sigelman and Zeng 1999:170). As McDonald 
and Moffit (1980) outline, this has caused many studies using the Tobit Type I model to 
misinterpret their results. One way in which researchers have dealt with this issue in the aid 
allocation literature is to focus on the sign and significance of the aggregated (latent) Tobit 
coefficients, as was done in McGillivray (2003a) and in Alesina and Dollar (2005).31
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) show, however, that the marginal effect of the explanatory 
variables on the observed dependent variable can be further decomposed into each of its 
two parts. This chapter adopts this decomposition method to calculate firstly the effect of 
each independent variable on aid allocations when it is in a non limit, that is, non zero,
31 Long (1997:207) argues that if the principal concern is on the latent dependent variable, then the Type I coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted similarly to those obtained from ordinary OLS results. However, if the outcome variable actually summarises two separate 
processes over the latent variable and these separate processes are of interest, this approach is no longer valid.
33
case; secondly, to calculate the change in the probability of aid allocations being above 
zero, again weighted by the expected value of aid allocations if they are above zero 
(McDonald and Moffitt 1980:319).32 In effect, this gives the impact of each of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of having a non zero observation (Roneck 
1992:503).33
2.5 D a ta  C ollection and  M easu rem en t 
2.5.1 M easu ring  D onor In te rest
Australian self interest is captured through a variety of measures. Commercial 
considerations are measured by including country J s receipt of Australian exports as a 
percentage of Australian gross domestic product (GDP). This measure reflects the 
importance of each aid recipient as a destination of Australian exports. Data for this 
variable was obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade 
(2007) and International Financial Statistics’ (2007) database.
The distance between Australia and the recipient is included to capture the influence of a 
recipient’s regional proximity to Australia on the amount of aid it receives. This variable 
reflects Australia’s motivation in assisting those countries which are closest to itself after 
controlling for other typical determinants of aid dispersion. The geographical proximity 
variable helps to overcome a number of limitations of traditional measures of Australia’s 
strategic priorities, such as arms transfers or military expenditure. One of the limitations is 
that a majority of the SIDS of the South Pacific have zero (or unrecorded) values for these 
types of variables.
A second limitation is that the security concerns of the Australian aid program are less 
likely to be related to the military might of recipients per se than to a potential security 
breakdown, creating adverse consequences through humanitarian and economic migration 
or organised crime syndicates (Alpers 2005:58; AusAID 2006). In fact, it is conceivable that
32 The Tobit estimation method is also useful because the logarithmic transformation of zero-value aid flows is undefined (that is, 
negative infinity), which in turn requires either truncating the data set or censoring the zero-value trade flows. As already discussed, 
whilst it has been an approach adopted by others, truncaung the data set is not an option as it discards a large amount of legitimate 
information from the model. Foster (1986:111) and Gujarati (1995:387) suggest that for such cases the variables of interest may simply 
be re-centred, which is done by adding to each observation the absolute value of the minimum taken by the variable plus one. This 
approach is also adopted in a number of studies from the trade literature, most recently in Todo and Kimura (2007:10). One dollar is 
added to all zero responses, which results in jn(0 ) =  T  = 0 > where, 7 = 7- = q •
33 It must be highlighted, however, that the coefficient estimates from this decomposition must be evaluated at some value of X ß . which 
is typically taken at the mean value of the explanatory variables (that is, evaluated at X ß ) -  It is incorrect to generalise the interpretation 
of the coefficient estimates to the sample as a whole (Kang 2005).
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in some instances a greater control of force by governments in the region may actually 
strengthen the security situation, leading donors to allocate less foreign aid to the respective 
country. For example, if the Solomon Islands Government had a more extensively 
equipped military and/or police force, the 2001 Australian-led RAMSI intervention may 
not have been required following the escalation of ethnic tensions.
The distance data used in this chapter measures the great-circle distance34 between capital 
cities and is sourced from Byers (2007). As a check for robustness, alternate estimations are 
also made using total military expenditure of the recipient as a percentage of its GDP as 
well as total arms imports and exports. Data limitations restrict the sample size of 
observations and reduce the time period to 1988—2004. This data is sourced from the 
World Bank (2008a) and measured in constant 2005 US$. Estimations will also be made 
with regional dummies for the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia and Africa to determine 
whether the distance effect can simply be captured by these typical regional effects or 
whether the proximity is better captured by a continuous measure, such as distance, which 
allows for variations in impact within regions.
The final measure of donor interest is the net amount of non Australian aid flows allocated 
to each recipient country, including both multilateral and bilateral aid. On the one hand, 
these other aid flows can be seen as a substitute for Australian aid so that recipients which 
receive large quantities of aid from other donors require, ceteris paribus, less assistance from 
Australia and vice-versa. On the other hand, a large number of authors have also found 
that many donors allocate more aid to countries already receiving high aid flows. Dudley 
and Montmarquette (1976:137) were the first to report this effect, terming it the 
‘bandwagon strategy’ as it allows the donor to top-up already existing aid flows to increase 
the perceived impact of its own aid. As a result, the expected sign of the other aid 
coefficient will be ambiguous, depending on which effect dominates. This data is sourced 
from the OECD DAC database and measured in constant 2005 US$.
2.5.2 M easu ring  R ecip ient N e ed
GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth are used to capture recipient need, both in a 
static sense (measured by income levels) and in a dynamic sense (measured by changes in 
income). The inclusion of these variables is in keeping with practices in the broader 
literature, and whilst by no means perfect indicators of recipient need, they do capture the
34 The great-circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the surface of a sphere measured along a path on the 
surface of the sphere (as opposed to going through the sphere's interior).
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prevailing economic situation in the recipient country and reflect Australian perceptions of 
need. This data is converted from constant 1985 international dollars to constant 2005 US$ 
with data taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) (2007). Income-based measures of 
recipient need are also augmented with a welfare variable measuring infant mortality rates.33 
This data is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database.36
A measure of institutional quality is also incorporated as part of the recipient need 
specifications for two reasons. Firstly, Australia has expressed a growing desire to allocate 
additional funds to those governments which are perceived as satisfying good governance 
criteria. This measure is incorporated as part of the recipient need specification given that 
an increasing amount of literature has shown aid tends to be more effective when delivered 
to those countries where the quality of economic policies and governance capacity are 
highest (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002; Burnside and Dollar 2004). 
Allocating more aid to countries which improve the quality of their governance is 
therefore, ceteris paribus, likely to enhance the poverty-reducing impact of Australian aid.37 
Secondly, the inclusion of this variable will also allow the estimation to ascertain whether 
Australia has been increasingly motivated by policy-based selectivity in the current decade 
or whether the variety of other motivations have limited its ability to carry through with 
this aspiration. To measure this effect, a rule of law variable is included to proxy for the 
overall governance environment of recipient countries. This variable is taken from World 
Bank (2008a) and is an index ranging from -2.5 (poor) to 2.5 (good).
2.5.3 Measuring Colonial History
To control for colonial history three measures are employed. For Australia, historical 
relationships are strongly influenced by its British colonial legacy. As such, a dummy 
variable measuring whether country j  is an ex-British colony or protectorate is included. 
The list covers 74 countries (see Appendix 2.1). The second is a variable measuring what 
fraction of the recipient population speaks English to measure the depth of these historical 
colonial relationships. The third is a cumulative measure of the fraction of the population
35 This variable offers a number of advantages over other aggregate welfare measures such as life expectancy. Firsdy, it is much more 
responsive to changes in the prevailing economic, social and political conditions of a country as opposed to life expectancy which 
changes only very slowly over long periods. Secondly, it is a discrete variable which measures outcomes and is easily observable. Lasdy, 
and potenually because of these first two reasons, it is perhaps the most commonly collected data in most developing countries, giving 
a rich data source with a reduced potential for bias as opposed to other prospective measures such as literacy rates.
36 For a number of countries this data is subject to missing values for multiple years. In these cases, the missing observations have been 
linearly extrapolated for missing, and in the event that the last observation was before the final year of the sample, the mortality rate 
was assumed to remain constant.
37 Whilst these studies have been subsequendy disputed in the wider aid effectiveness literature (see, for example, Easterly 2003), there is 
litde doubt of the impact that their findings have had on the mind set of aid donors (Wood 2008:1125).
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which speaks a European language (including English), included to capture the historical 
linkages which Australia’s aid recipients may have to other European donors. Both of these 
linguistic variables are taken from Hall and Jones (1999) and extended to a number of 
South Pacific countries as described in Appendix 2.2.
2.5.4 O ther M easurem ent Issues
For the dependent variable, total net bilateral ODA flows between Australia and recipient j  
are taken from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid disbursements 
database and measured in constant 2005 US$.38 The technical assistance component of 
total ODA is defined as per OECD (1991), which states that it includes ‘assistance 
activities designed to improve the level of knowledge, skills, technical know-how, or 
productive aptitudes of a population in a developing country’. Recipient country 
population is taken from the Penn World Tables v6.2 and measured in thousands of people 
(Heston et al. 2006).
In keeping with the literature, all explanatory variables are lagged by one period to avoid 
simultaneity bias. This approach is also appropriate because decisions over aid allocation 
are generally made at the beginning of each budgetary cycle— hence they are not influenced 
by current period outcomes. Given the importance of Pacific Island countries to Australia’s 
aid program, missing information for a number of these variables was collected from a 
variety of regional sources such as the Pacific Regional Information System (PRISM). A 
full list of these additions and an explanation of it can be found in Appendix 2.2. The 
summary statistics for each of these core variables are displayed below in Table 2.1.
For the core model, the data set includes data for 160 aid recipient countries, 136 of which 
Australia has given aid to between 1980 and 2005.39 This sample includes 2,964 
observations, of which 1,515 are non zero in Australian aid. The maximum aid amount is 
US$538 million which was given to PNG in 1980, whereas the smallest amount was given 
to Botswana in 1999 at US$10,000. The closest aid recipient capital city to Canberra is 
Noumea in New Caledonia, whilst the furthest is Rabat in Morocco. The most populous 
aid recipient is China, with a population of 1.29 billion in 2005, and the smallest is Niue 
with a population of 1,200 in 2004.
38 Feeny and McGillivray (2004:107) provide a discussion of the relauve merits of using commitment versus actual disbursement data. In 
the present case, the quality of Australian commitment data was not of sufficient quality for the sample of countries under 
consideration, limiting the choice to the use of disbursements.
39 Palestine is not included in any of the estimations, which received an average US$2.8 million of Australian ODA since 1992.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Non Censored Sample
V a riab le D e sc r ip t io n O b s M ea n Std . D M in M ax
O D A N atu ra l lo g arith m  o f  O D A  
rece ip ts m easu red  in c o n s ta n t 
2006 US$
2,964 7.16 7.25 0.00 20.09
T A /O D A P ro p o r tio n  o f  O D A  given  in 
the  fo rm  o f  tech n ica l assistance.
2,964 0.55 0.39 0.00 1.00
R gdpch N a tu ra l lo g arith m  o f  real G D P  
p e r cap ita
2,964 8.09 1.02 5.14 10.81
R g d p ch g R eal G D P  p e r  cap ita  g ro w th 2,964 0.01 0.14 -0.63 6.23
In fm o rt N a tu ra l lo g arith m  o f  in fan t 
m o rta lity
2,964 3.74 0.88 0.69 5.25
R ule R ule o f  law  In d ex 2,964 -0.24 0.74 -2.17 1.85
O th o d a N a tu ra l lo g arith m  o f  o th e r  
O D A  rece ip ts
2,964 16.67 5.80 0.00 22.66
E x p o rtsg d p A ustra lian  ex p o rts  to  rec ip ien t j 
as a p ro p o r tio n  o f  A ustra lian  
G D P
2,964 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
D is t N a tu ra l lo g arith m  o f  d is tance 
b e tw een  d o n o r  an d  rec ip ien t
2,964 9.36 0.41 7.91 9.79
A rm strad e T o ta l a rm s trad e  in rec ip ien t j 2,964 95.80 378.00 0.00 5,660.00
M ilitaryex M ilitary e x p en d itu re  as a p e r 
c e n t o f  G D P
2,667 4.48 43.10 0.00 1,457.00
P o p N a tu ra l lo g arith m  o f  p o p u la tio n 2,964 8.79 1.84 4.07 14.07
E n g frac F rac tio n  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  
speak ing  E ng lish
2,964 0.07 0.23 0.00 1.00
E u rfra c F rac tio n  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  
speak ing  E u ro p e a n
2,964 0.17 0.34 0.00 1.00
B rco l B ritish  co lo n y  d u m m y 2,964 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Pic Pacific  Is land  d u m m y 2,964 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
A siae E a s t A sia d u m m y 2,964 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
A frica A frica  d u m m y 2,964 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
2.6 Estimation Results
2.6.1 Aggregate Model (1980-2005)
To begin, Table 2.2 presents the OLS and latent Tobit coefficient results for the full 25 
year sample in columns 1 and 2, respectively.40 The decomposed coefficients are then 
presented in column 3, which shows marginal effects conditional on the dependent variable 
being uncensored, and column 4 presents the impact of each of the explanatory variables 
on the probability of being uncensored.
40 All estimations were carried out using STATA Version 9.1. Due to coding requirements, the program was converted to Version 8 for 
the marginal effect calculations.
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Table 2.2: Core Model Estimation Results with Marginal Effects (1980-2005)
O DA: 1980- 
2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
O LS T ob it M arginal E ffects
Latent Cond. Prob.
U ncensored U ncensored
R R gdpch1 -1.492 -1.814 -0.823 -0.088
(0.176)** (0.288)** (0.131)** (0.014)**
R R gdpchg2 -0.024 -0.770 -0.349 -0.037
(0.708) (1.339) (0.608) (0.065)
R In fm ort3 -0.296 0.421 0.191 0.020
(0.183) (0.350) (0.159) (0.017)
R Rule4 1.138 1.816 0.824 0.088
(0.201)** (0.306)** (0.139)** (0.015)**
I O th o d a5 0.284 0.882 0.400 0.043
(0.017)** (0.054)** (0.024)** (0.003)**
I E xportsgdp6 -142.346 -26.940 -12.225 -1.307
(147.147) (235.557) (106.887) (11.427)
I D istj7 -8.974 -14.142 -6.417 -0.686
(0.321)** (0.463)** (0.210)** (0.022)**
C E ngfrac8’* -0.332 -0.268 -0.122 -0.013
(0.383) (0.775) (0.352) (0.038)
C E urfrac9’* -0.040 1.843 0.836 0.089
(0.410) (0.589)** (0.267)** (0.029)**
C B rcol10’* 4.311 7.421 3.605 0.334
(0.223)** (0.392)** (0.178)** (0.019)**
Pop 1.142 1.690 0.767 0.082
(0.058)** (0.107)** (0.049)** (0.005)**
C onstan t 89.715 118.346 53.701 5.741
(3.878)** (5.553)** (2.520) ** (0.269) **
O bs. 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964
U ncens/C ens - 1,515/1,449 - -
O LS R2 0.580 0.580 - -
Pseudo R2 - 0.157 - -
9 V * F(4) = 19.96 F(4) = 19.96
Prob> F = 0.000 Prob>F = 0.000
^5,7 F(3) = 764.08 F(3) = 764.08
Prob> F = 0.000 Prob> F =0.000
'P 8,10 F(3) = 128.69 F(3) = 128.69
Prob> F = 0.000 Prob>F =0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level; Time dummies 
excluded from table. (*) dF/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (**) F-Test for joint 
significance of R, I and C categories (that is, that each coefficient equals zero). In each estimation the 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared (y2) test indicates that each of the equations are individually significant with at 
least one of the predictors’ regression coefficients not being equal to zero at a 99 per cent confidence interval.
The OLS coefficients indicate firstly that of the four recipient need variables, only real 
GDP per capita and the rule of law coefficients have had a significant impact on aid 
allocations, with more aid going to countries with lower per capita incomes and better 
policy performance. Other intuitively signed and significant explanatory variables include 
the distance term, other ODA, the British colony dummy and recipient population size; 
GDP growth, child mortality, exports and the two linguistic measures of colonial 
connection are all insignificant.
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Consistent with the theory outlined in McGillivray (2003a), the OLS results put a 
downward bias on each of the significant OLS coefficient estimates once they have been 
adjusted with the Tobit estimation method. Nevertheless, in terms of sign and significance 
nearly all the OLS results are repeated in the latent Tobit coefficients. Firstly, real GDP per 
capita again has a highly statistically significant negative coefficient, whilst the rule 
coefficient is significant and positive, supporting the notion that Australia has had a 
preference for aiding the poorest populations and for giving assistance to those countries 
which have better performing institutions.
In terms of donor interest, the highly significant and positive coefficient on the distance 
variable indicates that Australia has allocated significantly more aid to countries in the 
region even after controlling for shared colonial history, trade linkages and levels of 
regional poverty. The other donor ODA variable is also highly significant and positive, 
indicating that Australia has tended to allocate more aid to countries which already receive 
high levels of aid from other donors. One interpretation of this result is that Australia has 
been susceptible to bandwagon effects in its aid allocation during this 1980—2005 period.
Trade motivations appear not to have had a significant impact on the allocation decisions 
of Australia’s aid program over the last 25 years, with the exports to GDP coefficient 
remaining both negatively signed and insignificant. The colonial heritage variables differ 
from the OLS estimations with both the British colony and European language variables 
recording significant and positively signed coefficients. The British colony variable 
illustrates the clear bias that Australia displays towards giving foreign aid to its historical 
colonial partners—beyond the fact that many happen to be located in close geographic 
proximity. The eurfrac coefficient indicates, however, that this bias extends not only to 
Australia’s British heritage but also to countries which share a European colonial heritage.41
The final three rows of Table 2.2 also provide a number of joint significance F-Tests for 
each of the recipient need 0P14), donor interest OP57) and colonial heritage CP810) 
categories. Consistent with much of the previous literature on the motivations of 
Australian aid allocation, these results suggest that Australia has been driven by all three of 
these motivations in determining its aid allocation over the last 25 years.
41 This could be represented, for example, by countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma which have a strong francophone 
connection yet receive significant quantities of Australian aid.
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To measure the fit of the model to the data, two measures are used. The first is a pseudo- 
R2 calculated according to the method described by Sribney (1997). The second is a simple 
adjusted-R2 from the OLS estimation of the model. The reason this second variable is 
included is because of the limitations of the pseudo-R2 measure which can place a 
significant downward bias on the supposed explanatory power of the Tobit model (this 
issue is discussed in Appendix 2.3). The pseudo-R2 reports a figure of 0.16 whilst the OLS 
method indicates a relatively high explanatory power of the model with an adjusted-R2 of 
0.58.
The results presented in column 3 and 4 demonstrate the disaggregation of the latent 
coefficients into their two separate effects. These estimates also allow an analysis of the 
relative size of the core coefficient estimates. Here it is observed, for example, that a one 
percentage point increase in real GDP per capita leads, ceteris paribus, to an approximately 
0.8 per cent decline in aid receipts and a 0.09 per cent decrease in the probability of 
receiving any aid at all. Similarly, a one per cent increase in aid received from other donors 
leads on average to a 0.4 per cent increase in aid from Australia and a 0.043 per cent 
increase in their probability of receiving aid. Both of these effects are highly statistically 
significant.
A one percentage point increase in population is shown to lead to an approximately 0.77 
per cent increase in foreign aid receipts. Given this coefficient is less than one, it also 
indicates that in per capita terms Australia has tended to give more foreign aid to countries 
with smaller populations. This effect may be partly explained by the many fixed costs 
associated with aid delivery and the economies of scale achievable in larger aid programs. 
Smaller aid programs, for example, require a relatively higher number of administrative 
staff per dollar spent as opposed to those delivered in larger countries with larger projects. 
In addition, a 1 per cent increase in population size increases the likelihood, ceteris paribus, 
that a country will receive foreign aid from Australia by approximately 0.08 per cent. This 
small coefficient size may reflect the tendency for donors to allocate foreign aid to places 
where it is believed to have the greatest impact. In other words, a given quantity of money 
will be more visible in a small rather than a large country.
The final variable of interest is the distance effect. Here it is observed that, ceteris paribus, a 1 
per cent increase in distance from Australia leads both to a 6.4 per cent decline in aid 
receipts for those already receiving assistance and a 0.7 per cent decline in the likelihood of 
receiving Australian aid. Given that all of the other typical determinants of aid allocation
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have been controlled for, it may be reasonable to assess this effect as being representative 
of the greater importance that countries closer to Australia have in achieving the security 
and strategic objectives of its aid program.
2.6.2 Disaggregated Model (1980—2005)
In the previous table, the aid allocation decisions made by Australia over the last 25 years 
were aggregated into a single estimation. This pooling of aid receipts may be aggregating 
important changes in the composition and motivations of Australia’s aid allocations. 
Hence, this section estimates the model for four different periods. The first from 1980 to 
1984 represents the pre Jackson Review period, the second from 1985 to 1990 the 
immediate post Jackson Review, the third from 1991 to 1996 the pre Simons Review 
period and the fourth from 1997 to 2004 the post Simons Review period. Table 2.3 below 
presents the results.
The first major trend seen across the time periods is the decline in size of the real GDP per 
capita coefficient across the first three periods, which becomes insignificant in the post 
Simons Review period. When combined with the continued insignificance of both the real 
GDP per capita growth and infant mortality variables, this finding indicates a declining 
impetus of recipient need in the motivations of Australian aid, particularly in the post 
Simons Review era. Another explanation for this finding is the increasing significance of 
the distance coefficient in the post Simons Review period— suggesting that Australia has, 
ceteris paribus, been placing a growing focus on allocating aid towards countries within its 
immediate region. This situation may thus reflect how growing regional priorities of aid can 
impact negatively on the ability of aid resources to be directed towards those countries with 
the lowest per capita incomes.
The deterioration of the welfare focus of aid in the post Simons Review period is also 
reflected by the increase in policy-based selectivity during the 1990s. Following a 
statistically significant coefficient estimate in the pre Jackson Review period, the rule of law 
variable becomes insignificant in the post Jackson Review period but then returns as a 
highly significant explanatory variable in the pre and post Simons Review periods. This 
trend is supported at the global level by authors such as Berthelemy and Tichit (2004:271) 
who find that the most effective mechanism for developing countries to increase their 
donor assistance during the 1990s was to improve the quality of their domestic institutions. 
Moreover, these authors find that this effect is particularly large in regard to Australian
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assistance, with an institutional bonus seven and a half times higher than that for the 
average donor.42
Table 2.3: Australian Aid Allocations by Major Period (1980—2005)
ODA: 1980- 
2005
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation T ob it-L aten t T ob it-L atent T ob it-L aten t T ob it-L aten t
Type
Period 1980-1984 1985-1990 1991-1996 1997-2005
Pre Jackson P ost Jackson Pre S im ons P ost S im on s
R R gdpch1 -3.463 -2.403 -2.093 -0.360
(0.736)** (0.527)** (0.548)** (0.528)
R Rgdpchg2 3.119 1.549 3.363 -3.369
(5.852) (4.937) (3.309) (3.014)
R In fm ort3 0.463 -0.357 0.624 1.136
(1.008) (0.692) (0.705) (0.581)
R Rule4 3.358 0.962 1.555 1.902
(0.786)** (0.519) (0.586)** (0.589)**
I O th o d a5 0.830 0.693 0.823 1.043
(0.132)** (0.096)** (0.111)** (0.099)**
I E xportsgdp6 205.986 1,081.356 372.987 -954.139
(704.818) (609.399) (391.334) (412.854)*
I D istj7 -12.367 -12.240 -12.589 -17.421
(1.253)** (0.842)** (0.861)** (0.874)**
C E ngfrac8’* 2.496 -2.590 -0.893 -0.185
(2.182) (1.451) (1.386) (1.446)
C E urfrac9-* 2.338 5.652 2.617 -2.128
(1.634) (1.060)** (1.084)* (1.106)
C Brcol10>* 8.433 9.185 7.811 5.254
(1.023)** (0.699)** (0.733)** (0.722)**
Pop 1.809 1.389 1.422 2.029
(0.307)** (0.199)** (0.191)** (0.203)**
C onstant 112.772 115.980 117.504 146.639
(13.591)** (9.261)** (9.616)** (9.247)**
O bs. 345 683 794 1142
U ncens/C ens 185/160 402/281 429 /365 643 /499
O LS R2 0.654 0.604 0.572 0.579
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.149 0.152 0.171
F(4)= 9.76 F(4) = 7.34 F(4) = 8.02 F(4) = 3.68
Prob >F = 0.00 Prob >F =0.00 Prob>F =0.00 Prob > F = 0.00
T  5,7 F(3) = 41.13 F(3) = 84.37 F(3) = 82.18 F(3) = 138.15
Prob>F =0.00 Prob>F =0.00 Prob>F =0.00 Prob>F =0.00
T  8,10 F(3) =26.13 F(3) = 59.48 F(3) = 39.73 F(3) = 22.37
Prob>F =0.00 Prob>F =0.00 Prob>F =0.00 Prob > F = 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level; Time dummies excluded from table. (*) 
dF/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (**) F-Test for joint significance of R, I and C categories 
(that is, that each coefficient equals zero). In each estimation the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared (x2) test indicates that each 
of the equations are individually significant with at least one of the predictors’ regression coefficients not being equal to 
zero at a 99 per cent confidence interval._____________________________________________________________________
The remaining elements of donor interest also change considerably across these periods. 
The exports to GDP variable remains insignificant in the first three periods but becomes 
significant at a 95 per cent confidence level in the final period with a negative coefficient
42 This result coincides with those of Alesina and Dollar (2000) who conclude that political rights have had a positive impact on the 
amount of aid allocated by Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, the UK and the US. Likewise 
Alesina and Weder (2002) find that only Australia and the Scandinavian countries give more aid to countries with low levels of 
corruption whilst the US, the UK, Canada, Italy, Germany, Spain and Switzerland are not influenced by the recipient’s policy 
environment.
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sign. This result is counter intuitive, suggesting that Australia actually gave less aid to 
countries with which it had increased trade relations during 1997-2005 but nevertheless 
supports the hypothesis that Australia’s aid allocation decisions are not biased by 
commercial considerations.
The Other ODA coefficient remains, in contrast, highly significant and positively signed 
throughout the estimations, suggesting that bandwagoning has continued to take place in 
Australia’s aid allocation decisions. Another explanation for this behaviour is what Round 
and Odedokun (2004) term as ‘peer pressure’. In this case, Australia’s aid effort could be 
seen as a positive function of other donors’ allocations due to multilateral commitments 
whereby donors seek to match each others’ effort; for example, to meet jointly agreed 
DAC aid allocation targets to specific countries (Round and Odedokun 2004:298).
In terms of colonial heritage, the European language variable coefficient is significant in 
only the post Jackson and pre Simons Review periods; the English language variable is 
insignificant throughout. The British colony and protectorate variable has, however, 
remained highly significant within each estimation period although it has consistently 
decreased in size since the Jackson Review.
Finally, the joint significance F-Tests reveal that both donor interest and colonial history 
have continued to play a highly significant role in motivating Australian aid allocation 
across all four time periods. An interesting aside to this result is that once the rule of law 
variable is excluded from the joint recipient need F-Test, the remaining variables (GDP per 
capita, GDP per capita growth and infant mortality) have no significant joint explanatory 
power over aid allocations in the post Simons Review period at a 90 per cent confidence 
interval. This situation highlights an important trade-off which Australia faces in choosing 
whether to implement governance-based methods of aid allocation within the region. That 
is, allocating more aid to countries satisfying good governance criteria is likely to 
correspond with a declining responsiveness to providing aid to those countries which in 
fact need that assistance the most. This issue shall be discussed in more detail shortly.
2.6.3 R obustness C hecks
Amongst other findings, the previous results highlighted the importance of distance in the 
determination of Australian aid allocations, which was said to more accurately reflect the 
strategic regional priorities of the aid program than traditional measures of arms trade and 
military expenditure. Table 2.4 tests whether this assumption affects the results with the 
inclusion of alternative explanatory variables.
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Table 2.4: Australian ODA Allocation—Alternative Explanatory Variables
O D A : 1980- 
2004
(9) (10) (11) (12)
T o b it-L a te n t T o b it-L a te n t T o b it-L a te n t T o b it-L a te n t
R R gdpch1 -1.707 -1.894 -1.830 -1.914
(0.321)** (0.326)** (0.318)** (0.297)**
• R Rgdpehg2 -0.514 -0.452 -0.068 -0.626
(1.381) (1.362) (1.546) (1.313)
R In fm o rt3 0.088 0.507 1.579 0.732
(0.399) (0.440) (0.409)** (0.386)
R Rule4 1.555 1.703 2.198 1.787
(0.339)** (0.344)** (0.336)** (0.313)**
I O th o d a5 0.934 0.838 0.829 0.828
(0.063)** (0.062)** (0.055)** (0.053)**
I E xportsgdp6 -156.137 -330.529 44.193 -249.420
(263.466) (276.849) (258.213) (244.000)
I D istj7 -14.497 -16.978 - -15.665
(0.539)** (1.083)** (0.919)**
I A rm strade8 0.0001 0.0003 - -
(0.0019) (0.001)
I M ilitaryex9 0.005 0.005 - -
(0.004) (0.004)
C E n g frac10’* -0.461 0.794 -3.821 1.189
(1.103) (1.177) (0.887)** (0.873)
C E u rfrac11’* 1.319 1.377 2.057 1.898
(0.680) (0.694)* (0.644)** (0.603)**
C B rcol12’* 7.729 7.650 10.422 7.531
(0.419)** (0.457)** (0.427)** (0.421)**
P op 1.639 1.496 1.719 1.577
(0.133)** (0.136)** (0.118)** (0.110)**
A frica13’* - -0.637 -2.465 -0.438
(0.543) (0.530)** (0.506)
E asia14’* - -0.288 11.106 0.831
(1.037) (0.713)** (0.876)
P IC 15-* - -7.823 15.524 -4.569
(1.807)** (0.876)** (1.392)**
C onstan t 124.226 153.062 -18.666 135.758
(7.339)** (12.332) (5.316)** (10.188)**
O bs. 2,667 2,667 2,964 2,964
U n cen s/C en s 1,336/1,331 1,336/1,331 1,515/1,449 1,515/1,449
O LS R2 0.574 0.583 0.534 0.585
Pseudo  R2 0.155 0.157 0.139 0.159
4 V * F(4) = 12.50 F(4) = 18.99 F (4 )=  22.82 F(4) =  19.02
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
T 5,9 /  T 5,6 /T 5,7 F(5) = 164.47 F(5) = 155.29 F(2) = 115.48 F( 3) = 163.66
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
T io.u F(3) = 123.11 F(3) = 121.22 F(3) = 203.15 F(3) = 125.35
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F =0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level; Time dummies excluded from table. 
(*) dF /dx  is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (**) F-Test for joint significance o f R, I and C categories (that 
is, that each coefficient equals zero). In each esdmation the likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared (x2) test indicates that each of the 
equations are individually significant with at least one o f the predictors’ regression coefficients not being equal to zero at a 99 
per cent confidence interval.________________________________________________________________________________________
Column 9 presents the results of the core model with the inclusion of both arms trade and 
military expenditure variables. Neither of these variables record statistically significant 
coefficient estimates, whereas the distance term remains highly significant. In addition, 
each of the other explanatory variables remains relatively unchanged from its original 
estimation.
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Column 10 presents the estimation results of the full model with the inclusion of the 
military expenditure and trade variables as well as regional dummies for the Pacific and 
Southeast Asia. A dummy variable for Africa is also included in the estimations because of 
the region’s special circumstance as the world’s major aid recipient and poorest continent. 
The inclusion of these regional dummies also tests whether the distance variable simply 
represents the special relationship which Australia has developed with many of its Pacific 
Island and Southeast Asian neighbours or whether there is any specific continuous distance 
effect. In this case, neither the African nor the Southeast Asian dummies are significant 
whereas the Pacific Island dummy has a highly significant but negative coefficient. This 
result is also supported in column 12 which shows the same estimation but excluding the 
military expenditure variables.
The removal of the distance term in column 11 leads to the Pacific Island dummy 
recording a highly significant and positive coefficient estimate. The combination of this and 
the previous negative coefficient for the Pacific Island dummy highlights the importance of 
regional proximity in the determination of Australia’s aid flows to its immediate region— 
rather than any other unique characteristics of the Pacific Islands. Indeed, once the 
important role of distance has been controlled for these results suggest that Australia gives 
less aid to these countries than what otherwise might be expected based on the priorities 
established by its other aid disbursements. Further, with the exclusion of the distance 
variable both the adjusted-R2 and pseudo-R2 values drop considerably from the core 
estimation shown in column 2 of Table 2.1, suggesting that the use of the continuous 
distance term rather than the regional dummy is more suited to the data.
Notably, in all of these estimations the rule of law, other ODA, population and British 
colony variable coefficients have remained highly significant and positively signed, whilst 
the real GDP per capita variable has remained significant and negative. These alternative 
specifications thus also support the robustness of the previous core estimations.
2.6.4 What has Determined Australia’s Growing Focus on Technical 
Assistance (1996—2005)?
As discussed, Australia now allocates more than twice as much of its aid program in the 
form of technical assistance than the average of all other OECD bilateral donors. Chart 2.2 
illustrates how this situation is a result of a sustained expansion in the volume of aid given 
as technical assistance since the beginning of the 1990s. This section uses the above 
framework incorporating the proportion of total Australian ODA provided as technical
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assistance as the dependent variable in order to determine how factors affecting patterns of 
Australian aid allocations have influenced this shift in aid policy over the last decade.
Given the significance of institutional motivations in giving technical assistance, a number 
of additional governance indicators are also included in these estimations^-beyond the rule 
of law indicator used in the previous specifications which acted as a proxy for the overall 
governance environment. The first of these indicators is a measure of government 
effectiveness which assesses the ‘quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, and the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation’ (Kauffmann et al. 2007:3). The second is regulatory 
quality which measures the ‘ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development’ (Kauffmann 
et al. 2007:4). The third is control of corruption which measures ‘the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests’ (Kauffmann et al. 2007:4). Each 
variable is measured within an index ranging from -2.5 (poor) to 2.5 (good) and is sourced 
from Kauffmann et al. (2007).
The following estimations also include the dependent variable from the previous 
estimations, total Australian ODA, as an explanatory variable to control for whether the 
size of Australia’s aid effort influences the types of aid modalities it adopts. All of the other 
variables remain unchanged. The sample is restricted to 1996—2005 due to the inclusion of 
the additional governance indicators which are only available from 1996 onwards. It is 
during this same period that technical assistance has taken a dominant role within the 
Australian aid program.
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results. Column 13 shows the estimation results using the 
pooled OLS method from the entire sample between 1996 and 2005. In this case, there are 
again a large number of zero observations for the occasions when Australia decides to give 
foreign aid to a recipient but none of it is in the form of technical assistance. Column 14 
reports the Tobit estimation results of the full sample. Column 15 reports the Tobit results 
of the estimation for 1996—2000 and column 16 reports them for 2001-2005. This 
disaggregation determines whether the heightened security environment established in the 
aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks led to a structural shift in Australia’s motivations for 
giving a higher proportion of its aid as technical assistance. A number of interesting results 
are shown.
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Firstly, each of the coefficients on the total Australian ODA variable is highly significant 
and negatively signed, suggesting that the larger the size of the total Australian aid 
resources given to a recipient, the lower the proportion of that aid which will be given as 
technical assistance. The volume of aid given by other donors, however, appears to have no 
impact on the aid modalities chosen by Australia, with the OthODA variable recording 
insignificant coefficients across the entire estimation.
Table 2.5: Determinants of Australian Technical Assistance (1996-2005)
Proportion  o f  
Australian O D A  as 
Technical Assistance
(13)
P oo led  OLS  
(1996-2005)
(14)
T ob it
(1996-2005)
(15)
T ob it
(1996-2000)
(16)
T ob it
(2001-2005)
Ln(A usO D A ) -0.041 -0.039 -0.063 -0.009
(0.011)*** (0.011) *** (0.013) *** (0.019)
Ln(Rgdpch) 0.043 0.045 0.040 0.072
(0.026) (0.030) (0.037) (0.051)
Ln(Infm ort) 0.114 0.129 0.139 0.120
(0.035)*** (0.036) *** (0.048) *** (0.054)**
G ovt Effectiveness 0.142 0.158 0.087 0.264
(0.055)*** (0.065)** (0.074) (0.121)**
Regulatory Quality 0.060 0.077 0.090 0.083
(0.037) (0.042)* (0.047)* (0.077)
Rule o f  Law 0.014 0.017 0.024 0.028
(0.040) (0.050) (0.058) (0.090)
C ontrol C orruption -0.095 -0.110 -0.018 -0.290
(0.054)* (0.057)* (0.062) (0.111)***
L n(O thoda) 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
E xportsG D P 47.956 45.744 51.462 42.300
(15.169)*** (23.337)* (27.531)* (39.983)
Ln(Dist) -0.288 -0.328 -0.269 -0.393
(0.060)*** (0.065) *** (0.081) *** (0.103)***
Engfrac -0.055 -0.068 -0.040 -0.095
(0.060) (0.082) (0.099) (0.136)
Eurfrac -0.139 -0.171 -0.250 -0.077
(0.082)* (0.077)** (0.105)** (0.113)
Brcol -0.003 -0.005 0.044 -0.084
(0.032) (0.038) (0.045) (0.061)
Ln(Pop) -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.047
(0.010)*** (0.012) *** (0.015)** (0.019)**
C onstant 3.345 3.537 3.257 3.516
(0.675)*** (0.726) *** (0.862) *** (1.239) ***
O bs. 568 568 312 256
U ncens/C ens - 4 9 1 /77 2 8 0 /32 211 /45
Adj. OLS R2 0.215 0.215 0.242 0.191
Pseudo R2 - 0.176 0.272 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level; Time dummies excluded from 
table. (*) dF/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. In each estimation the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared 
(X 2)  test indicates that each of the equations are individually significant with at least one of the predictors’ regression 
coefficients not being equal to zero at a 99 per cent confidence interval.____________________________________________
Levels of technical assistance provided have not been influenced by the income levels of 
recipient countries, with the real GDP per capita variable recording insignificant coefficient 
estimates. The child mortality variable, however, records significant and positive 
coefficients, suggesting that higher rates of child mortality have encouraged significantly
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larger proportions of aid given as technical assistance. This could represent a preference by 
Australia to stem declining service delivery by attempting to strengthen institutional 
resources rather than funding the delivery of those services directly.
In terms of the institutional characteristics of the recipient, the control of corruption 
variable has a highly significant and negative coefficient estimate for the full sample Tobit 
and OLS estimations. In contrast, the government effectiveness and regulatory quality 
variables both record highly significant and positive coefficient estimates in the full sample 
Tobit estimation. These results suggest that the perceived level of corruption is the key 
institutional determinant of the composition of aid given by Australia.43 Higher levels of 
corruption lead to a higher proportion of aid delivered through technical assistance. On the 
other hand, once this corruption bias has been controlled for, Australia gives more 
technical assistance to countries with better institutional environments. This perhaps 
reflects a desire to foster greater institutional linkages with countries that display positive 
institutional and policy behaviour— for a given level of corruption.
Another important result is the significant and positive coefficient estimate on the trade 
variable. This indicates that the proportion of aid given as technical assistance has been 
positively related to the amount of trade which Australia has with that country. One 
explanation is that Australia uses its technical assistance as a vanguard for higher levels of 
Australian trade, or to protect its pre-existing interests; for example, to ensure that 
favourable trading arrangements are put in place within the recipient bureaucracy. This role 
of technical assistance is highlighted in ODE (2008c: 10) which states that the Australian aid 
program ‘supports private-sector development through technical assistance to governments 
to cut red tape and reduce business costs, promote competition, support trade and regional 
integration...and support facilities designed to assist business’.
The estimation results also indicate that Australia has persistently given a higher proportion 
of its aid in the form of technical assistance to countries which are both closer to itself and 
which have smaller populations— shown by the negative and highly statistically significant 
coefficient estimates on both the distance and population variables. This is an intuitive 
result given Australia’s growing concern over the establishment of functioning and 
effective states within the SIDS of its immediate region—and its preference for using 
technical assistance to achieve these outcomes.
43 It is worth noting that the corruption variable measures the ‘control of corruption’ rather than corruption such that a negative 
coefficient estimate indicates a higher proportion of aid in the form of technical assistance to corrupt regimes.
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Finally, British colonial connections appear to have had a limited impact on determining 
how Australia delivers its aid to recipients, evidenced by the insignificant coefficient 
estimates for both the English language and Bridsh colony variables. There is, however, 
evidence that Australia has tended to offer lower proportions of technical assistance to 
countries which come from a European colonial heritage, perhaps reflecting the lower 
levels of diplomatic engagement which Australia has with non English colonised countries.
There are also some important differences across the two time periods considered. In 
particular, the Australian aid volume, regulatory quality, trade vanguard and European 
language effects all change from being significant in 1996-2000 to showing insignificant 
coefficient estimates post 2001. In contrast, the government effectiveness and control of 
corruption coefficients both become highly significant in the most recent period, whereas 
they recorded insignificant coefficient estimates for the earlier period. This suggests that in 
the post 11 September 2001 security environment, Australia has paid increasing attention 
to the institutional determinants of how much technical assistance it decides to give a 
recipient. In particular, it has allocated a higher proportion of its aid program in the form 
of technical assistance to countries which are perceived to be more corrupt. It has also 
favoured higher levels of technical assistance to countries which have higher levels of 
overall government effectiveness, perhaps representing a degree of responsiveness by 
AusAID to support pro reform governments by offering additional human capital 
resources to embed positive institutional behaviour.
2.7 D iscussion  and Conclusion
This chapter has sought to assess how Australia’s changing strategic, altruistic and colonial 
motivations have influenced the distribution of its aid program between 1980 and 2005. 
Econometric techniques have been used, which controlled for the censored nature of the 
dependent variable and the Tobit decomposition method has been utilised to give a 
detailed exposition of the dual nature of the Australian aid allocation process. This chapter 
has also considered a long time series of data which has allowed the analysis of two major 
government reviews on the allocation priorities of Australian aid as well as whether 
Australia has been increasingly influenced by governance-based selectivity in the current 
decade.
On aggregate, the results imply that Australia has over the past 25 years considered various 
aspects of recipient need, donor interest and colonial heritage in determining its aid
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allocations. These results are consistent with studies such as Gounder (1994) and Feeny 
and McGillivray (2004) who found that both recipient need and donor interest have 
determined the pattern of Australian aid.44 Whilst these results also coincide pardally with 
the results of McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991) in terms of the recipient need and donor 
interest modvadons, this chapter has found no evidence that Australia has been influenced 
by commercial modvadons such as trading reladonships.
These results do, however, mask important changes in the patterns of Australian aid across 
the period. This has included a declining influence of colonial legacy and a rise of regional 
priorides amidst the maintenance of a reladvely constant small-country bias. One of the 
other trends to emerge is that in the post Simons Review period, the influence of recipient 
need—in terms of GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth and infant mortality—has 
declined whilst the influence of the distance and the rule of law variables has increased. As 
mentioned, the decline in welfare modvadons in lieu of the rising influence of governance- 
based allocations highlights a fundamental issue of the performance-based selectivity 
approach. That is, by rewarding good performers, or punishing bad ones, donors are also 
likely to increasingly bias aid allocations away from countries that are in fact of the greatest 
humanitarian need.
The declining responsiveness of Australian aid to measures of recipient need has occurred 
in tandem with a rise in the influence of geographic proximity on patterns of Australian aid. 
This highlights another trade-off which Australia must face, which is that as it pursues 
regionally based strategic and security objectives its responsiveness to levels of recipient 
need may be reduced. This raises considerable questions over the claim that the aid 
program can pursue Australian national interests without compromising its responsiveness 
to global poverty.
These factors have also had a large impact on the type of foreign aid delivered by Australia. 
In particular, Australia has favoured giving significantly higher proportions of its foreign 
aid in the form of technical assistance to countries which are smaller, geographically closer 
and which are perceived to have a poor control of corrupt activities within government. 
These results highlight the heavy focus which Australia has placed on using technical 
assistance as a means of securing both its strategic national interest and humanitarian
44 In contrast, these results oppose the finding of Gounder and Sen (1999) who assert that donor interest and commercial modvadons 
were the dominant factors for Australian aid disbursement.
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objectives within the SIDS of the South Pacific. It also highlights the heavy focus which 
the aid program has placed on pursuing an anti corruption agenda in the region.
Finally, whilst Australia was found not to have significandy biased its levels of aid 
allocation in favour of trade partners, it has- tended to give more aid in the form of 
technical assistance to these countries. This highlights another avenue through which 
Australia has used its aid program to pursue trade objectives not previously discussed in the 
literature.
What does this mean for Australian aid policy in the SIDS of the South Pacific? Clearly, 
Australia has motivations for its aid program beyond achieving the maximum possible 
reduction in global poverty. Placing a large focus on the allocation of funds to countries 
within the immediate region is a natural consequence of these priorities. In this sense, the 
dual motivations of Australian aid are indeed compatible as Australia seeks to reduce 
poverty in the SIDS of the South Pacific. The regionalisation of aid delivery is also likely to 
have allowed Australia to build important specialisations in the countries to which it 
delivers aid as well as to derive a number of administrative conveniences. It is not 
immediately clear that Australia or recipient countries would derive any immediate benefit 
from a reallocation of Australian aid away from the region. Nevertheless, as Australia 
moves to scale up its aid program it should remain cognisant of the trade-offs mentioned 
above. Reallocating the aid program with a larger focus on recipient need amongst existing 
recipients may prove to be valuable in helping the South Pacific make faster rates of 
progress towards achieving the goals set out under the MDGs.
Finally, a limitation of the finding that Australia has allocated both more aid and higher 
proportions of technical assistance to countries with better governance is that it may also 
reflect that the allocation of aid has caused improvements in policy performance. This raises 
a final point worth noting. Patterns of aid allocation are only one component of the 
broader challenge of improving the effectiveness of Australian aid at alleviating poverty 
and helping countries to achieve the MDGs. In this sense, the key ability of aid to improve 
development outcomes depends on its ability to improve the performance of these 
recipient country bureaucracies and on how it interacts with these bureaucracies to 
influence domestic economic outcomes. This is the subject of the following chapters.
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C hapter 3: Foreign Aid and G overnm ent Effectiveness in Small
States: Is Australia Different?
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Overview
This chapter seeks to address a number of questions. What impact does foreign aid have 
on improving the performance of recipient governments? Is technical assistance the most 
effective method of achieving these objectives? And, do any of the unique economic 
characteristics of SIDS make foreign assistance any less effective in these environments? 
Having addressed each of these questions, the chapter then seeks to determine whether 
Australia’s specialisation in the delivery of aid—both in the form of technical assistance 
and to SIDS— has made it more, or less, successful at promoting the establishment of 
functioning and effective states.
This chapter refines and extends the previous literature on this topic by adopting more 
advanced estimation methods which better control for the endogenous explanatory 
variables and which control for persistence in institutional performance. Evidence is found 
to support the notion that the positive impact of aid on government effectiveness tends to 
diminish as countries decrease in population. The diminishing marginal returns to aid in 
population are shown to be most pronounced within the technical assistance component of 
aid. Each of these effects is also particularly significant within the Australian aid program.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1.2 discusses the role of aid and technical 
assistance as a method for donor countries to try and improve the performance of recipient 
governments. Section 3.1.3 discusses a number of reasons why these effects may be 
different in small vis-ä-vis large countries. Section 3.1.4 provides an overview of aid and 
technical assistance in the SIDS of the South Pacific. Section 3.2 reviews the literature 
assessing the impact of foreign aid on the effectiveness of recipient governments and their 
policy performance. Section 3.3 illustrates the model to be estimated and Section 3.4 
discusses a number of estimation and empirical issues. Section 3.5 describes the data whilst 
Section 3.5 provides the estimation results. Section 3.6 concludes and discusses some 
policy implications.
3.1.2 Foreign Aid, Technical Assistance and Government Effectiveness
The diversity of assistance offered by aid donors to help strengthen the quality of 
institutions in recipient countries reflects the equally diverse interpretation of what actually
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comprises good governance (World Bank 2005; Rodrik 2006).4:i Kaufmann et al. (1999a; 
1999b) have proposed what is perhaps the most widely used definition of governance, 
arguing that it reflects the combination of rules and institutions by which a country is 
administered. Governance, they say, includes a diverse range of factors— from the way in 
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced to the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement policies, and also the respect that citizens and the 
state have for the rules and institutions that govern political, social and economic 
interactions among them (Kaufmann et al. 1999a; Kaufmann et al. 1999b).
As discussed, the emergence of the governance agenda has had a large impact on the 
Australian aid program, in particular through a large increase in the proportion of its aid 
given as technical assistance. As was shown in Chart 2.2, the proportion of Australia’s grant 
aid delivered through technical cooperation has steadily increased since the 1980s, from 12 
per cent in 1981 to 50 per cent in 2006.46 As a result, Australia now gives more aid in the 
form of technical assistance than any other major bilateral aid donor (OECD DAC 2008).
Foreign aid has, however, been widely criticised on the grounds that it undermines rather 
than supports institutional strengthening efforts. Rodrik (1996:31), for example, argues that 
whilst aid funds can provide resources for useful economic reforms, they can also help 
perpetuate bad economic policy by reducing the costs of ‘doing nothing’. Aid has also been 
widely associated with undermining domestic revenue collection as recipients find it more 
politically appealing to extract resources from donors than to increase taxes on their 
constituents. This not only depletes domestically generated resources but creates a 
dependency on continued aid flows and donor assistance which can support rent-seeking 
behaviour by the recipient government (Bauer 1971; Svensson 2000; Easterly 2002). Critics 
also argue that by providing essential public services, aid has the potential to weaken the 
recipient government’s economic and social management responsibilities contributing to 
what Djankov et al. (2008:193) term the ‘curse of aid’, whereby aid dependency leads to a 
deterioration of democratic institutions.
45 In 2007-08 major expenditure items for Australia’s institutional strengthening efforts within the South Pacific included government 
administration (AS267 million), legal and judicial areas (AS 155 million), economic policy (AS 109 million), civil society (AS64 million) 
and public sector financial policy and management (AS70 million) (AusAID 2008:14).
46 Globally, the proportion of ODA from all DAC donors has followed a different trend, increasing from 10 per cent of all ODA in 1960 
to a peak of 25 per cent in 1974. This proportion then remained at a relatively stable 20 per cent of ODA until the late 1990s when it 
increased to 25 per cent of all ODA. Most recendy, as total aid flows have increased rapidly post 2002, the proportion of technical 
assistance has declined to approximately 15 per cent, reflecting in part the large amount of ODA allocated as debt relief under the 
HIPC Initiatives (OECD DAC 2008). See Chart 3.2 in Appendix 3.1.
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A large subset of the criticisms of foreign aid’s impact on government performance has 
also been focused specifically on the delivery of technical assistance. As early as the mid 
1990s, dissadsfaction with technical assistance began to emerge within the World Bank’s 
Operations and Evaluations Department, where a major review found that ‘[ojutcomes 
have varied widely but the overall efficacy and cost effectiveness of technical assistance has 
been disappointing’ (World Bank 1996:4). Central to these criticisms is the claim that the 
key goal of technical assistance to make itself superfluous by establishing independent, 
functioning institutions and structures has very rarely, if ever, been achieved. Instead, 
critics argue, advisors tend to embed themselves within local institutional structures leaving 
a ‘capacity gap’ upon their departure (Klingebiel 1999:42).
Similar scepticism of the ability of aid and technical assistance efforts to improve 
institutional performance has been shown about the Australian aid program. The 2007 
Annual Review of Development Effectiveness by AusAID cites that a ‘recent review of 
economic technical assistance in the Pacific region found that country officials, mainly at a 
high level, were overburdened with visits by staff of international and bilateral agencies and 
their consultants on TA [technical assistance] assignments’ (ODE 2008b:32).47
Australia’s focus on technical assistance has also led to a growing sense of frustration on 
the recipient side. Former PNG Prime Minister and now Parliamentary Opposition Leader 
Sir Mekere Morata responded to a March 2008 visit to PNG by Australian Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd by calling for an overhaul of the aid program claiming that ‘[h]undreds of 
millions have been spent or are being spent on capacity building, but nothing really has 
eventuated’ (Marshall 2008:1). Powles (2006), too, argues that in the case of the Solomon 
Islands, a culture of dependency has emerged as a result of technical assistance, with many 
locals letting the deployed officers take the lead in reform efforts. The author argues this 
culture is being perpetuated by deployed officers who often find it easier to complete tasks 
themselves rather than letting locals take the lead, generally as a result of time pressures. 
This in effect has been ‘subverting the very people whose capacity is supposedly being 
built’ (Powles 2006:11).48
47 ODE (2008b) also quotes: ‘An independent completion report of a multimillion-dollar health program in PNG notes that:... the high 
volume of support personnel and the enthusiasm they have brought has resulted, at national level, in a perception that ... there has 
been too much technical assistance, resulting in at best duplication of effort, and at worst, suppression of activity and adverse 
consequences for ownership and optimism.’
48 These constraints are also amplified in many cases by a lack of domestic ownership over specific capacity-building activities. For 
example, Land (2007:12) argues that: ‘the Solomon Islands provides an example of a country that is “more a taker rather than shaper of 
its external assistance”. Political instability and fragility, a poor record of success with external assistance (Technical Assistance, in
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3.1.3 Is the Impact of Aid and Technical Assistance Different in SIDS?
In addition to being the largest reladve provider of technical assistance, the focus of 
Australian aid on the South Pacific means that it also gives a large portion of its aid budget 
to small states. In 2007 for example, Australia gave bilateral assistance to 83 countries, 19 
of which had a population of fewer than 2 million people, and 18 of which are members of 
the SIDS grouping. Furthermore, despite the SIDS grouping accounting for just 0.41 per 
cent of the total population of all Australian aid recipients, the group received an average of 
35 per cent of total Australian aid between 2003 and 2007 (see Appendix 3.2).
As mentioned, SIDS face a number of unique economic challenges. They tend to be 
categorised by limited resource endowments and narrow production bases (Read 2007:5), 
often leading to a high dependence on international trade. When combined with their 
exposure to both natural and external shocks, this has led to unstable foreign exchange 
earnings and volatile economic activity (McGillivray et al. 2008). The economic costs of 
these disadvantages have also tended to be amplified by remoteness to major international 
markets and limited scale economies, leading to high per-unit transportation costs 
(McGillivray et al. 2008:482).
In addition to economic challenges, SIDS also face a number of unique characteristics 
which can impact on their ability to develop well functioning bureaucracies. For example, 
the small size of SIDS public sectors means decision-making authority often rests in the 
hands of relatively few actors. This leads to lower levels of consensus decision making 
within government, which in turn can erode the buy-in of other actors to reform processes 
(Warrington 1994). The small absolute size of bureaucracies also has implications for 
recruitment and promotion decisions, which tend to be more influenced by personal 
patronage and social alliances than performance (Farrugia 1993). Scale disadvantages 
extend to the delivery of services— small states are expected to provide the same range of 
public goods as larger countries despite their high cost when spread across a relatively small 
population (Jacobs 1975). These effects have been shown to be particularly pronounced 
when services have to be delivered in remote and island locations common to the many 
archipelagic SIDS (Baker 1992).
particular), as well as a lack of personnel to attend to policy and planning matters seem to be factors that have encouraged a lack of 
engagement.’
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The small size of the bureaucracy also means that senior civil servants are expected to 
cover a much wider range of issues, leading to a lack of specialist knowledge in many areas 
of the administration (Liiv 2002). Studies have also shown that the limited private sector 
opportunities in SIDS combined with patronage-based promotion have meant that 
entrepreneurship is generally not pursued by public sector employees (Streeton 1993). This 
has led to a heavy focus on carrying out routine administration tasks, a resistance to public 
sector reform and a tendency for not making decisions which may jeopardise future career 
aspirations.
Despite the plethora of studies analysing the unique economic and administrative 
challenges facing SIDS, little attention has been paid to whether these characteristics can 
impact the effectiveness of foreign aid at improving institutional quality in these 
environments.
Lower absolute levels of institutional capacity may, for example, amplify the negative 
impact of migrating bureaucratic resources towards dealing with donors—with program 
design, monitoring and evaluation, and coordination efforts all soaking up scarce 
institutional capacity. Limited institutional resources in SIDS also mean that they may have 
a lower ability to enforce donor harmonisation policies, which further adds to the excessive 
burden placed on their bureaucracy.
A desire by domestic civil servants to maintain their important patronage relationships, 
both within the bureaucracy and within government, may also mean that they are less 
willing to draw on technical assistance to pursue public sector reform efforts. This can 
leave technical advisers as isolated agents of change when placed in recipient bureaucracies, 
amplifying the well-known tendency of technical assistance to ‘crowd out’ rather than 
‘crowd in’ bureaucratic capacity.
Donors also have a tendency to offer higher per capita levels of aid to SIDS which makes 
them more aid dependent than larger recipients. When combined with their limited 
institutional resources, this dependency may result in a decreased ability to effectively push 
back on the objectives of donors. Over the longer term, this situation may lead to a lower 
level of country ownership amongst domestic recipients, something that is now widely 
regarded as a key success factor in aid projects (Drazen 2002:2).
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3.1.4 Impact o f Aid on Government Effectiveness in the South Pacific
These policy challenges may help to explain why, despite significant aid flows and in 
particular technical assistance, the governments of the South Pacific continue to perform 
poorly. Table 3.1 shows very high levels of foreign aid per capita across all of the SIDS of 
the South Pacific ranging from an average of US$5,100 per capita in Niue to US$54 per 
capita in PNG. Because of its larger population, PNG is the outlier within this group, with 
all others receiving average aid per capita flows well above US$100 per capita per annum 
between 1996 and 2006. For many of these countries, technical assistance has been the 
dominant form of aid given during this period. O f the major recipients of Australian aid, 
Vanuatu was the one to receive the highest proportion as technical assistance—71 per cent. 
Likewise, Samoa received 64 per cent, Fiji and Tonga received 63 per cent, Solomon 
Islands received 62 per cent, Cook Islands received 59 per cent and PNG received exactly 
half of its aid through technical assistance. Australia has been the dominant donor in many 
of these Pacific countries, particularly those from Melanesia. Amongst the highest 
proportions are Nauru and PNG, which received 84 per cent and 79 per cent of their aid 
from Australia, respectively. In the Solomon Islands, this proportion was 55 per cent whilst 
Vanuatu and Fiji received 38 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively.
Table 3.1: Key Indicators for Pacific Island Countries (1996—2006)
G rowth ODA't> O D A *  T A  O D A ®  A ustralian G D P p cQ P opn GE* A G E
G D P  O D A 0
pefr
1996- per per per %
2006 US$m capita capita % total capita total ’000sUS$ ’000s Index A IndexUS$ US$ US$
Cook Is. 6.05 5.89 312.58 185.90 0.59 65.63 0.21 12.88 19 0.5 0.40
Fiji 0.51 43.48 51.97 32.79 0.63 14.99 0.29 4.92 875 -0.1 0.00
Kiribad 1.40 17.03 183.20 97.62 0.53 59.11 0.32 1.42 100 -0.5 -0.20
Micronesia -0.77 101.90 945.13 64.85 0.07 9.58 0.01 3.85 109 -0.1 0.50
Nauru 2.51 7.65 668.07 75.95 0.11 559.89 0.84 6.98 11 -0.4 0.80
Niue - 7.52 5,137.40 845.29 0.16 679.60 0.13 - 1 -0.4 0.40
Palau -0.15 39.24 2,122.00 213.48 0.10 19.32 0.01 9.55 19 -0.8 -0.50
PNG 0.88 265.93 53.80 27.06 0.50 42.45 0.79 4.49 5,404 -1 -0.70
Samoa 4.16 31.20 173.79 111.70 0.64 50.60 0.29 3.46 179 0.3 0.70
Solomon Is. -4.09 69.60 141.57 87.19 0.62 78.27 0.55 1.73 530 -0.7 0.30
E. Timor 0.80 132.06 156.34 60.63 0.39 40.46 0.26 0.36 983 -0.9 0.00
Tonga -1.65 22.69 220.83 140.12 0.63 66.92 0.30 3.20 108 -0.5 -0.30
Tuvalu - 7.58 731.70 303.50 0.41 193.89 0.26 2.82 11 0 -0.50
Vanuatu 0.56 32.20 168.25 118.92 0.71 63.67 0.38 3.01 203 -0.3 -0.10
'P Average growth in real GDP per capita from 1996 to 2006. Source: PWT (2007) and ADB Key Indicators (2008). See Appendix 3.4.
<t> Average ODA disbursements from 1996 to 2006. Source: OECD DAC (2008).
Q 2006 real GDP per capita in USS- Source: PWT (2007) and ADB Key Indicators (2008). See Appendix 3.4. 
n  Total populadon in thousands. Source: See Appendix 3.4.
9 Government Effecuveness Index ranging from -2.5 (poor) to 2.5 (good). See text for a full explanation. A Index represents the absolute 
change in the Index between 1996 and 2006. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2007).______________________________________________________
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Based on the definition of governance discussed earlier, Kauffman et al. (2007) provide a 
percepdons-based index of government effectiveness, giving each country a normalised 
score of between -2.5 (poor) and 2.5 (good).49 This index shows that despite a plentiful 
supply of foreign aid and technical assistance Kiribati, Fiji, East Timor, Palau, PNG, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu have all either worsened or remained unchanged in terms of 
their government effectiveness between 1996 and 2006. In addition, despite being the 
biggest recipient of financial assistance in aggregate terms, PNG was the worst performer 
during this period, with its index declining from -0.3 to -1. Nauru, on the other hand, made 
the biggest improvement across the decade, increasing its score by 0.8— albeit retaining a 
negative rating. In fact, the only two countries in the Pacific to have positive values on their 
governance index in 2006 were Samoa and the Cook Islands, with scores of 0.3 and 0.5 
respectively.
Continued poor government performance despite high levels of foreign aid and technical 
assistance present a number of important questions for the effectiveness and design of the 
Australian aid program as it attempts to establish functioning and effective states within the 
South Pacific region. This remainder of this chapter seeks to empirically detemiine what 
impact foreign aid has on the effectiveness of governments and whether technical 
assistance is the best way to improve this effectiveness. In addition, it focuses on whether 
any of these effects vary according to the size of the recipient and whether Australia’s 
specialisation in technical assistance to small states has made it more effective vis-ä-vis 
other donors in these environments.
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1. Past Studies
Knack (1999) was one of the first authors to study how foreign aid impacts on government 
performance, combining measures of bureaucratic quality, rule of law and corruption into a 
single index. Covering a sample of 80 countries between 1982 and 1995, the author finds 
that higher levels of aid have tended to erode the quality of governance in recipient 
countries. This result was supported by Svennsson (2000) who provides a game theoretic 
illustration of the interaction between powerful competing social groups in response to an 
aid flow injection— showing that foreign aid is linked with higher levels of government
49 This index was originally constructed in Kaufmann et al. (1999b) and uses an unobserved components methodology to aggregate a 
large number of governance measures into six aggregate indicators corresponding to six dimensions of governance. These include voice 
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and corruption, offering the most 
comprehensive data set on government performance covering 212 countries between 1996 and 2006.
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regulation, rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. This hypothesis is then supported with 
empirical evidence for a panel of countries between 1980 and 1994, showing that aid has 
been associated with higher levels of corruption.
Bräutigam and Knack (2004) also support these findings by contending that foreign aid 
creates a substantial moral hazard problem for both donor and recipient which lowers local 
pressures for economic reform and reduces accountability mechanisms within the 
economy. The authors then present empirical evidence from a panel of sub-Saharan 
African countries between 1982 to 1997, showing a robust statistical relationship between 
high aid levels in Africa and deteriorations in governance.30
These results were supported by Djankov et al. (2008) who argue that foreign aid has an 
overall negative effect on democracy because it encourages politicians to engage in rent- 
seeking behaviour similar to that documented in the resource revenue windfall (or resource 
curse) literature.31 Using panel data for 108 recipient countries between 1960 and 1999, the 
authors compare the effects of both aid and oil revenue inflows on institutions. They find 
that whilst both have had a negative impact on institutional quality, the effect of aid is a 
much larger curse than that of oil.
Celasun and 'Walliser (2005) then try and determine why this negative relationship between 
foreign aid and government performance exists— focussing on the impact of aid on fiscal 
policy in a cross section of eight African countries between 1994 and 2004. The key finding 
of their paper is that the volatility of foreign aid flows have contributed to perverse policy 
effects as recipient governments struggle to maintain fiscal discipline in the face of 
uncertain revenue streams. Knack and Rahman (2004) also try and explain the negative 
aid—governance relationship by examining the role of donor fragmentation using an index 
of bureaucratic quality available for recipient nations between 1982 and 2001. These 
authors find that high levels of donor fragmentation tend to have a particularly large 
negative effect on bureaucratic quality and capacity in recipient countries because the 
plethora of donors put pressure on government bureaucracies to satisfy their own 
reporting and evaluation requirements.
50 One particularly important manifestation of eroding governance identified in their paper is the similarly strong relationship between 
higher aid levels and a lower tax share of GDP, creating a situation of perpetual aid dependency (Bräutigam and Knack 2004).
51 In this process, politicians attempt to isolate other political elite from these resources so their constituents can receive a 
disproportionate benefit. Political institutions then become less representative and less democratic (Djankov et al. 2008).
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Heckelman and Knack (2005) analyse the impact of foreign aid on the capacity of 
governments to engage in market liberalising reform, which they measure using the World 
Bank’s CPIA Index.52 After conducting a variety of cross-country regressions, they find 
that between 1980 and 2000, countries which received higher levels of foreign aid were less 
likely to engage in market liberalising economic reform, although the effect appears to 
differ across policy type and was much larger in the 1980s than the 1990s.53
The only study to date which directly addresses the potential for differential impacts of 
foreign aid on economic policy performance on the basis of recipient population size has 
been that by Bowman and Chand (2007). By controlling for this difference, their paper 
finds that the negative impacts of foreign aid on economic policy performance increases as 
countries decrease in size—  with larger countries typically receiving positive impacts of aid 
but countries with populations of less than 1.4 million receiving overall negative effects. 
Additionally, an evaluation of donor assistance efforts in Fiji led the authors to conclude 
that ‘power asymmetries were behind many of the failed programs in the Pacific, that 
overloaded officials had little understanding of their own Ministry as a result of the 
competing demands of donors and an unstable political environment’ (Bowman and Chand 
2007:19).
3.2.2 R esearch  Gap
To determine whether a country’s size influences the effectiveness of foreign aid at 
improving bureaucratic and government performance this chapter extends the empirical 
analysis of Bowman and Chand (2007). In particular, it seeks to overcome a number of 
empirical limitations which constrained the reliability of their results. This includes 
insignificant Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates which attempted to control for the 
endogeneity between poor institutional performance and the potential to receive higher aid 
flows, as well as a sample of countries which only included a limited number of small 
states. This chapter compiles a much larger panel of data, which is estimated with a more
52 A number of studies have criticised the use of the CPIA as a measure of policy and institudonal quality, focusing on the lack of 
transparency and objectivity in its calculation and the arbitrariness of the selection and weighting of the indicators, which combine both 
some indicators that could be taken as a reflection of government commitment and effort, and those that reflect structural weaknesses 
in the institutional environment’ (Kotoglou and Jones 2005:5).
53 After disaggregating the policy reform variable, the authors also reveal that this effect varies across the sub-components of the 
economic freedom index. For example, while on the one hand foreign aid has had a significandy negative impact on access to sound 
money and the regulation of credit, labour and business, it has on the other hand had an insignificant impact on the size of government 
and freedom to exchange with foreigners.
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robust instrumentation strategy employing both 2SLS and generalised method of moments 
(difference and systems) techniques.
This chapter also extends the literature by disaggregating aid flows to take account of the 
differential impacts of technical assistance vis-a-vis service delivery assistance on 
government performance. This approach seeks to determine, for example, whether the aid 
curse originates from technical assistance crowding out instead of crowding in bureaucratic 
capacity or whether providing aid-financed services undermines a recipient government’s 
social management responsibilities. Finally, this chapter separates Australian aid flows vis-a- 
vis other donor aid flows to determine whether its specialisations have made it more, or 
less, successful at promoting the establishment of functioning and effective states.
where /TVS,, represents the quality (effectiveness) of government in country i at period /, 
A t represents the average quantity of foreign aid received over the previous four years, yt 
is a series of time dummies and £t t satisfies the typical i.i.d assumptions. One core 
difference of this specification to that in the general literature is the inclusion of the P; t term 
which measures the population (size) of the recipient country and an interaction term 
between aid and population, AJit / In Pi t . The inclusion of these variables allows an explicit
analysis of whether the effects of aid on government performance vary according to the 
size of the recipient such that the marginal impact of aid is given by solving
explanatory variables drawn from the literature, including initial income per capita, access 
to major waterways, distance from the equator as well as a dummy variable measuring 
whether a country is deemed to be fragile.34
54 Distance from the equator acts as a proxy for the various impacts of climate on institutional development and economic performance 
(Sachs 2003). Geographic proximity of the population to major waterways acts as a proxy for the impact of countries which have a 
higher proportion of their population close to major waterways and which are much more integrated into the global economy than
3.3 T he  M odel
The cross-country specification in Bowman and Chand (2007) posited that:
INS,t = f t  + M ,  + A In p ,  + Ä  ( A , ,  / In />,) + P  Z + yt + ei4 
V i = 1,2,...,7V; t = \,2,...,T
(3.1)
= 0 ■ Finally, the Z term is said to represent a vector of other
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A key estimation issue is that the aid variable is potentially endogenous, with better 
institutional behaviour encouraging higher levels of aid which can create a positive bias in 
the impact of aid on government effectiveness (Knack 2000:9).33 Two methods are utilised 
to control for this.
3.4 Estimation Method 
3.4.1 Two Stage Least Squares
The first method to control for potential endogeneity is through the well known 2SLS 
technique which uses instrumental variables to identify exogenous sources of variation in 
the explanatory aid variables. In the first stage of the procedure, this involves the 
estimation of:
A , , = a : 0 + a-X,(3.2)
where X (. t is a vector of variables which are exogenous with INSi , but which are plausibly
correlated with foreign aid (Wooldridge 2000:461). That is, in the estimation of (3.1) and 
(3.2):
O>rr(XiV,A ,)* 0  (3.3)
Corr(X.J,e.J) = 0 (3.4)
In the first instance this chapter also adopts the 2SLS technique and follows the aid and 
governance literature with the introduction of ten-year lagged values of real GDP per 
capita and population levels as instruments (see, for example, Coviello and Islam 
2006:14).56 In terms of estimating the impact of technical assistance vis-ä-vis other aid 
flows, papers such as Coviello and Islam (2006:24) circumvented the need for a 
disaggregated aid instrumentation strategy by only including technical assistance aid as an 
explanatory term—and using the same set of instruments as they did for the total aid flows 
variable. Excluding non technical assistance aid flows, however (which often make up a 
dominant proportion of financial assistance), has the potential to introduce omitted
their landlocked counterparts (Gallup et al. 1999). The fragile states dummy variable is based on the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional CPIA framework and controls for the growing recognition within the aid effectiveness literature that fragile states have 
unique challenges which may make them respond differently to financial assistance than countries with higher levels of governance 
capacity (Hjertholm and White 2004; AusAID 2005; OECD 2005).
55 Aid allocation systems— such as the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) loan allocations and the United 
States Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) grant allocations—determine how aid is allocated in part by subjective assessments of a 
recipient country’s institutional performance.
56 Each of the estimations was carried out using seven, eight and nine-year period lags as well and the results remained comparatively 
similar.
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variable bias into the estimation procedure—particularly if one assumes that these other 
types of aid have the potential to impact on government effectiveness.3
To explain exogenous variations for heterogenous aid, this paper uses lagged values of aid 
flows as used by Clemens et al. (2004:17) and Dalgaard et al. (2004:204) .38 Choosing the 
appropriate lag period is important because past aid flows could influence current 
institutional quality. To an extent, this is controlled for by including the per capita GDP 
variable which measures the economic impacts of improved institutional quality. 
Additionally, as per previous instruments, a ten-year lag period is chosen, which is 
sufficiendy long to ensure limited spill-over effects.
A number of tests are used to determine whether the instrumentation strategy satisfies the 
requirement of Equations (3.3-3.4). Staiger and Stock (1994) propose that as a rule of 
thumb, the first stage F-Statistics for each endogenous regressor should be above ten for 
the instruments to be sufficiently identified with the relevant endogenous explanatory 
variables.59 Whilst this rule of thumb is still widely used in the literature (see Clemens et al. 
2004; Knack and Rahman 2004; Coviello and Islam 2006;), its reliability can be questioned 
on the basis that it does not adjust the size of the critical F-Statistic for the number of 
included endogenous regressors or the number of instrumental variables. This has the 
potential to place a downward bias on the required critical F-Statistic value (Martina and 
Batten 2008).60 This chapter draws on an improved test provided by Stock and Yogo 
(2002) and extended in Martina and Batten (2008) which adjusts the required F-Statistic 
critical value with respect to the number of endogenous variables and the number of 
instruments (see Appendix 3.6).
As the instrumentation strategy is over identified, it is also possible to test for instrument 
exogeneity. Consistent with the literature, the variance estimates in each case have been 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity robustness in the error terms according to the process
57 In the event that other aid flows and technical assistance aid flows are highly positively correlated, the technical assistance coefficient 
may thus overstate the effect their impact has on governance outcomes.
58 Dalgaard et al. (2004:204) demonstrate that ‘...the reduced form relation for aid shows that lagged observations of aid are highly 
correlated with aid in the presence of time invariant factors. As not all controls can be included in the reduced form, and because of the 
correlation between the regressors and the error, we cannot expect to estimate a coefficient of unity on lagged aid. However the 
reduced form shows that we should expect a high correladon between past and present aid.’
59 Weak instruments are problematic because if the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, a small correladon 
between these instruments and the disturbance term will produce a larger inconsistency in the instrumented regression estimates than 
in the non instrumented regression estimates (Staiger and Stock 1994:33).
60 In cases where the number of instruments significandy exceeds the number of endogenous regressors (as is the case in this paper and 
within the literature generally), this will lead to a downward bias in the size of the first stage criucal F-Stadsuc (see Appendix 3.5).
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developed by White (1980). As such, the relevant test for instrument exogeneity is 
Hansen’s J-Statistic and its associated Chi-Squared p-value (Baum et al. 2003:17). This is a 
test of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid, that is, uncorrelated 
with the error term and correcdy excluded from the estimation equation, where a rejection 
casts doubt on the instrument’s validity (Hayashi 2000:227).61
3.4.2 D ifference-G eneralised M ethod  o f M om ents
In practice, finding truly exogenous instruments which satisfy Equation (3.3—3.4) has 
proven difficult in the aid effectiveness literature (Roodman 2007). Indeed, in Bowman and 
Chand (2007), poorly identified instruments led to insignificant 2SLS results for many of 
the core estimations. Another limitation of their paper is that it does not control for 
persistence in institutional performance, whereby initial institutional performance 
determines subsequent developments, as has been the case in much of the other existing 
literature (see Knack 2000; Coviello and Islam 2006). Given the dynamic structure of the 
data it is also important to control for country specific effects (fixed effects) in the 
estimation of Equation (3.1). In the presence of these country specific effects both the 
OLS and 2SLS estimates may be both biased and inconsistent since the lagged value of 
government effectiveness will be correlated with the error term.62 To control for these 
issues this chapter also estimates an augmented version of Equation (3.1) which can be 
written as:
~ ßo +  ßilNSi t- 1 +  ß 2Aiit +  ß3^nPi,t +  & (Ai t/Pi't) (3.5)
+ ß  Z + y t +  r\i + si t
where 7Ji captures the country specific effects for all i countries in the sample and INSi
represents the level of government performance in the previous period. The first 
differenced generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and
61 The Hansen test of over identifying restrictions tests the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, that is, uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null hypothesis, the 
test statistic is distributed as Chi-Squared in the number of over identifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the 
instruments.
62 In addition, it has been shown that this correlation cannot be removed as the number of countries in the sample increases or as the 
time period of estimation increases (Coviello and Islam 2006:22).
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Bond (1991) is one method to estimate this specification.6^ In this case, the estimation o f 
Equation (3.5) is carried out in first differences( Xi t — Xf. ,_,) such that:
Am ,  = ß 0+ ßA INS^  + ß M ,,  + ß A  >n ß ,  + ßA (  A, / in pi4)
+ ß 'A Z + A y , + £it
(3.6)
where the country specific effects, 77., are cancelled out by the difference operator.
Difference-GMM also controls for the endogeneity o f both the aid and government 
performance variables by using internal instruments, which are based on the lagged values 
o f each o f the endogenous explanatory variables (Coviello and Islam 2006:23). For a
consistent estimation, however, it is required that £if have the typical i.i.d properties and
each explanatory variable satisfy an assumption o f weak exogeneity. This weak exogeneity 
requires that variables must be uncorrelated with future unanticipated shocks to the 
dependent variable but could be influenced by both past and present levels o f government 
effectiveness— which means that they are uncorrelated with €iJt such that:
EUNS,,_,(£iJ -£ ,„ )]■ = 0
E l ? = 0
V r = 3,...,T; s> 2 (3.7)
where T is the number o f time periods in the sample and Z represents the vector of all the 
weakly exogenous explanatory variables.
3.4.3 System -G eneralised  M ethods M om ents
Bond et al. (2001) show however that when estimating persistent time series (such as 
measures o f government effectiveness), the first-differenced GMM estimator can be poorly 
behaved since lagged levels of the series provide only weak instruments for subsequent first 
differences.64 A solution to this problem is provided by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1997) who develop an estimator known as System-GMM. The System- 
GMM approach also uses lagged values of the dependent and independent variables as 
internal instruments but these are derived from the estimation o f a system of two 
simultaneous equations. The first is in levels with lagged first differences as instruments
63 It is worth noting that a whilst a simple fixed effects panel data approach to estimating Equation (3.5) would account for the existence 
of country specific effects, the coefficient estimates will still remain biased because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable. In 
addition, the fixed-effects estimator would remove a number of control variables which are also of interest, such as the fragile states 
dummy variable, as they are time invariant; hence the focus on GMM estimation procedures.
64 In particular, when the dependent variable follows a path close to a random walk, the Differenced-GMM has poor finite sample 
properties, and it is downwards biased, especially when the number of periods within the estimation is small (Presbitero 2006:6).
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and the second is in first differences with lagged levels as instruments (Presbitero 2006:6). 
This approach more accurately addresses the issue of weak instrumentation which occurs 
with the first differenced GMM estimations when estimating highly persistent series with 
System-GMM (Elbadawi et al. 2007:15).
The System-GMM procedure requires both the original orthogonality conditions of the 
first differenced GMM estimator (Equation 3.7) as well as several more assumptions to be 
in place. The first is that the equation in differences has no correlation between the 
differences of the variables and the country specific effects63 such that:
E[(INSl^ - m iJtq)r]l] = 0
(3-8)
£ [ ( Z „ t , - Z „ . ,> 7 , ]  = 0 V m
For the equation in levels, two additional moment conditions are required which ensure 
that the internal instruments gain a sufficient degree of identification with the dependent 
government effectiveness variable, given its highly persistent nature, such that:
E[(INS, ,., -  I N S M  + eu )] = 0 
£[(zy_s-zV s-,)('i + e o )) = 0 S =  1
A downside of using the System-GMM procedure is that whilst the estimators are 
asymptotically robust, they are known to have very poor finite sample properties leading to 
a downwards bias in the standard error estimates (Roodman 2006:1). This issue is 
addressed by using the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) which 
produces standard errors that are asymptotically robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation.
As outlined in Blundel and Bond (1998), the Hansen/Sargan test of over identifying 
restrictions is reported in all of the GMM estimations for the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model.66 The Arellano- 
Bond test statistic is also used to examine the null hypothesis that the error term is not 
serially correlated. The values reported are the p-values for first, AR (1), and second, AR
65 This implies that the system is stationary and that temporary deviations from the steady state value are uncorrelated with the fixed 
effects (Djankov et al. 2008:184).
66 For each of the robust estimations, Hansen’s J-Statistic is presented instead of the Sargan Statistic. Both tests have the same null 
hypothesis.
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(2), order auto correlated disturbances in the first differenced equations.6 As per Coviello 
and Islam (2006), each model’s lag structure and its subsequent instrumentation strategy is 
determined by assessing the best combination of test results. Given the large number of 
endogenous variables considered in the disaggregated models, to avoid the problem of over 
fitting the model by including more instruments than there are country clusters in the 
sample (Roodman 2006), the lag length is restricted to no greater than three.
3.5 Data
This chapter measures the performance of government with the data set constructed by 
Kauffmann et al. (2007). This is the most comprehensive data set available on government 
performance, covering 212 countries between 1996 and 2006. The data set also includes a 
large number of SIDS which are typically excluded from governance indicator data sets. 
The government effectiveness index is chosen as the core dependent variable as it is 
deemed to best reflect the overall governance environment facing a recipient country. It 
measures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009:6). One limitation of the Kauffman et al. (2009) governance 
indicators is the significant margins of error which are present within individual country 
rankings. These margins of error plague all data collection efforts and in particular those 
that rely on perceptions based indices. It is for this reason that the data is used to make 
broad cross country comparisons of the impact of foreign aid on institutional performance 
rather than to assess the comparative performance of specific countries at, or across, 
specific points in time. This indicator is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. Unrecorded values for 1997, 
1999 and 2001 are linearly extrapolated from adjoining years.68
GDP per capita data is taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) v6.2 and is expressed in 
the natural logarithm of constant US$. Population data is also taken from the PWT and 
measured in thousands of people. As in the previous chapter, foreign aid is measured as
67 A failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates a need for higher-order lags of 
the variables to be used as instruments.
68 These results were also carried out using the economic policy performance index and each of its sub-components compiled by the 
Heritage Foundation as was used in Bowman and Chand (2007). In terms of aggregate aid and technical assistance flows, the results 
were comparatively similar; however, the limited number of small countries available in this sample raised concerns over the result’s 
robustness. In addition, the limited number of South Pacific countries available meant that it was not possible to conduct a robust 
analysis of Australian aid flows.
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total net ODA and Technical Assistance flows are as described in Appendix 3.4. Data for 
both aid variables are taken from the OECD DAC (2008) for Australia and all other 
donors and measured in current US$. This data is then converted into real purchasing 
power parity terms using the PWT GDP deflator and expressed as a proportion of real 
GDP averaged over a four-year period. Whilst split between technical assistance and total 
ODA it is important to note that not all of these aid funds are provided directly at 
improing the policy environment. As such, this has the potential to place a downward bias 
on the coefficient estimates of the impact of ODA on government effectiveness. This bias 
is likely to be reduced with the usage of the technical assistance variable as this type of aid 
tends to have a larger proportion aimed directly at improving policy performance. 
Nevertheless, this type of aggregation bias remains a limitation of the approach, and as 
shall be discused in the concluding section offers a potential avenue for further research.
Distance from the equator is measured as the absolute value of latitude in degrees from the 
equator and is sourced from Rodrik et al. (2004). Geographic proximity to major waterways 
is taken from Gallup et al. (1999) and measures the total proportion of a country’s 
population within 100km of a major waterway. The fragile states dummy is sourced from 
Chauvet and Collier (2007) and calculated from the World Bank’s definition of fragile 
states, which includes low income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the World Bank’s 
CP1A index (see Appendix 3.3 for a list of countries). To fill in missing data for a number 
of South Pacific countries, data was collected from a variety of regional sources including 
PRISM. A full list and explanation of these additions can be found in Appendix 3.4. The 
summary statistics for each of these core variables are displayed below in Table 3.2.
Amongst the sample of countries used in this chapter, Micronesia was the biggest aid 
recipient receiving a mean value of financial assistance equal to 27.8 per cent of its GDP 
between 1996 and 2005, followed closely by Liberia with 27.4 per cent of its GDP. Chile 
recorded the highest value for government effectiveness amongst the aid recipient sample 
with a value of 1.4 in 1998, whilst the Solomon Islands recorded the lowest value with a 
score of -2.5 in 2003. The total sample thus comprises an unbalanced panel of 1,234 
observations from 112 recipient countries, including nine from the South Pacific (see 
Appendix 3.5).
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics—Total Sample (1996—2005)
Variable Label Obs M ean Std D ev Min M ax
Government
Effectiveness GE 1,234 -0.481 0.658 -2.5 1.4
Population Pop 1,234 46,283 160,829 10.065 1,294,843
GDP Per Capita GDPpc 1,234 4.221 4.239 0.187 30.494
Distance from the 
Equator Disteq 1,234 17.673 12.243 0 47
Access to 
Waterways Pop100km 1,234 0.479 0.389 0
1
Fragile States 
Dummy Fragile 1,234 0.281 0.450 0 1
ODA* ODAGDP 1,234 2.147 3.417 0.004 27.813
Technical 
Assistance ODA TechGDP 1,234 0.710 1.183 0.001 8.911
Non Technical 
Assistance ODA ResGDP 1,234 1.437 2.676 0 26.078
Australian ODA AusODAGDP 1,234 0.167 0.706 0 9.330
Australian 
Technical 
Assistance ODA 
Australian Non
AusTechGDP 1,234 0.127 0.564 0 8.279
Technical AusResGDP 1,234 0.040 0.188 0 2.358
Assistance ODA 
Non Australian 
ODA
Non Australian
OthODAGDP 1,234 1.981 3.167 0 27.607
Technical 
Assistance ODA 
Non Australian
OthTechGDP 1,234 0.583 0.795 0 6.107
non Technical OthResGDP 1,234 1.397 2.643 0 26.011
Assistance ODA 
Distance from the 
Equator Dist 1,234 12,143 3,715 2,717 17,807
British Colony Brcol 1,234 0.361 0.481 0 1
*AU ODA variables measured as a proportion of GDP.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Aid and Government Effectiveness in Small States
As a point of comparison with the existing literature, Table 3.3 reports the results of the 
estimation of Equation (3.1) in column 1 and 2. Columns 3—5 report the results of the 
estimation of the preferred core specification, Equation (3.5). All estimations measure the 
impact of total ODA flows on government effectiveness.
Column 1 and 2 use pooled OLS and 2SLS estimators respectively, both with country- 
clustered and White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Column 3 uses the 
Difference-GMM estimator shown in Equation (3.7), column 4 uses the System-GMM 
estimator and column 5 uses the System-GMM estimator with standard errors adjusted 
according to the process developed by Windmeijer (2005). All GMM estimations are 
carried out using the xtabond2 STATA command developed by Roodman (2006).
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Table 3.3: Impact of PD A  on Government Effectiveness
(1)
P o o le d
O L S -
C lu s te r
R o b u s t
(2)
2 S L S -
C lu s te r
R o b u s t
(3)
D iff-
G M M
(4)
S y s-G M M
(5)
S y s-G M M
R o b u s t
lnpop 0.001 0.061 0.163 -0.002 0.001
(0.009) (0.038) (0.091)* (0.005) (0.006)
lny 0.430 0.097 0.150 0.096 0.101
(0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.071)** (0.026)*** (0.028)***
disteq -0.001 0.005 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.005) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001)
pop100km 0.084 0.028 0.003 0.003
(0.050)* (0.172) (0.033) (0.042)
fragile -0.292 -0.347 - 0.111 -0.098 -0.087
(0.041)*** (0.093)*** (0.088) (0.037)*** (0.035)**
odagdp 0.054 0.069 0.005 0.033 0.032
(0.022)** (0.114) (0.033) (0.017)* (0.019)*
o d a g d p /ln (p o p ) -0.254 -0.040 0.216 -0.154 -0.150
(0.103)** (0.444) (0.253) (0.082)* (0.086)*
L.ge 0.254 0.801 0.806
(0.039)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)***
C onstan t -0.995 -1.755 -0.166 -0.183
(0.126)*** (0.598)*** (0.071)** (0.075)**
O bservations 1,234 837 908 1051 1051
R -squared 0.487
Ä + Ä  =0 111 - - 106 108
In ( p o p , . )
N u m b e r o f  code 152 152 140 143 143
1st Stage F-Statistics
O D A 32.94
O D A /ln p o p 93.37
H ansen  J-S ta t 0.266
C hi2 P-V alue (0.875)
S a rg an /H an sen  T est 89.41 107.72 107.72
C hi2 P-V alue (0.000) (0.012) (0.012)
AR(1) P-value 0.002 0.004 0.000
AR(2) P-value 0.023 0.011 0.012
* S ig n ific a n t at 10% ; ** S ig n ifica n t at 5% ; * * * S sig n ifica n t at 1% . O L S  an d  2S L S  e s t im a tio n s  s h o w  W h ite  (1 9 8 0 )
h e te r o sk e d a s t ic ity -r o b u s t  an d  co u n try  c lu ste r e d  stand ard  errors in  p a r e n th e se s . G M M  stan d ard  errors are as
d e sc r ib e d  in  m a in  tex t. F irst stage F -S ta tis t ic s  fro m  2S L S  e s t im a tio n s  are w e ll a b o v e  th e  th r e sh o ld s  s h o w n  in
A p p e n d ix  3 .6 , an d  th e n u ll h y p o th e s is  th at th e  e x c lu d e d  in s tr u m e n ts  are va lid  th ro u g h  H a n s e n ’s J -S ta tis t ic  test
is  n o t  re jected  w ith in  a 9 9  p er  c e n t c o n f id e n c e  in terval.
The results offer clear support for the notion that the impact of aid varies according to the 
size of the recipient. Firstly, column 1 shows a significant and posidve coefficient for the 
ODA variable and a significant negative coefficient for the ODA and population 
interaction term, supporting the results of Bowman and Chand (2007). These results do, 
however, become insignificant in the 2SLS estimation although the sign of the coefficients 
remains unchanged, potentially reflecting a weak instrumentation strategy.
The Difference-GMM estimator shown in column 3 presents the only deviation from these 
results, with both the ODA and ODA interaction term recording positive coefficients, 
although neither is significant. Estimating the model by using the System-GMM procedure 
with both unadjusted and robust standard errors shows, however, a positive impact of 
ODA on government effectiveness which declines as recipients decrease in size. Estimates
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for the point at which the effect of aid on government effectiveness turns negative have a 
relatively small range of between 106,000 and 111,000 people.
Other notable results are that the natural logarithm of income per capita maintains a highly 
significant positively signed coefficient throughout all the estimations, suggesting that an 
increase in GDP per capita contributes to improvements in government effectiveness. Also 
as expected, the fragile states dummy is consistently highly significant and negatively 
signed, illustrating the persistence of poor governance once a country has obtained fragile 
status. Finally, in all the GMM estimations the lagged value of government effectiveness is 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that past institutional performance influences 
current performance. Other specifications within the literature which do not account for 
this persistence in institutional performance are thus likely to be biased.
For the core System-GMM estimations the Sargan/Hansen test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of instrument validity, albeit at a relatively high, 99 per cent confidence interval. 
The Difference-GMM estimation does, however, appear to suffer from weak instruments, 
with the Hansen test rejecting the null hypothesis of instrument validity. This confirms the 
issue raised previously that when estimating persistent time series such as measures of 
government effectiveness, the first-differenced GMM estimator can behave poorly since 
lagged levels of the series provide only weak instruments for subsequent first differences 
(Bond et al. 2001). In each case, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation between the 
error term and the endogenous variables is not rejected at a 99 per cent confidence level 
for the AR (2) lag.
3.6.2 T echn ical A ssistance and G overnm ent E ffectiveness in Small 
States
Table 3.4 below reports the results of the estimation of Equation (3.1) in columns 6 and 7 
and Equation (3.5) in columns 8 to 11. In this case, however, all estimations are made using 
two measures of ODA. The first measures the amount of technical assistance ODA whilst 
the second measures the amount of non technical assistance or ‘residual’ ODA. Both are 
accompanied by their respective population interaction terms.
The results provide substantial evidence for the fact that the dominant transmission 
mechanism for the diminishing marginal returns to aid in population size has been through 
the technical assistance component of ODA. Both the pooled OLS and 2SLS estimates of 
Equation (3.1) show that technical assistance has a significant positive impact on 
government effectiveness which diminishes as countries decrease in size, whilst the residual
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ODA variable is negative and insignificant. Column 8 provides a robust System-GMM 
estimation with the inclusion of only technical assistance and the exclusion of the residual 
ODA variable, ä la Coviello and Islam (2006:13) except with the inclusion of the 
interaction term. This estimation shows results that are comparatively similar to that in the 
previous two columns, although the size of the technical assistance coefficient decreases 
somewhat in size. This result supports the contention that not only does the size of the 
recipient reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid but that the costs of aid arise 
predominately from technical assistance.
Table 3.4: Impact of Technical Assistance on Government Effectiveness
(6)
P o o led
O L S-
C luster
R ob ust
(7)
2SLS-
C luster
R ob u st
(8)
G M M -
S ystem
R ob u st
(9)
G M M -
D if f
R o b u st
(10)
G M M -
S ystem
(11)
G M M -
System
R ob u st
lnpop 0.053 0.107 0.003 0.159 0.013 0.013
(0.013)*** (0.038)*** (0.006) (0.038)*** (0.004)*** (0.019)
lny 0.537 0.633 0.096 0.214 0.320 0.320
(0.034)*** (0.137)*** (0.030)*** (0.040)*** (0.002)*** (0.053)***
disteq 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001)** (0.003)
p o p 100km -0.077 -0.107 0.011 - 0.049 0.049
(0.054) (0.144) (0.043) (0.022)** (0.105)
fragile -0.139 -0.090 -0.095 -0.017 -0.221 -0.221
(0.043)*** (0.102) (0.034)*** (0.036) (0.002)*** (0.072)***
odatechgdp 0.489 1.537 0.086 0.151 0.070 0.070
(0.158)*** (0.680)** (0.042)** (0.040)*** (0.001)*** (0.094)
o d a te ch g d p / In (pop) -1.809 -6.426 -0.359 -0.657 -0.164 -0.164
(0.696)*** (3.087)** (0.202)* (0.189)*** (0.005)*** (0.576)
odaresgdp -0.013 -0.242 - 0.072 0.016 0.016
(0.039) (0.234) (0.017)*** (0.001)*** (0.023)
o d a resg d p / In (pop) 0.084 1.235 - -0.239 -0.025 -0.025
(0.188) (1.083) (0.080)*** (0.004)*** (0.108)
L.ge - - 0.797 0.040 0.254 0.254
(0.047)*** (0.022)* (0.001)*** (0.030)***
C onstan t -1.822 -2.359 -0.215 - -0.791 -0.791
(0.185)*** (0.631)*** (0.075)*** (0.039)*** (0.222)***
O bservations 855 853 1051 908 1051 1051
R -squared 0.510
N u m b e r o f  code 112 112 143 140 143 143
A + A -, . 1 =oIn (pop,,) 40 65 64 77, 27 1 0 ,4 -
1st Stage F-Statistics
odatechgdp4 117.24
o d a te ch g d p 4 / In (pop) 41.81
odaresgdp4 292.73
o d a resg d p 4 / ln(pop) 85.27
H ansen  J -Stadl 3.652
C hi2 P-V alue (0.161)
S arg an /H an sen  T est 114.24 40.91 126.92 126.92
C hi2 P-V alue (0.004) (0.227) (0.192) (0.192)
A rellano-B ond stadstic
AR(1) P-value 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.024
AR(2) P-value 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. OLS and 2SLS estimations show White’s heteroskedasticity-robust
and country clustered standard errors in parentheses. GMM standard errors are as described in main text. First stage F-Staustics from
2SLS estimations are well above the thresholds shown in Appendix 3.6, and the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid
through Hansen’s ]-Statistic test is not rejected within a 99 per cent confidence interval.
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The residual ODA variables are then included in the robust Difference-GMM estimation 
shown in column 9 with the sign and significance of the technical assistance results 
remaining unchanged. In this case, the residual ODA variable is also positively signed and 
significant whilst its interaction term is negative and significant. This result is then repeated 
with the System-GMM estimator and the results are shown in column 10; column 11 
shows however the results are not robust when the Windmeijer (2005) standard error 
correction process is included.
The natural logarithm of income and the lagged dependent variable are again significant 
and positive throughout each of the estimations whilst the fragile states dummy continues 
to show a significant negative impact of the effectiveness of government. The natural 
logarithm of population variable is also positive and significant in four of the six 
estimations suggesting that, ceteris paribus, smaller countries tend to perform worse in terms 
of government effectiveness than their larger counterparts.
All the GMM estimations pass the Sargan/Hansen test except for those in column 8, which 
reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity at a 99.4 per cent confidence level. This 
may be due to omitted variable bias given that this is the under specified model which 
includes only technical assistance and not residual ODA flows—estimated as a point of 
comparison with previous studies which have adopted this approach. Nevertheless, the 
results remain consistent across all of the following estimations giving a greater degree of 
confidence to the findings. In each case, the null hypothesis of no first order serial 
correlation between the error term and the endogenous variables is not rejected at a 99 per 
cent confidence level.
3.6.3 Australian Aid and Government Effectiveness in Small States
Table 3.5 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (3.5) with aid flows 
disaggregated between Australia and all other donors. Columns 12—15 consider the impact 
of total Australian ODA vis-ä-vis other ODA donors, whilst columns 15—18 further 
disaggregate these results into Australian technical assistance vis-ä-vis other donors’ 
technical assistance. All except the first two columns are accompanied with their respective 
population interaction terms. The results provide substantial evidence for the fact that the 
impact of small states on the effectiveness of aid has been particularly pronounced for the 
Australian aid program— especially through its technical assistance efforts.
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Table 3.5: Impact of Australian ODA and Technical Assistance on Government 
Effectiveness
(12)
G M M -
D iff
(13)
G M M -
System
R obust
(14)
G M M -
D iff
(15)
G M M -
System
R obust
(16)
G M M -
D iff
(17)
G M M -
System
R obust
(18)
G M M -
D iff
L g e 0.293 0.755 0.100 0.810 0.091 0.825 0.467
(0.026)*** (0.044)*** (0.043)** (0.041)*** (0.042)** (0.036)*** (0.071)***
lnpop 0.118 0.001 0.139 -0.001 0.113 -0.001 0.108
(0.069)* (0.007) (0.071)** (0.005) (0.071) (0.004) (0.073)
rgdpch 0.035 0.017 0.039 0.014 0.035 0.014 0.034
(0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.011)*** (0.003)*** (0.011)*** (0.003)*** (0.011)***
disteq -0.026 -0.000 -0.010 -0.000 -0.012 -0.000 -0.022
(0.018) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.018)
fragile -0.121 -0.123 -0.137 -0.096 -0.135 -0.097 -0.113
(0.045)*** (0.037)*** (0.042)*** (0.029)*** (0.041)*** (0.029)*** (0.045)**
poplOOkm - 0.019 - 0.005 - 0.001 -
odaausgdp 0.093
(0.040)
0.026 0.421
(0.030)
0.113
(0.029)
o d a au sg d p /
(0.019)*** (0.012)** (0.227)*
-2.336
(0.060)*
-0.516 . . _
ln(pop)
o d ao thgdp 0.012 -0.006
(1.392)*
0.008
(0.303)*
-0.020
o d a o th g d p /
(0.006)* (0.005) (0.026)
0.083
(0.009)**
0.095 . . .
In (pop)
odatechausgdp _ _
(0.186) (0.042)**
0.763 0.194 1.084
o d a tech au sg d p / _ _ _ _
(0.320)**
-4.524
(0.047)***
-0.811
(0.353)***
-6.191
In (pop)
odaresausgdp _ _ _ _
(1.962)**
-0.114
(0.284)***
-0.111
(2.170)***
0.353
o d a techo thgdp . _ _ _
(0.073)
0.125
(0.098)
-0.044
(0.420)
-0.018
od a tech o th g d p  / . . _
(0.087)
-0.357
(0.054)
0.265
(0.102)
0.382
In (pop)
odareso thgdp _ . .
(0.471)
-0.000
(0.277)
-0.001
(0.584)
-0.012
o d a resau sg d p / _ . . _
(0.010) (0.002) (0.030)
-2.331
In (pop)
o d a reso th g d p / _ _ _ _ _ _
(2.126)
0.078
In (pop)
C onstan t -0.152 -0.106 -0.107
(0.196)
O bservations 934
(0.087)*
1086 934
(0.063)*
1086 934
(0.059)*
1086 934
N u m b e r o f 149 152 149 152 149 152 149
code
ß ,  +  ß . -----1---- = 0 260 95 384 67 302
ln( p o p tJ)
S a rg an /H an sen 455.53 838.00 415.21 143.27 328.19 476.82 142.94
T est
Chi2 P- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.439)
Value
A rellano-B ond
statistic
AR(1) P-value 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.013
AR(2) P-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. GMM standard errors are as described in the main text.
Column 12 and 13 use the Difference-GMM and robust System-GMM estimators 
respectively to estimate the impact of total Australian ODA and all other donor ODA on
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the effectiveness of governments. Both estimations indicate that, ceteris paribus, Australian 
aid has had an overall posidve impact on the performance of recipient governments. The 
other ODA variable also records a posidve coefficient estimate for the Difference-GMM 
estimation, significant at a 90 per cent confidence interval.
Column 14 and 15 show the same two estimations with the inclusion of the population 
interaction terms. The results for Australian aid are again consistent with the previous two 
columns— the positive impact of aid on government effectiveness diminishes for smaller 
countries. In column 15, however, the System-GMM estimator records a negative 
coefficient estimate for the other ODA variable whilst its population interaction term is 
positive and significant. However, this effect is only moderately significant, not robust to 
the use of the Difference-GMM estimator in column 14, and, as shall be shown, not robust 
to a number of following estimations.69
Column 16 and 17 now disaggregate ODA into two, technical assistance and residual aid 
flows, for both donor categories. In this case, to reduce the number of endogenous 
variables within the model, the residual ODA variables are not interacted with population. 
Both sets of results show significant and positive coefficient estimates for the technical 
assistance variable whilst their population interaction term is significant and negative. The 
residual ODA variable and its interaction term on the other hand is insignificant in both 
estimations. This indicates that the dominant cause of the decreasing marginal effectiveness 
of Australian aid in small states has been technical assistance. The variables for the other 
donors are also insignificant in both estimations, suggesting that once the particularly 
pronounced effects of Australia are removed from the data, the diminishing marginal 
impact of technical assistance is, on average, less discernable within the data. As a final 
check for robustness, the residual ODA variables are interacted with population and 
estimated with the System-GMM in column 18. The results are comparatively similar and 
add further support to those obtained in the previous two columns.
A notable issue in these estimations is the failure of the Sargan/Hansen test statistic to 
confirm the instrument sets as valid, with the estimations shown in column 12, 13, 14, 16 
and 17 all rejecting the null hypothesis of instrument validity at a 99 per cent confidence 
level. The failure of the test in this model is likely to represent the large number of
69 The fragility of this result reduces its reliability and hence the overall concern that it raises for the general story that the impact of aid 
on government effectiveness decreases for smaller countries. Nevertheless, this is a counter-intuitive result and one that is at odds with 
the numerous other estimadons shown in this chapter.
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endogenous variables (given the high level of disaggregation of aid) and the weakness of 
the Sargan statistic when the number of instruments is close to, or greater than, the number 
of countries in the sample (Roodman 2006:14). The consistency and stability of the results 
across all the previous estimations and with the two sets of estimations made in column 15 
and 18 which do pass the instrument validity test give some degree of confidence to these 
findings. Both estimations which do pass the Sargan/Hansen test also fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation between the error term and the endogenous variables—at 
a 99 per cent confidence level for the AR(1) lag. Nevertheless, the tests suggest that 
disaggregating aid into its type and its donor can lead to fragile results which should be 
treated with a degree of caution.
3.7 D iscussion  and C onclusion
This chapter has made a number of improvements to the literature assessing the impact of 
foreign aid on the performance of recipient governments. Firstly, it has focused on the 
potentially divergent impacts of aid in small countries vis-ä-vis large countries. Secondly, it 
has distinguished between technical assistance and other types of aid delivery, reducing the 
potential for omitted variable bias as can be found in other papers in the literature. Thirdly, 
it has considered explicitly whether the Australian aid program’s focus on small states and 
on the delivery of technical assistance has made any of these effects more pronounced. 
Fourthly, this chapter has adopted more advanced estimation methods which better 
control for endogenous explanatory variables than the 2SLS estimates seen in other 
previous studies. Fifthly, the core estimations have controlled for institutional persistence, 
which was previously unused in the only other study to consider the divergent impact of 
aid across small countries. Sixthly, this chapter has collected a large cross country data set 
across ten years with data included for small states, particularly those in the South Pacific. 
Finally, this chapter has adopted a more rigorous testing of the 2SLS first stage F-Statistic 
identification assumption, previously unused in this literature.
A number of important findings have been made. In general, it was found that the positive 
impact of aid on government effectiveness tends to diminish as countries decrease in 
population. For the full sample, the threshold estimates for when the impact of ODA on 
government effectiveness turns negative ranges from a popualtion of 106 thousand to 111 
thousand. Whilst the specific results for Australian aid produce threshold effects between 
95 thousand and 260 thousand for total Australian ODA and 302 thousand to 384 
thousand for Australian technical assistance. For the full sample total ODA results this
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then implies that Cook Islands, Kiribad, Nauru, Niue, Palau, and Tuvalu have all incurred 
negative impacts of aid on government performance whilst countries such as Tonga and 
FSM are on the threshold. This grouping of countries is then expanded to include Vanuatu 
and Samoa for the Australia specific results. As such, assuming that each of these countries 
has mean values for each of the other explanatory factors, out of a total of 14 Pacific Island 
countries included within the sample 10 can be expected to have incurred some form of 
negative impact of either aid, or technical assistance, between 1996 and 2006. The only 
countries not included in this group are Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands and East Timor.
The results also indicate that the diminishing marginal returns to aid in population also 
appear to be most pronounced within the technical assistance component of aid. This is an 
intuitively appealing result because the range of criticisms levelled against foreign aid are 
often focused on its bureaucratic costs in the form of encouraging rent-seeking behaviour, 
undermining incentives for responsible fiscal management and its ability to soak up scarce 
institutional resources in the recipient country. More specifically, in terms of technical 
assistance, these costs have manifested themselves through accusations of the crowding out 
of local bureaucratic capacity and reducing domestic ownership of reform processes.
This chapter has explained the numerous reasons to believe that many of these costs may 
be more pronounced in small countries vis-ä-vis large countries. Indeed, widespread 
anecdotal evidence from across the South Pacific suggests that the disproportionate power 
held by representatives and consultants from donor organisations in these countries has 
often undermined the establishment of productive working partnerships with recipient 
governments and bureaucracies. The weaker recipient governments in small states are also 
much less able to enforce donor harmonisation practices or to even enforce good donor 
policies, leaving aid givers much more freedom to pursue their own, rather than the 
recipients’, objectives. The limited institutional capacity present in small states also 
exacerbates the costs of aid donors soaking up bureaucratic capital through design 
processes, monitoring and evaluation requirements, and negotiation of funding 
arrangements.
Given these unique challenges facing SIDS, it is perhaps no surprise to observe that the
diminishing impact of aid and technical assistance in small states is particularly pronounced
for Australia—given its historical focus on delivering aid to small states, increasingly in the
form of technical assistance. Whilst the thresholds at which these efforts begin to have a
detrimental impact vary by estimation method, these results offer an important insight into
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why institutional performance has continued to deteriorate in many South Pacific countries 
over the last three decades. When taking the upper estimates of the population thresholds, 
Nauru, Kiribati, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands all fall within the range 
where aid has a negative impact on government performance. Whilst PNG is well above 
these thresholds, its weak public sector capacity, low levels of human capital and 
fragmented politics may have made it an outlier in this regard. These results also help to 
explain the apparent ‘Pacific paradox’— abundant external grant support parallel with poor 
developmental outcomes. As discussed, anecdotal evidence emerging from a number of 
recent AusAID reviews of its own technical assistance efforts also now appears to be 
reinforcing this quantitative evidence.
Governance programs are likely to remain at the forefront of Australian assistance efforts 
in the Pacific, particularly as the aid program scales up over the coming years. This is 
appropriate given the significant governance capacity constraints which are widely 
acknowledged as being one of the most important growth constraints to the region. 
However, these results should sound a substantial caution to the Australian aid program as 
it seeks to expand these assistance efforts.
Australia must remain mindful of the variety of distortions which foreign aid, and in 
particular technical assistance, can create and that these effects are likely to be much more 
pronounced in small states. The design of aid modalities which minimise bureaucratic 
burden, augment rather than replace domestic capacity, and perhaps most importantly 
create a requisite demand for institutional reform must therefore be at the forefront of 
Australia’s, and other donors’, efforts to continue providing high volumes of aid in the 
South Pacific region.
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C hapter 4: Foreign Aid and F iscal Perform ance in Post
Independence P N G
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background
The previous chapter showed that the positive impact of aid on overall levels of 
government effectiveness tends to decline as the size of the recipient country decreases. 
The following chapters delve deeper into analysing the impact of foreign aid on recipient 
government behaviour in SIDS through a case study of PNG. This case study focuses on 
how foreign aid and government behaviour have interacted to influence the process that 
can be broadly defined as fiscal policy. Fiscal policies, which are determined largely through 
the budget process, are responsible for aggregating the diverse preferences of society, 
assessing the redistributive consequences of meeting these preferences and ultimately 
providing the mechanism through which government becomes accountable to its citizens 
for the quality of goods and services it provides (Fischer 1993; Easterly and Rebelo 1993; 
Bleaney et al. 2001).
In particular, the following chapters classify the broad process of fiscal policy into three 
separate elements, each of which impacts on a government’s ability to deliver adequate 
levels of social services and create an environment conducive to widespread wealth 
creation.
The first element of fiscal policy which is analysed is how foreign aid flows have impacted 
on the PNG Government’s management of its fiscal aggregates such as domestic revenue 
collection, accumulation of public debt and expenditure levels. Effective management of 
these fiscal aggregates determines the sustainability of a government’s expenditure and 
revenue policies and ultimately determines whether the government is able to support long 
term economic growth and macroeconomic stability by maintaining fiscal discipline. These 
issues are considered in Chapter 5.
The second element of fiscal policy which is analysed is how foreign aid has impacted on 
the allocation of PNG Government spending to productive sectors of the economy which 
facilitate an expansion of both human and physical capital. This includes for example the 
level of investment made in core public goods such as health, education, infrastructure, and 
law and order. These issues are considered in Chapter 6.
The third element of fiscal policy which is analysed is how foreign aid has impacted on the 
ability of the PNG Government to translate its public spending allocations into improved
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social outcomes. In this sense, what impact has foreign aid had on the ability of the PNG 
Government to obtain value for money in terms of maximising the impact its spending has 
on the social outcomes for which the money has been designated. These issues are 
considered in Chapter 7.
The purpose and contribution of the present chapter therefore is threefold. Firstly, it 
discusses the theoretical relationships which exist between foreign aid and each of these 
elements of fiscal policy— and develops a theoretical model of how each of the above 
interactions take place. This forms the basis of the empirical models considered in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Secondly, this chapter provides a historical analysis of the relationship 
between foreign aid and the PNG Government’s fiscal and bureaucratic performance in 
the post independence era. This provides a context for the empirical analysis and reveals a 
number of important fiscal behaviours of successive PNG Governments. The lessons from 
this analysis are then included in the final policy implications chapter.
4.1.2 A Case Study of the Relationship between Aid and Fiscal Policy in 
PNG
PNG represents a unique and important case study for understanding the impact of 
Australia’s foreign assistance efforts on bureaucratic and fiscal behaviour of SIDS for a 
number of reasons. PNG has stood as the cornerstone of the Australian aid program since 
its inception as a system of government-to-government grants following World War Two 
(ABS 2001). By the time of PNG’s independence in 1975, Australia was transferring over 
K900 million in real 1999 terms under a program of direct budget support. This was equal 
to almost K500 per capita and comprised over half of the PNG Government’s total 
revenue. Since then, PNG has received 61 per cent of total Australian aid flows. In 2007, 
Australia gave PNG some K650 million in real 1999 terms such that since independence 
Australia has accounted for just over 87 per cent of PNG’s total aid receipts.
PNG also represents an important case study for the Australian aid program because
despite high levels of foreign assistance, PNG’s economic and social performance has
languished in the post independence era (Batten 2008). Even with the exploitation of
substantial mineral and natural resources, per capita incomes have continued along a long
term decline (Chart 4.3). The proportion of the population living on less than US$1 a day
increased from 25 to 40 per cent over the last decade, whilst health and education statistics
have also continued to perform poorly, lagging behind both global averages and that of its
Melanesian neighbours (Chart 4.1, Appendix 4.1). This data corroborates substantial
83
anecdotal evidence that the quality of government services— such as rural health posts, 
primary and secondary schooling, and basic infrastructure— has continued to deteriorate 
throughout the post independence era. These effects have been particularly pronounced in 
rural areas of the country where approximately 80—85 per cent of the population lives.
This situation raises a number of important questions regarding the contribution of 
Australian and other donor aid to PNG’s overall development performance. There have 
been a number of previous studies seeking to answer this question. Some have argued that 
the rate of decline would have been much higher had the Australian aid program not been 
present. For example, an internal report by AusAID (2003a) titled the Contribution of 
Australian A id  to PNG Development (1975—2003) argues that the aid it has given to the 
education sector has been central to the isolated gains made in literacy and school 
enrolment rates. It also posits that aid funds have prevented the collapse of the health 
system and maintained funding levels for essential road and air infrastructure.70
In contrast, other authors have attributed the very presence of aid as the factor 
contributing to the decline in post independence economic and fiscal performance. These 
have included Windybank and Manning (2003:12) who have argued that Australian aid 
enabled successive PNG governments to ‘live beyond their means, encouraging 
irresponsible policies and postponing the need for reform’. Indeed, according to 
Windybank and Manning (2003), Australian aid has not only perpetuated poor policies but 
also encouraged PNG’s dependence on financial assistance as the expansive aid program 
became a surrogate government. This argument was also supported by Hughes (2003) and 
Hughes and Windybank (2005) who have argued that aid has failed in the Pacific region as 
a whole because it has supported irresponsible fiscal behaviour.
The DAC of the OECD also undertook a Peer Review of Australian aid in 2004. This 
Review gave Australia credit for evolving its aid program towards international best 
practice standards in its program design, administration and implementation. It also 
highlighted, however, the need to employ an improved framework for ensuring improved 
PNG Government funding for key service delivery sectors. This was because it believed 
wide scale fungibility had been taking place, limiting the potential impacts of aid on 
improving sectoral outcomes (OECD DAC 2005:94).
70 Although, in spite of these achievements, the report still concedes that the aid program has been unable to convert this into per capita 
income growth.
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This view was also highlighted in the Joint Review of Australian A id  Program to PNG (Lepani et 
al. 2004). This report blamed many of the poor post independence fiscal outcomes on the 
weaknesses in the existing performance monitoring system for jointly monitoring 
expenditure of total resources. This, it argued, arose largely as a result of a lack of 
constructive dialogue between the two governments regarding what public finances should 
be targeted at achieving.71
Each of these studies has, however, relied on casual observations of PNG’s fiscal data. As 
shall now be shown, however, understanding the marginal impact of foreign aid on each of 
these macro and micro fiscal outcomes requires an analysis of the complex set of 
interactions which occur between these variables. Understanding these interactions can 
then serve as a central element of designing future assistance strategies better targeted at 
improving fiscal and economic outcomes in PNG.
4.2 Fiscal E ffects o f Aid: T heory  
4.2.1 F oreign  Aid and F iscal Policy
To illustrate how foreign aid can influence each of the three elements of fiscal policy 
discussed above, this section considers first the most simplistic form of the PNG 
Government’s accounting identity, which can be written as:
E ,-(T ,+ A ,)  = D, (4.1)
where Et equals total government expenditure at time /, Tt equals domestic taxation 
receipts, A, equals total aid revenues and Dt equals the change in the government’s debt 
levels (borrowing) or the deficit/surplus. This is the most basic requirement which each 
PNG Government must satisfy each fiscal year.
Although this static framework does not reveal any inter temporal dynamics, it can be used 
to illustrate some important insights into the potential responses of the PNG Government 
following an inflow of aid. Firstly, assuming that taxation revenues are held constant, an
71 Most recently, Heinecke et al. (2008) have argued that whilst in some cases Australian technical and financial assistance has led to 
observable improvements in the performance of government in PNG, insufficient attention has been placed on providing support 
which encourages a requisite demand for reform, and this has been limiting the overall effectiveness of the program.
85
inflow of aid can be used to either finance an increase in expenditures or to finance a 
reduction in borrowing. Similarly, bolding borrowing constant, the aid inflow can finance 
either an increase in expenditure or a fall in domesdc tax collection. Finally, in the event 
that the government chooses to hold expenditure levels constant, the aid inflow can be 
used to finance a reduction in domestic taxation or a lower level of borrowing.
Another consequence of an inflow foreign aid to a specific sector is known as the ‘flypaper 
effect’. In this situation the aid inflow leads to a more than proportional increase in 
expenditure for that sector (Heller 1975; Pack and Pack 1990; McGillivray and Ahmed 
1999).72 These increasing expenditures must then be funded either via increased domestic 
revenue collection or through higher levels of borrowing— such that the inflow of aid leads 
to higher levels of public debt.
One explanation for this effect is the ability of foreign aid to mobilise additional resources 
for government expenditures through, for example, improving tax collection or opening up 
new private sector sources of credit (World Bank 1998:64). McGillivray and Morrissey 
(2000) also offer an alternative explanation through a concept they call ‘aid illusion’. The 
authors argue that with imperfect information flows and weak expenditure management 
systems, aid inflows may be accompanied with misperceptions or illusions regarding either 
the real or nominal value of the aid inflow, and the spending conditions attached 
(McGillivray and Morrissey 2000:3). For example, donors may deny funds due to the 
recipient’s failure to meet certain conditionality agreements, following which the 
government may have to resort to additional borrowing to cover the expected revenue 
flow. Likewise, imperfect budgetary processes may overvalue the contribution of aid to a 
specific project or the aid inflow may require counterpart funding, both of which can also 
create a need for government to find additional funds. Equally, the government may also 
find that it has a lower need to borrow funds in the event that its public service under 
values the contribution of donor funds within a particular fiscal cycle.
Whether this, or any of the other fiscal effects of aid described, occurs depends ultimately 
on how the recipient government responds to the inflow of aid. From a theoretical 
perspective however, none of these outcomes are necessarily preferable to others. In a 
country with high and/or distortionary7 taxes, a cut in domestic revenue may stimulate
72 The flypaper effect was originally coined in reference to the effect of grants from upper level government stimulating higher levels of 
local spending than would a comparable increase in local income (van de Walle and Mu 2007:669). In this sense aid tends to ‘stick’ to 
these expenditures (see Heller (1975), McGillivray and Ahmed (1999) and Pack and Pack (1990) for a discussion in the aid context).
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further private sector investment whilst in a low taxation environment this action may 
encourage higher levels of aid dependence. Likewise, additional expenditure may be used to 
finance growth-inducing productive activities or it may perpetuate the existence of 
subsidies which distort the prevailing business environment.
To try and ensure that funds are spent on donor priorities, foreign aid is often disbursed to 
specific expenditure priorities or activities within the recipient country. These allocations 
reflect the donors’ own preferences for the optimal allocation of their financial assistance. 
Hence, Equation (4.1) can now be more accurately written as:
EDj +Ec , - (T i +BS,+PR,) = D,(4.2)
In this case, the donor attempts to satisfy their own expenditure preferences by delivering 
aid in the form of either general budgetary support, p$  , or as aid earmarked for 
expenditure on particular activities or sectors of the economy typically through project or 
program delivery mechanisms, pR . Assuming that the donor has altruistic motivations,
pp  allocations are made to sectors which they perceive to be development orientated, 
R^ , whilst PS can be spent freely by the recipient on either development expenditures, 
Pd ' ,  or other general government expenditures, Rg ^.
4.2.2 Aid and Fiscal Aggregates
How the recipient government decides to treat these two different types of aid inflows will 
depend on two key factors. First is the recipient government’s own utility function whereby 
it derives benefit from allocating government funds across each of the two expenditure 
priorities, R^ and Rc • Assuming that these preferences can be expressed with the 
familiar Cobb-Douglas utility function, this can thus be written as:
U(EDj ,EGj ) = E“Dj.E £  (4.3)
The second determinant is the proportion of aid allocated in the form of pp  which the 
recipient government treats as fungible, ^ • This ^ parameter represents the amount of aid 
which the recipient government perceives it can use to free up its own revenues to spend 
on other priorities, such as lowering taxation, lowering borrowing or altering the
87
expenditure composition between £  and £  . Incorporating this into Equation (4.2)
Dyt G yt
thus gives:
PnyEBj + Paj.Eaj-(T, + BS, +0PR,) = D, (4.4)
This identity represents the recipient government’s budget constraint when it goes about 
solving Equation (4.3). As such, the government maximisation problem can be written as:
max
(£D,£c )er(G)
U(EDj ,EGj ) s.t. (T' + BSt +</>PR') + D' - PDrEDl + PGrEGl - 0 (4.5)
The Lagrangian for the problem can thus be written as:
e = £ “,£'0 ° + MT. + BS, + + D -P DJ-Ed,, + Pa., E0.,) (4.6)
This gives the first order conditions:
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
which for each of the two expenditure categories solves to give:
Ed t = a (T, + BS, + (f)PR, + D,)
(4.10)
EG,=<X-a)(T,+BS'+tPR,+D')
= aE “D-'.E'-“-APDj=0
Jn,t
= (1 - a ) £ “ ,.£c“ -  XPUj = 0
JG,t
~ T, + BS, + (j)PR, + D, PD , .Ed , + PG ( .Eg , — 0
These expenditure identities can then be rearranged to give a system of interdependent 
equations which relate the impact of foreign aid on each of the fiscal variables according to:
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(4.11)
Ed =  co(T, BS, PR, D)
Eg = t(T,BS,PR,D )
T = tj(Ed,Eg,BS,PR,D)
D = ic(Ed,Eg,T,BS,PR )
A = 7t(Ed,Eg,T ,D )
This system o f fiscal equations provides the theoretical basis for analysing the impact of 
foreign aid on the PNG Government’s management of fiscal aggregates in the post 
independence period in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 then disaggregates the expenditure 
components of this system to consider a model which analyses the impact o f foreign aid on 
the composition of government expenditure, decomposing spending between a number of 
sectoral priorities.
4.2.3 Aid and Public Sector Efficiency
Just as important as where the government allocates its resources is how effective the 
public sector is at utilising these resources to achieve improvements in service delivery 
within each sector. This is a particularly pertinent issue both within PN G  and the other 
SIDS of the South Pacific as weak public sector capacity continues to be a significant 
contributor to poor levels of service delivery (Feeny and Rogers 2008).73 Along with 
providing resources for pro poor investments therefore, a key question for the Australian 
aid program is what role its own, and other donor, assistance plays in improving the ability 
of recipient governments to use both domestic and foreign resources effectively.
Assume, for example, that the public expenditure allocation E Di t derived above is targeted
at the attainment of a specific development outcome i at time /, <!>,,. Incorporating this
spending into a social welfare production function of the type used in Rajkumar and 
Swaroop (2002) can be written as:
cp — e K <
{  T T \ U f  rr \ß
v Yt y
a >  0 , / ?> 0 (4.12)
73 Feeny and Rogers (2008), for example, find that public sector efficiency at improving health and educauon outcomes tends to be 
considerably lower in SIDS than in other larger countries.
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where \  is a vector of time, /, variant factors that affect the performance of the recipient 
government in providing public services, Yt *s total output and is total population. The 
restrictions placed on the marginal elasticity coefficients for both per capita GDP, #  and 
public expenditures as a percentage of GDP, ß  indicate that outcomes in sector i are 
strictly increasing with improvements in per capita income and that outcomes in sector i 
are weakly increasing with higher levels of public expenditure.
In environments of weak public sector accountability and poor expenditure management 
processes such as in PNG, the amount of funds allocated to a specific expenditure priority 
may, however, not actually be representative of the ability of those funds to influence social 
welfare outcomes. In this case it can be said that in Equation (4.12):
ß  = v ( . ) ß (4.13)
where the function £>(.) represents the amount of i sector development expenditures, ,
which are spent productively rather than wasted through misuse, corruption or 
malfeasance. In essence this is a measure of the efficiency of the public sector in 
transforming budgeted expenditure allocations into productive investments. The ß { term 
thus represents the efficiency of the public service in converting these government 
allocated funds into social outcomes in each sector.
As discussed, however, technical assistance can potentially have an important impact on 
the efficiency of public spending, both by providing additional bureaucratic resources (the 
‘doing’ component of technical assistance) and by improving the quality of existing 
resources through capacity development (the ‘building’ component of technical 
assistance).74 Given this, £>(.)can be said to be represented by:
v,=Zc + Z,.,-T(4-14)
where T, is the amount of technical assistance received at time t and^,, is the marginal 
impact of technical assistance on public sector efficiency. Substituting 4.14 into 4.13 gives 
ß  ~ {Zoi + %\ I 'T , y ß i  which can then be substituted into 4.12 to give:
74 This approach contrasts with that of Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) who focused on the role of governance in determining public 
sector efficiency.
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(4.15)
Suppose also that each of the explanatory variables is interdependent. For example, 
technical assistance is designed to effect the efficiency of public service delivery which, 
combined with public expenditures, will flow on to effect income growth. In turn, income 
growth will affect social welfare outcomes, and public sector capacity is likely to be a 
determinant of the amount of aid received as technical assistance. The relationships shown 
in Equation (4.15) can then be more fully categorised by a system of equations given by:
This specification is applied in Chapter 7 to a case study of PNG’s health sector as a means 
of assessing how technical assistance has affected the efficiency of the public sector in 
providing health outcomes. The remainder of this chapter provides a historical background 
for this case study, discussing the inter play between foreign aid, in its varying forms, and 
PNG’s fiscal policy since independence.
PNG began the post independence era with a small, mostly agriculturally based economy 
with domestic revenues sourced from personal income taxes of the large expatriate 
population, a few larger companies and trade duties (Fallon 1992:10). During 1975-87, 
PNG was also heavily dependent on the receipt of financial assistance from foreign donors, 
mostly originating from its former colonial administrator Australia in the form of budgetary 
support. The budget support approach emphasised the role of aid in alleviating the 
resource constraints facing the government as it had a limited domestic production base 
and poor revenue raising ability. Channelling resources directly into PNG’s budgetary 
system also had the added advantage of utilising and potentially strengthening the 
government’s fiscal management processes, giving the newly independent government a 
high degree of control and ownership over of these resources. The importance of budget 
support to PNG’s fiscal position during this period can be seen in Chart 4.1, which shows
<t> = f ( A , Y / N , E DiIY)  
A = g(<t>,Y/N,EDi/ Y)  
Y / N  = A, EDi / T)
EDi/ Y  = k(<t>,A,Y/N)
(4.16)
4.3 Post Independence Foreign Aid and Fiscal Trends in PNG
4.3.1 The Budget Support Era (1975—87)
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that in 1975 foreign financial support was equivalent to just over K900 million in real 1999 
terms. This funding was approximately 20 per cent larger in per capita terms than total 
domestic revenue collection.
In the years following independence, PNG began to reduce its reliance on foreign aid as a 
source of government revenue. After peaking in 1975, real levels of foreign aid per capita 
declined at an average rate of 8 per cent per annum between 1975 and 1982. This decline 
occurred in tandem with a growth in domestic revenue collection from K365 per capita in 
1975 to K450 per capita in 1982. Nevertheless, foreign assistance was still a dominant 
source of finance for government expenditure during this period, with grants averaging 38 
per cent of total revenue.
Chart 4.1: Government Expenditure*, Domestic Revenue and Total Aid Flows
Kina per capita, constant 1999
Mlrtary operations in 
Bougainville
Foreign exch ange crisis & 
floating of Kina
Fteakaid
Bougainville
rrine closure
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80% shift to  project aid
Expendtire ------Grant Aid ------Domestic Revenue
Source: Government PNG Budget Documents (various years), see Appendix 5.1. * Excluding debt repayment.
Despite growing domestic revenues, the rapid decline in foreign financial support meant 
that the PNG Government faced immediate difficulties in trying to maintain fiscal balance 
(Hinchliffe 1980:820). Adding to these pressures was also the rapid growth in the cost of 
the bureaucracy, which occurred from increasing minimum wage levels (to compensate for 
the high rates of inflation induced by the 1973 oil price shock) and a continuing 
decentralisation of government service delivery— following the establishment of provincial
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governments in 1977. BPNG (1978), for example, estimates that in 1978 up to 58 per cent 
of government expenditure went on salary and wages costs.
A growing bureaucracy combined with pressures for an improvement in service delivery 
from a newly formed government and declines in budget support led to a- large and 
persistent fiscal gap in the late 1970s (Lim 1987). During this period, total expenditures 
equalled just over 30 per cent of GDP, whilst domestic revenue equalled 10 per cent of 
GDP leaving a 20 per cent fiscal gap. Foreign grants covered the majority of this gap, 
averaging 15 per cent of GDP, and underwrote the costs of the growing bureaucracy. 
However, with expenditures exceeding revenues by an average of 4—5 per cent of GDP, the 
budget remained in deficit for the rest of the decade which led to steadily increasing public 
debt (Chart 4.2).
Chart 4.2: Budget Balance (1975—2009)
Budget Balance (% GDP)
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Source: IMF GFS (2009) and GoPNG (2008, 2009).
These fiscal pressures also led to some significant changes in the composition of 
government expenditures. In particular, whilst health and education spending remained 
relatively constant throughout this period, the rapid increase in general government 
expenditure corresponded with a significant drop in infrastructure investment—which fell 
from a peak of K130 per capita in 1974 to K60 per capita in 1982 (Chart 4.3).V:>
75 Sectoral expenditure figures represent a substantial data collection exercise undertaken with data from the IMF International Finance 
Stadstics (2008) and the PNG Department of Treasury and Finance (explained in detail in Appendix 5.1). These figures are expressed
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Chart 4.3: Government Expenditure by Sector— Infrastructure, Health, Education 
and General
Kina per capita, constant 1999 Kina per capita, constant 1999
------ Infrastructure (LHS) ------- Health (LHS) ------- Education (LHS) — General (RHS)
Source: Government PNG Budget Documents (various years), see Appendix 5.1.
PNG entered the 1980s facing a number of severe external shocks to its economy. The 
tripling of oil prices following the global oil price shock in 1979 led to a rapid decline in the 
economy’s terms of trade and a subsequent deterioration of its balance of payments 
position. The emergence of a global recession in 1980 then caused a considerable drop in 
the prices of many of PNG’s key agricultural export commodities. The revenue impact of 
this was also augmented by a period of reduced output from the Bougainville mining 
operations which had been making a large contribution to government revenues since 1974 
(Wolfers 1981). This effect can be seen in Chart 4.4 which shows real GDP per capita 
declining below its 1975 level in the early 1980s.
in per capita terms to reflect the government’s financial ability to deliver a comparable set of services to the enure population in the 
post independence period. Government expenditures include those components of foreign aid which are channelled through PNG 
budgetary processes.
94
Chart 4.4: GDP and GDP Per Capita (1974-2008)
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Source: Government PNG Budget Documents (various years), see Appendix 5.1.
These pressures posed the government with some significant fiscal challenges. GDP 
growth was again negative in 1980, recording a decline of 2.3 per cent, and inflation levels 
had jumped to 12 per cent. Reduced Australian budgetary support also led to grant revenue 
declining to approximately 31 per cent of total revenue. Combined with almost static 
domestic revenue collection between 1980 and 1982, this led to a tight fiscal constraint on 
any attempts by the government to fund new expenditures.
Some non priority expenditure cuts were made during this period, mainly in areas related to 
capital projects and ongoing maintenance costs, with their share of total expenditure 
dropping from 15 to 12 per cent between 1980 and 1982 (BPNG 2007). In contrast, other 
recurrent costs such as wages and salaries continued to grow. This meant that despite 
stagnant funding levels to development priority areas such as health and education, the 
fiscal gap increased dramatically in 1981 and 1982, with the budget recording deficits of 5.9 
and 5.1 per cent of GDP, respectively.76
In 1982, the PNG Government commissioned the Garnaut and Baxter Review (1983) 
which sought to assess the country’s macroeconomic policy settings, focusing in particular 
on the country’s fixed exchange rate system. Motivated in part by the upcoming floating of
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76 Public employment numbers continued to increase during this period reaching upwards of 50,000 in 1982 and soaking up 
approximately 33 per cent of total budget expenditures (King 1983:165).
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the Australian Dollar in 1983, the Review supported the continuation of a pegged exchange 
rate, or hard Kina, policy for PNG (Garnaut and Baxter 1983). However, the Review also 
emphasised that to maintain a pegged exchange rate, the government would have to reduce 
its overall expenditure levels and increase fiscal discipline in order to correct the 
macroeconomic imbalances which had opened up during the early 1980s. Central to this 
task would be efforts to reduce the price of labour (which had been growing strongly with 
increases in minimum wages) relative to other tradable goods by approximately 25 to 30 
per cent so as to offset the contractionary effects on employment which would occur from 
a reduction in the level of government expenditure.
The PNG Government chose not to implement any wage growth constraints (Imbun 
2005:231). Instead it chose to re-orientate its macroeconomic and fiscal policy towards a 
more sustainable footing by trying to improve fiscal discipline and devaluing the Kina to 
encourage greater international competitiveness.77 This included a fiscal stabilisation policy 
which targeted a restraint on expenditure growth leading to an overall cut in expenditures 
of just over 5 per cent in real terms for the 1983 budget (Hegarty and King 1983:224). This 
allowed the government to reign in the large fiscal gap which had opened up in the 
immediate post independence period, however, the budget continued to remain in deficit, 
averaging 0.2 per cent of GDP between 1983 and 1987.
4.3.2 The Bougainville Crisis and the First Donor Bail-Out (1988—93)
By the end of 1988, the economy and its fiscal management began to deteriorate (Fallon 
1992:10). A drop in agricultural prices led to lower government revenues and foreign 
financial assistance continued to decline, falling from 34 per cent of total revenues in 1983 
to just under 20 per cent in 1989.78 The economy also contracted by 1.4 per cent in 1989 
and by just under 3 per cent in 1990—which contributed to the budget deficit increasing 
from 1.15 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1990.
This deteriorating economic performance also gave rise to a growth in the criticism of 
Australia’s program of direct budget support. Primarily, critics began to argue that budget 
support had insulated successive PNG Governments from taking difficult decisions on 
revenue raising efforts or for prioritising their own domestic resources towards key
77 In terms of the US Dollar, this led to a drop in the exchange rate from K 1.36/USS in 1982, to parity in 1985.
78 This decline occurred in line with the 1985 Aid Agreement between Australia and PNG which agreed on a gradual reducdon of 3 per 
cent per annum in real terms in the total amount of Australian funding.
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development sectors (Callick et al. 1990:81). Large inflows of unconditional Australian aid 
were also attributed to PNG’s booming government sector which since independence had 
been growing at a faster rate than the economy.'9 In turn, this drew a large proportion of 
the limited supply of educated and entrepreneurial citizens into the bureaucracy rather than 
towards more productive sectors of the economy conducive to wealth creation.80
Growing expectations regarding PNG’s ability to obtain fiscal self reliance from the 
expanding mining sector during the 1980s, combined with perceptions of fiscal 
mismanagement (May 2001; Standish 2007:135) then led Australia to initiate a shift in its 
aid delivery away from direct budgetary support. This approach was formalised with the 
signing of a new Development Cooperation Treaty (DCT) between the two governments 
in 1989 which sought to gradually increase the proportion of funds given to earmarked 
activities through project aid.81
It was also during the late 1980s when the PNG Government was plunged into its first 
major crisis in the form of a domestic conflict in its Bougainville province. A struggle for 
greater compensation and less environmental damage by local residents from the Panguna 
Copper Mine run by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) manifested itself into an island 
wide struggle for independence. In 1989, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
closed the mine by launching a secessionist war (Masono 2006:35).82 By the time of its 
closure, the Panguna mine, half way through a 30-year lifespan, was generating 
approximately 35 per cent of the country’s total exports, 15 per cent of government 
revenue and 8 per cent of GDP (Stein 1991:7). As a result, the abrupt cessation of activities 
in this mine had a large destabilising effect on the economy. The effects of this on the fiscal 
position were also compounded by a large drop in cocoa production on the island from the 
associated conflict as well as a large drop in the country’s terms of trade for a number of 
other agricultural products such as coffee, copra and palm oil (Batten 2008). In total,
79 The World Bank (1999:129), for example, estimates that despite numerous attempts at downsizing the public service, by 1990 total 
wage spending comprised 40.1 per cent of recurrent government expenditure and 33.9 per cent of total expenditure.
80 More recendy, Hughes (2003) and Hughes and Windybank (2005) have also supported this view, arguing that budgetary support was 
widely used to fund higher levels of general government consumpdon and had underwritten the government’s inability to prioridse 
resources away from inefficient or ineffecuve government acdvides.
81 Specifically, this Treaty committed Australia to providing K750 million of assistance over the following five years. Whilst this 
maintained nominal levels of budgetary assistance (in effect declining by the rate of Australian infladon), all further increases in 
financial assistance were agreed to occur through project aid (DCT 1989).
82 It was not until 1997 that a degree of peace was officially restored following the government’s controversial hiring of the Sandline 
mercenary group to remove the leadership of the BRA and secure control over the mine (May 2006:160). Later in 1997, peace talks 
commenced, brokered by Australia and New Zealand, which eventually led to the establishment of the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (Regan 1998).
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domestic revenue collection declined by 15 per cent in per capita terms between 1989 and 
1990, and then by a further 4 per cent between 1990 and 1991 (Chart 4.1).
Increasing military obligations arising from the Bougainville conflict also placed pressures 
on the expenditure side of the government’s fiscal envelope. Following a small 1.5 per cent 
contraction between 1989 and 1990 amid the drop in revenue, expenditures increased by 
12 per cent between 1990 and 1991. When combined with the loss in revenue, this led both 
to a sharp deterioration in the fiscal balance, with the budget deficit increasing from 1.15 
per cent of GDP in 1989 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1990. The government’s total 
outstanding debt also rapidly increased, rising in real terms by 14 per cent between 1989 
and 1990, from K3.2 billion to K3.7 billion.83
Further compounding these fiscal pressures was an escalation by Australia of the rate at 
which it sought to shift the aid program from direct budgetary support to project aid. This 
stemmed largely from the continuation of the Bougainville crisis, and the Australian 
Government’s desire not to be seen as funding conflict related expenditures through its aid 
program (Tulip 2005:1).84 As shown in Chart 4.5, in the four years following the signing of 
the original 1989 DCT, the amount of budgetary support dropped rapidly, declining from 
K140 per capita to K24 per capita, a decline of 82 per cent. When combined with the 18 
per cent decline in per capita domestic revenue generation which occurred throughout this 
period (falling from K600 per capita to K490 per capita), it meant that at the peak of the 
Bougainville crisis the PNG Government was increasingly left to finance non donor- 
financed sectors with its own resources.
This initiated a number of fiscal responses by the PNG Government. In the first instance 
was a dramatic increase in levels of borrowing to maintain expenditures in other non 
donor-financed areas of the budget, particularly those related to defence. As such, despite 
falling domestic and budgetary support revenues, there was a large increase in aggregate 
expenditure levels during this period (Chart 4.5).
Another important feature of this rapid shift away from budget support was that despite 
aid being increasingly tied to specific development activities, the amount of aggregate 
funding for development items such as health and infrastructure remained relatively
83 These developments did, however, have little impact on revenue collection as they were only in the early stages of production.
84 This policy was formalised in a revised DCT signed by the two governments in 1992, which, whilst offering comparable levels of 
financial support, committed Australia to a complete phasing-out of budget support by the end of the decade in favour of project aid.
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unchanged between 1989 and 1991, whilst per capita funding for educadon actually fell. In 
contrast, funding for the general expenditure category increased rapidly. As shall be 
analysed in Chapter 6, this illustrates a period of extreme aid fungibility where the PNG 
Government was forced to withdraw resources from aid-financed sectors in order to fund 
activities related to the Bougainville crisis.
Chart 4.5: Budgetary Support and Project and Program Grants (1974—2008)
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Source: Government PNG Budget Documents (various years), see Appendix 5.1.
The government’s growing levels of deficit financing throughout the crisis also continued 
to stimulate domestic demand. This contributed to higher levels of import growth, raising 
the country’s already high current account deficit. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the 
loss of foreign exchange earnings from the Bougainville mining operations, combined with 
public sector debt reaching 47 per cent of GDP in 1990, meant that the government was 
facing a considerable shortage of foreign exchange reserves at the end of the decade.
Donors responded to this situation in 1990 by issuing a US$50 million World Bank loan 
through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to cover the 
government’s foreign exchange requirements (World Bank 1990). As part of the 
conditionality associated with this package, PNG was required to adopt its first Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP). Under the requirements of the SAP, the government adopted 
a stabilisation package which devalued the Kina by 10 per cent and committed to restrain 
wage growth, reduce recurrent expenditures and undertake a number of structural reforms
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aimed at trade liberalisation and the privatisation of state owned entities (World Bank 
1990). These moves, combined with the commencement of production at the Misima mine 
and the further development of the Porgera mine, were enough to keep the economy out 
of sustained recession, with GDP growth rebounding strongly in 1991 following two years 
of successive contraction in 1989 and 1990.
Following the 1990 SAP agreement, the economic fundamentals of the economy showed 
signs of improvement. The economy expanded by 9.5 per cent in 1991, 13.8 per cent in 
1992 and by 18.2 per cent in 1993. This economic recovery was largely a result of increased 
resource extraction from new mines that opened in the 1980s, such as Ok Tedi and the 
Misima mine (BPNG 1998). The revenue effect of this was then enhanced by a substantial 
increase in resource prices, creating PNG’s first major commodity boom. Domestic 
revenue increased dramatically, growing by almost 40 per cent between 1991 and 1995. 
These rapid revenue increases also more than compensated for the further decline in 
foreign budgetary support which in real per capita terms had decreased by 70 per cent 
between independence and 1995.
In 1993, continued slow progress on development outcomes and rapidly expanding 
revenue streams from resource extraction led the government to adopt a premeditated 
rebuttal of the attempts at fiscal restraint committed to in the 1990 SAP (BPNG 2007)A 
On the revenue side, the government also sought to stimulate the supply side growth of 
the economy by lowering personal income and company tax rates (BPNG 1998). This 
aggressive fiscal approach led to a planned budget deficit of 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1993. 
But despite revenue growth of just over 18 per cent between 1992 and 1993, continued 
expenditure overruns by numerous government departments meant the government still 
failed to remain within its target, recording a final deficit outcome equal to 5.5 per cent of 
GDP.
4.3.3 Currency Crisis and the Second Donor Bail-Out (1994—97)
Given PNG’s reliance on imports for consumption and investment goods, the stimulatory 
impact of the government’s unrestrained expenditure again led to a significant increase in
85 As quoted in the 1993 budget by the Wingti Government which came to office in July 1992: ‘The 1993 budget heralds in something of 
a new era in fiscal policy in that the revenue and balance of payments constraints have to some extent been relaxed, at least in the short 
term. The relaxation occurs as a result of receipt from 1993 of very rapidly improving revenues from mining and especially petroleum. 
Recognition of the new situation has led the government to believe that a somewhat more aggressive fiscal policy is now appropriate’ 
(BPNG 2007).
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the demand for foreign exchange during the early 1990s. By the end of 1993, foreign 
exchange reserves were enough to cover only 1.6 months of total imports (BPNG 2007). 
Following a considerable drop in global oil prices as well as declining output levels in 
mining and agriculture, there was a revenue shortfall in 1994— in contrast to the 1993 
overshoot (Mawuli 1997:14). This forced the government to seek out unprecedented levels 
of domestic borrowing to maintain funding for its planned development expenditures. By 
the middle of the year, the deficit had already exceeded its yearly target, reaching K277 
million (Mawuli 1997:12), and public debt condnued to increase rapidly (King and Sugden 
1996:17).
The combination of rapidly accumulating debt and dwindling foreign exchange supplies led 
to another balance of payments crisis towards the end of 1994, as investors withdrew 
resources and the government struggled to find new creditors.86 The loss of foreign 
exchange reserves also forced the Bank of Papua New Guinea to move from a fixed peg to 
a floating exchange rate regime in October 1994 as it could no longer intervene to defend 
the value of the Kina (Bowman 2005:5).
Following the election of a new government in September 199487 and its stated 
commitment to restoring fiscal discipline, Australia offered loan facilities to the PNG 
Government if it agreed to another set of SAP conditions set by the World Bank. This 
caused a degree of political strain between Australia and PNG.88 However, upon PNG’s 
agreement, the IMF offered US$111 million in loan facilities to help the government 
restore macroeconomic stability (IMF 1995:2). The SAP conditions imposed by the World 
Bank targeted a number of reforms again focusing on restructuring the public sector, 
imposing greater constraints on expenditure levels and promoting faster rates of trade 
liberalisation and tax reform.
The government made some initial attempts at implementing the conditions of the SAP by 
reining in expenditure and undertaking some modest reforms in import liberalisation and 
revenue collection (IMF 1998). However, following another short period of fiscal austerity 
in 1995 and 1996, the reform process halted as a combination of both internal and external
86 Treasury T-Bill Rates, for example, reached up to 21 per cent in order to attract more capital to fund public debt (Mawuli 1997:12).
87 This coalidon government was led by Sir Julius Chan.
88 Woolner (1995:21) explains, for example, that Sir Julius Chan had iniually been seeking soft loan opuons from donors and that the 
government only agreed to the SAP condidons following Australia’s refusal to provide uncondiuonal funds. Many domesuc PNG 
leaders then saw themselves as bearing a perceived loss of face with intervendon from the World Bank, and blamed Australia for not 
suppordng them better.
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factors again shook the economy in 1997. This included cyclones, an on-going drought 
which had a severe effect on agricultural production as well the closure of the Ok Tedi and 
Porgera mines due to inadequate water supplies. These natural shocks were also 
compounded by the Asian financial crisis and the high cost and political instability 
originating from the Sandline intervention in Bougainville which seriously disrupted 
business, consumer confidence and macroeconomic stability (Curtin 2001). As a result, real 
GDP contracted by 6.3 per cent in 1997.
This period of fiscal management also marked a considerable shift in the composition of 
government expenditure away from some key development items. Between the onset of 
the Bougainville conflict in 1989 and the 1994 foreign exchange crises, education funding 
dropped from K135 per capita in 1990 to K100 per capita in 1992. This was accompanied 
with a further halving of investment in infrastructure from K55 per capita in 1993 to just 
over K20 per capita in 1994. Cutbacks were also made in health, albeit at a more gradual 
rate from K60 per capita in 1993 to K35 per capita in 1996. In contrast, other general 
government expenditure increased rapidly from K400 per capita in 1990 to K550 per capita 
in 1993, which again reflected in part the growing need to fund the government’s military 
operations in Bougainville.
4.3.4 Public Debt Crisis and Changing Aid Modalities (1998—2002)
Following elections in June 1997, a new government led by Prime Minister Skate again 
made commitments to establish more responsible fiscal management. However, 
uncontrolled spending by a number of ministries (in particular again related to the Defence 
department) combined with declining government revenue from the effects of drought, 
and the flow-on effects from the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to continued deficit 
financing of the budget (Standish 2001:285). Fiscal discipline continued to slip over the 
next two years, and, as outlined in Duncan (2002:4), by 1999 ‘government expenditure was 
again out of control, the budget deficit was expected to increase sharply, international 
reserves had fallen sharply and the Kina had depreciated rapidly, and inflation and interest 
rates had also increased rapidly’. In effect this again brought the country to the brink of 
bankruptcy.
In August 1999 another government came to power under the leadership of Sir Mekere 
Morauta. This government also widely committed itself to a more conservative and 
restrained approach to fiscal policy, immediately adopting a range of measures to improve 
the transparency of expenditures and responsible payment and acquisition of debt
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(Standish 2001:286). The first step of the new government was to hand down a 
supplementary budget which tried to account for the full amount of government liabilities 
accrued over the previous years. The situation emerged as being critical. Unpaid 
departmental spending (mainly defence, but also in health and many others) had 
accumulated to approximately 16 per cent of the recurrent budget, or 10 per cent of the 
total budget (BPNG 2007).
The government thus set out to undertake a significant reorganisation of fiscal policy, 
increasing personal and corporate tax rates as well as replacing the pre-existing sales tax 
with an across-the-board value-added tax (VAT) in 1999 to broaden the revenue base— 
which had become increasingly reliant on commodity and resource revenues throughout 
the 1990s (BPNG 1999; BPNG 2000). These reforms reassured reluctant international 
donors of the government’s commitment to more responsible fiscal and economic 
management and resulted in further loans. In mid 2000, the PNG Government received its 
third SAP loan from the World Bank and the IMF (IMF 2000).89
Continued fiscal pressure was, however, placed on the government from declining levels of 
real GDP by almost 2.5 per cent in 2000 following only modest growth of 1.8 per cent in 
1999. This occurred in spite of relatively strong growth in the agricultural, fisheries and 
forestry sectors as it was counteracted by a drop in the mineral sector from declining crude 
oil and copper production (GoPNG 2001). The government also faced high inflation rates 
of 14.9 per cent in 1999 and 15.6 per cent in 2000. Ultimately, despite a focus placed on the 
need for balanced budgets in order to curtail central government debt, the 1999 and 2000 
final budget outcomes continued to record deficits of 2.7 and 1.9 per cent of GDP, 
respectively.
The 1999—2000 public debt crises also had a number of important impacts on funding 
levels for key service delivery sectors. In 1999, the then Prime Minister Skate turned to a 
foreign advisor, Dr Pirouz Hamidian-Rad, and his consultancy firm Ikub to put together 
the 1999 budget (Standish 1999). In an attempt to reduce the size of the deficit, the 1999 
budget adopted extensive cuts to many government departments,90 abolishing 15 statutory
89 Whilst the IMF loan stipulated strict controls around fiscal and external account management, the terms of the World Bank’s 
Structural Adjustment Program required the government to significantly cut public expenditure on wages and salaries and redirect its 
expenditure towards priority human development areas (IMF 2000).
90 The 1999 budget, for example, demanded a 20 per cent cut in public service employment numbers with the retrenchment of 7,000 
public servants, well beyond the 2000recommendation made by the World Bank. In the event, however, the large cost of carrying out 
these retrenchments remained unfunded and only limited reductions in public sector employment numbers took place (Standish 1999).
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bodies including a large number of research and educational institutes. It was widely 
reported during this time, for example, that a number of universities had lost up to 20 per 
cent of their government grants, which led to the closure of entire teaching programs 
(Standish 1999).
As a result, one of the most dramatic impacts of the 1999 fiscal crisis was to initiate a large 
decline in the funding of the education sector which fell from its high of K120 per capita in 
1999 to a low of K35 per capita in 2004. Infrastructure funding also declined during this 
period from K45 per capita in 1999 to a low of K15 per capita in 2001, whilst health 
funding remained relatively constant at just under K40 per capita, albeit still following a 
path of long term decline since the mid 1980s. Despite these cuts to education and 
infrastructure spending, reductions in other general government expenditure were not 
forthcoming. Indeed, between 1998 and 2000, expenditure in the general category actually 
rose substantially from K350 per capita to K425 per capita.
Government expenditure increased further in the lead-up to the 2002 election beginning 
another period of expenditure overshooting. With a contraction of the mining and oil 
sectors, real GDP growth declined by 0.15 per cent adding further pressure to the fiscal 
position. Given the government’s poor credit rating, the 2002 budget deficit had to be 
funded largely by domestic sources. When combined with foreign debt levels, this meant 
that total government debt reached a peak of just over 70 per cent of GDP in 2002.
Chart 4.6: Public Debt— Foreign vs. Domestic (1974—2008)
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Source: Government PNG Budget Documents (various years), see Appendix 5.1.
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In response to a growing perception of deteriorating public sector capacity with the PNG 
bureaucracy and the continued weak demand for economic reform, the late 1990s also saw 
an expansion of Australian financial assistance given through bureaucratic support, or 
technical assistance programs (Chart 4.7). The Australian aid program also began to 
respond to criticisms surrounding project aid which, due to its tighter expenditure 
requirements, had dramatically reduced PNG Government control and ownership over the 
aid program and had created various political tensions between the two governments 
(Dorney, 1998; AusAID, 2003a:51).91 In particular, an increasing focus began to be placed 
on delivering program aid and sector wide approaches (SWAp), which attempted to correct 
many of the inadequacies of project-based aid by delivering resources through ‘single sector 
policy and expenditure programs, under [recipient] Government leadership, adopting 
common approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on Government 
procedures to disburse and account for all public expenditure’ (Hamblin 2006:1).
Chart 4.7: Foreign Grant Aid in PNG: Technical Assistance vs. Other Grants 
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91 AusAID (2003a:51), for example, notes that project aid in PNG ‘had created parallel systems, led to negative institutional impacts in 
the areas of capacity building and priority setting, and reduced prospects for sustainability’. Likewise, Dorney (1998) argues that ‘[w]ith 
increasing numbers of Australian officials and consultants delving into all these areas of PNG government responsibility... the range of 
points of irritation had grown exponentially.’
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4.3.5 Commodity Boom and Economic Recovery (2003—08)
On the back of a rise in global commodity and agricultural prices, the economic and fiscal
situation improved dramatically from 2003. Strong resource and agricultural sectors flowed 
on to growth in a number of other industries such as construction and services. This 
contributed to a 46 per cent increase in government revenues between 2003 and 2005 as 
well as a 120 per cent growth in foreign exchange reserves. Real GDP growth was strong, 
recording 2.1 per cent, 2.7 per cent and 3.4 per cent in 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
Inflation also scaled back to a moderate 2.1 per cent growth and 1.7 per cent growth in 
2004 and 2005 following a high of 14.7 per cent in 2002.
The culmination of Australia’s growing focus on technical assistance also occurred during 
this period, with the commencement of the ECP92 in 2004. The implementation of this 
program followed the adoption of a more general interventionist approach to aid delivery 
by Australia within the South Pacific region in an attempt to strengthen law and order and 
to help improve the quality of economic and public sector fiscal management.93 To achieve 
this, the ECP augmented AusAID’s pre-existing technical assistance programs by 
deploying more than 40 Australian government officials across a range of areas in the PNG 
bureaucracy, based mainly in central government agencies (Morauta 2005:160).
Whilst global commodity prices played a large part in the fiscal and economic progress 
made since 2002, the deployment of these officers coincided with some improvements in 
fiscal and economic management. The revenue windfalls of the 1990s, for example, had led 
to more than proportionate increases in spending, worsening fiscal outcomes and 
increasing government debt. In the present case, however, a significant proportion of the 
increased revenues were used to retire government debt—with total liabilities falling from 
72 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 47 per cent in 2005.94 Also, for the first time in a number of 
years, the wages and salaries bill of national departments remained relatively constant, 
although continued growth over the previous decade meant that it was still consuming 
almost half of the government’s total recurrent expenditures, at 49.3 per cent (ADB 2004).
92 During April 2008, the ECP was subsequently renamed the Strongim Gavman Program (Tok Pisin for ‘strengthening’ or ‘empowering 
government’) or SGP.
93 In its initial phase, the ECP also included the deployment of Australian Federal Police to Port Moresby. However, PNG's Supreme 
Court ruled in May 2005 that the immunity granted to Australian ECP personnel from prosecudon for any misconduct whilst on duty 
was not consistent with the PNG Consdtudon. As a result, over 150 Australian police were withdrawn from the program.
94 This was also in compliance with the Public Finances (Management) Act, which stated that 90 per cent of un-forecasted revenues were 
used to retire government debt (IMF 2006:31).
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Real GDP increased by 2.6 per cent in 2006, which would have been higher but for a 
contraction in some agricultural exports which were adversely affected by bad weather.
Continued high prices for copper, gold and oil, as well as for palm oil and logs, then led to 
larger than expected revenue growth in 2006 and a 1 per cent of GDP budget surplus— 
against an original deficit target of 0.6 per cent of GDP (GoPNG 2006). Total debt fell to 
just over 42 per cent of GDP, whilst external debt was brought down to 21 per cent of 
GDP.
Despite concerns over potentially high spending in the lead-up to the election, the 
government recorded another budget surplus equal to 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2007 on the 
back of continued oil and mining revenues and a 6 per cent real GDP growth rate. This 
allowed debt levels to fall further to 35 per cent of GDP, underwritten by the paying down 
of external debt in particular. The surplus outcome did, however, mask an almost 20 per 
cent increase in total expenditures for the year as the government sought to allocate 
additional resources towards investment priorities such as the rehabilitation of public 
infrastructure, direct investment in economic projects and the repayment of debt.
The impact of these additional revenues on increasing spending on key development items 
was, however, limited by implementation issues as many of the funds went largely 
unspent— eventually being allocated to various government trust accounts. For example, if 
unspent funds were treated as savings, the budget surplus in 2007 would have been equal 
to 11.4 per cent of GDP (ADB 2008).
Some improvements in funding for key development sectors were made however. 
Infrastructure spending increased from K25 per capita in 2004 to K65 per capita in 2007, 
health spending increased from K22 per capita in 2002 to K51 per capita in 2007, and 
education spending increased from a low of K30 per capita to K43 per capita in 2007. 
Nevertheless, despite comparable real per capita aggregate revenue and expenditure the 
funding for these items still remained significantly below those experienced during the 
1970s and 1980s and prior to the Bougainville crisis. In the case of education, for example, 
funding was still half of what it was two decades prior in 1988.
In contrast, the general expenditures category continued to increase dramatically reaching
record levels with its rise from K315 per capita in 2002 to K570 per capita in 2007.
Although, as mentioned, a large portion of these additional revenues were allocated to debt
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repayment. These expenditure trends then remained relatively constant in 2008, with 
continued strong economic and revenue growth— spurred by real GDP growth reaching 
6.6 per cent from continued high export prices, and the improved level of business 
confidence arising from more sensible economic management.
4.4 D iscussion  and  C onclusion
By providing foreign financial assistance, both Australia and other donors have tried to 
influence the public expenditure outcomes of the PNG Government. The period of 
budgetary support attempted to alleviate the aggregate fiscal constraints facing PNG, in 
order to reduce its need for deficit financing whilst still allowing the government to make 
substantial investments in human and physical infrastructure. Frustration at the 
composition and quality of the PNG Government’s expenditure then led to the 
implementation of earmarked forms of aid delivery such as project aid, and later, program 
aid. Whilst also alleviating the macro fiscal constraints, this was targeted at ensuring aid 
funds were spent on purposes in line with the donor’s preferences. During the current 
decade, Australian aid has become increasingly focused on trying to improve the efficiency 
of the PNG public sector in using both donor and domestic resources to produce desirable 
social and economic outcomes. This has led to a growing use of technical assistance 
programs aimed at strengthening state institutions and bureaucratic capacity as well as an 
adoption of programmatic aid providing sectoral support more integrated with local PNG 
systems and processes.
The links between this financial support and PNG’s fiscal behaviour, economic 
performance and social welfare outcomes have, however, not been as straightforward as 
both Australia and other donors may have liked. In terms of alleviating resource 
constraints, the historical analysis has shown that despite a substantial flow of foreign aid, a 
persistent lack of fiscal discipline has meant successive PNG Governments have continued 
to rely on high levels of deficit financing to meet their expenditure requirements in the post 
independence period. This has led to the need for three donor bail-outs during the 1990s 
and early 2000s in order to prevent the collapse of the domestic economy.
The analysis has also shown that despite being a key motivation for switching between 
budgetary support and project aid, the switch in aid modalities has not led to any significant 
improvement in the composition of total government expenditures towards key 
development sectors. In fact, following the switch between the two aid modalities there has 
even been, in some cases, a further deterioration in the quality and composition of sectoral
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expenditure levels. This view is supported by AusAID (2003a:27) which states that ‘analysis 
of the PNG Government’s own funding for different sectors confirms that government 
funding for key sectors such as infrastructure, health and education was higher when PNG 
was receiving budget support than in more recent times.’
O f course, domestic budgetary reallocations in response to an inflow of earmarked foreign 
assistance are not necessarily a problem. Even when aid finance is treated as being fully 
fungible, if the recipient’s public sector expenditure composition is satisfactory then the 
donor is likely to contribute to the alleviation of resource constraints in important sectors. 
However, as PNG continues to fall further behind, both in the region and globally, in 
achieving key welfare targets such as those of the MDGs, and as expenditure for key 
development sectors such as health, education and infrastructure continue to lag behind 
pre Bougainville crisis levels, it is clear that the government’s expenditure composition 
requires significant improvements if long term welfare targets are to be achieved.
This raises obvious questions about how the delivery of aid has encouraged the PNG 
Government to behave and what foreign aid has ultimately financed. It also raises the 
question of how this assistance has contributed to the capacity of the PNG public sector to 
utilise these resources effectively to achieve improvements in social welfare outcomes.
Despite being a central concern of nearly all assessments of aid effectiveness in PNG, to 
date no studies have attempted to measure the extent to which successive PNG 
governments have treated the delivery of project and program aid as an augmentation of 
their own resources or allowed donor funding to simply replace their pre-existing 
allocations. In addition, despite AusAID’s own acknowledgement that sectoral funding 
outcomes have declined since the introduction of project aid, no studies have sought to 
measure the extent to which both types of aid have contributed to improving fiscal 
expenditure priorities. The following chapters seek to address these questions.
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C hapter 5: Foreign Aid and F iscal A ggregates in PN G
no
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 highlighted that the effects of aid on economic outcomes in PNG involve a 
complex set of interactions between the public sector bureaucracy and key fiscal aggregates. 
The endogeneity of these relationships also suggests that an adjustment in any one of these 
aid or fiscal variables is likely to have important knock-on effects with each of the other 
fiscal outcomes. This chapter seeks to analyse these relationships with the use of a Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) which allows aid and fiscal aggregates to interact in a 
dynamic manner, both contemporaneously and with a number of lags.
Empirical studies on the impact of aid on PNG’s fiscal performance have been hampered 
by a chronic lack of consistent data on PNG’s fiscal outcomes. This chapter contributes to 
the literature by undertaking an extensive data collection exercise with assistance from staff 
from the PNG Department of Finance and Treasury. This allows the study to draw on a 
data set from 1974—2008. This covers the entire post independence period and gives 
sufficient degrees of freedom to conduct a dynamic analysis of PNG’s fiscal behaviour 
following inflows of foreign aid.
Based on the historical analysis presented in Chapter 4, this chapter will focus in particular 
on testing a number of hypotheses regarding the impact of aid on fiscal aggregates such as 
public debt, domestic taxation and expenditure levels in the post independence period. 
These include i) whether grant aid has tended to lower the PNG Government’s domestic 
revenue-raising efforts, ii) whether grant aid has encouraged the PNG Government to be 
less fiscally responsible and to accumulate higher levels of foreign debt, iii) whether grant 
aid has encouraged higher rates of non productive expenditure, and finally, iv) whether 
budget support vis-a-vis project and program aid have had differential effects on any of the 
above. In order to investigate these issues, three separate models shall be estimated. The 
first analyses the interaction between aggregate grant aid, taxation, total expenditure and 
borrowing levels. The second model then disaggregates government expenditure into what 
are termed ‘development’ and ‘general’ categories, whilst the third disaggregates foreign 
grants into budget support and project/program aid.
This analysis reveals a number of important insights regarding the interplay between 
foreign aid and public sector fiscal behaviour in post independence PNG. Key findings 
include evidence that grant aid has been an important source of debt reduction. Grant aid 
has, however, also tended to erode the domestic tax collection. The combination of these
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two effects means that foreign grants have contributed little to increasing aggregate 
expenditure levels. Preliminary evidence is also presented that suggests some of these 
effects vary considerably across different types of grant aid delivery. A number of policy 
implications of these findings are discussed in the final section.
5.2 L itera tu re  Review
5.2.1 Im p ac t o f Aid on F iscal A ggregates— Fiscal R esponse M odels
Traditionally, the impact of foreign aid on fiscal aggregates has been analysed with the use 
of Fiscal Response Models (FRMs). This approach is based on a utility-maximising 
government which sets itself targets for a variety of expenditure, revenue and borrowing 
outcomes. The government is assumed to maximise its utility by obtaining each one of 
these fiscal targets during each period. An inflow of aid is then assessed on the basis of its 
affect on each of the expenditure, revenue and borrowing targets, subject to budget and 
expenditure composition restraints.
Heller (1975) was one of the first to use this approach, analysing a cross section of 11 
African countries between 1961 and 1971. The author finds that between 30 and 60 per 
cent of aid was used for additional government spending whilst the remaining funds were 
used to reduce the level of domestic tax and borrowing. On the expenditure composition 
side, the author also found that ‘aid causes a strong shift away from public consumption 
and toward investment’ (Heller 1975:442).93
Heller (1975) spurred a range of other papers on this topic which have made some 
important methodological improvements to the literature. Binh and McGillivray (1993), for 
example, illustrated that the linear-quadratic loss functions which were used for 
government utility in earlier studies were incorrectly specified in the sense that achieving 
each of the expenditure targets did not lead to an unconstrained maximum for their utility 
functions.96 The authors then developed a quadratic loss function which allows for equal 
losses in utility from both over and under achieving each of the target variables whilst
95 In contrast, Gang and Khan (1991) find, using time series data for India between 1961 and 1984, that aid has tended to lower domestic 
tax collection. However, in this case the authors also found that aid encouraged higher levels of government investment, with the 
majority of funds being spent on earmarked projects.
96 This utility function for government expenditure is thus generally written as:
U = p 0 - ^ - ( E -  E')2 D')2 - & - ( T - T ' ) 2 -  y M -  A')2 -  -  B')2
112
leading to a maximum solution following the obtainment of all the respective target 
variables.97
Subsequent authors have made a number of additional extensions to the literature by 
specifying more realistic budget constraints and by incorporating aid into the theoretical 
model as an endogenous rather than exogenous parameter (Franco-Rodriguez et al. 1998; 
McGillivray and Ahmed 1999). Mavrotas (2002) analysed the various impacts of 
disaggregated types of aid,98 whilst Feeny (2006) developed an asymmetric utility 
specification which allows for larger losses in utility from revenue under-shooting than 
over-shooting.99
Feeny (2007) provides the most recent study on the impact of aid on fiscal performance in 
the Pacific Island countries, focusing on Melanesia (Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu) for the period 1989—2002. Here the author finds that whilst aid flows have 
impacted positively on development vis-ä-vis recurrent expenditures, they have also led to a 
significant reduction in domestic revenue collection. Highlighting that this has the potential 
to exacerbate problems of long term aid dependency, Feeny (2007:448) argues that donors 
should direct more effort towards strengthening revenue management in addition to their 
traditional focus on public expenditure.
5.2.2 Im pact o f Aid on Fiscal Aggregates— Dynam ic Approaches
The FRM literature has, however, increasingly been shown to suffer from a number of 
limitations. Criticisms have included the over simplification of government fiscal behaviour 
with utility based on a loss function, a number of studies recording estimates of the 
model’s structural parameters which are inconsistent with the theoretical model, and that in 
practice the fiscal target variables used to specify the government utility function are 
unobservable, meaning that they have to be estimated from past values (White 1994;
where E represents government expenditure, D public debt, T taxation revenue, A foreign aid, B is borrowing and each of the starred 
variables represent their respecdve target values. The government budget constraint states that total domestic government expenditure 
(investment and consumption) plus debt servicing costs must equal total domestic revenue generation plus foreign aid receipts and 
borrowing from all other sources. These models are then solved to reveal both the structural and reduced form parameters of the 
model and estimated with a systems equation approach, generally non linear Three Stage Least Squares.
98 The focus by Mavrotas (2002) on disaggregated aid—estimating data for India and Kenya over the period 1973—1990 and 1973-1992, 
respectively—led the author to conclude that for both countries, project aid has been less likely to displace other sources of 
government funding as compared to untied forms of aid, such as general budgetary support.
99 Feeny (2006) argues that in practice, discussions with relevant policy makers almost always indicate a clear preference for over­
shooting as opposed to under-shooting. He develops an asymmetric utility function incorporating these preferences. Whilst more 
appealing from a theoretical perspective, this approach is, however, shown to give comparable empirical results as the symmetric utility 
function.
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McGillivray and Morrisey 2001a; Osei et al. 2003). Perhaps the most important limitation 
of FRMs, however, is the implicit assumption that government fiscal behaviour remains 
static. As argued in McGillivray and Morrisey (2001 a:30) in reality one would expect ‘the 
impact of aid on fiscal behaviour to change over time. Indeed, the rationale for attaching 
policy reform conditions to aid is to alter behavioural responses.’
As a response to these criticisms, dynamic Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approaches have 
become an increasingly popular tool for modelling the relationship between aid and fiscal 
aggregates. This approach uses multivariate VAR models to estimate long run 
(cointegrating) relationships between each of the fiscal variables (Fagernäs and Roberts 
2004b).100 In addition, given the atheoretical nature of VAR models, this means that it is 
not necessary to estimate the unknown target values required for the structural 
representation of FRMs (Osei et al. 2003:2).101 This approach also facilitates the use of 
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to trace the dynamic effect on the system of an 
exogenous shock to one of the variables through deviations of the shocked time paths 
from the expected time path given by the model.102 Further, these IRFs capture the impact 
of the feedback effects which occur between each of the aid and fiscal policy variables.
Although still a relatively new component of the aid effectiveness literature, a number of 
country-level studies have recorded some important findings. Sugema and Chowdhury 
(2005), for example, find that in Indonesia, project aid allocated to development activities 
has been used to increase what they term ‘routine’ expenditures, suggesting that aid has 
been fungible across the two activities. These authors also find that aid flows have tended 
to make the Indonesian government fiscally lazy, as the availability of aid has acted as a 
disincentive to mobilise domestic revenue through a more efficient and effective taxation 
system.
100 See, for example, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1992).
101 In essence, assumptions about the exogeneity of each of the explanatory variables can also be tested within the VAR using data, rather 
than imposed a priori, and can then be applied to simulate the effect of aid injections via impulse response analysis.
102 The final advantage of the VAR approach is that it provides a highly tractable framework unlike FRMs, which require significant 
effort in determining the structural coefficient estimations from the reduced form parameters (Franco-Rodriguez 2000). The VAR 
approach also treats aid and fiscal behaviour as interdependent, where an adverse shock on the fiscal side will have follow-up impacts 
on aid. For example, a fall in domestic revenue may generate the need to increase aid inflows. In exchange, there are also feedback 
effects from aid— the availability of aid may reduce the need to adjust revenue sources or budgeted expenditure. Thus, rather than the 
uni directional relationships posited by FRMs, aid and fiscal policy in the VAR framework interact in a dynamic manner.
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Fagernäs and Roberts (2004a) study Zambia between 1964 and 2001103 and show that an 
injection of foreign aid is accompanied by sustained higher levels of both recurrent and 
capital expenditure levels. Aid inflows have, however, also been associated with lower 
domestic revenue receipts as well as higher levels of domestic borrowing. This suggests 
that, rather than using aid funds to stabilise the economy, the government has tended to 
take the opportunity to relax fiscal and macroeconomic controls as aid has permitted public 
expenditures to rise well above levels able to be financed from domestic resources.
In contrast, Osei et al. (2003) find that for Ghana between 1966 and 1998, foreign aid has 
been associated with reduced domestic borrowing and increased tax effort, combining to 
increase public spending by more than the initial aid inflows. Fagernäs and Schurich (2004) 
also find similar results for their study of Malawi over the period 1970 to 2000, concluding 
that external finance has had a positive long run impact on the government’s development 
budget whilst having a negative impact on levels of domestic borrowing—and no impact on 
the domestic tax effort.
5.2.3 Research Gap
The diversity of results observed across countries indicates that public sector bureaucracies 
respond in vastly different ways to inflows of foreign financial assistance. Applying these 
methods to a case study of PNG will give valuable insights into the impact of aid on fiscal 
performance. However, one limitation of both the VAR and FRM literature has been its 
assessment of expenditure priorities.104 As discussed in Chapter 4, a key criticism of 
Australian aid in post independence PNG has been the perception that it has deteriorated 
the government’s expenditure priorities towards unproductive sectors of the economy. 
The literature assessing the impact of aid on ‘development’ and ‘non development’ related 
expenditure has, however, focused almost exclusively on recurrent and development 
(capital) budget classifications (see Fagernäs and Roberts 2004a; Fagernäs and Schurich 
2004; Sugema and Chowdhury 2005).
103 In this case, the authors use a VAR rather than VECM approach as each of the fiscal aggregate variables was found to be stationary 
and hence there was no need to estimate a VECM model. Notably, in this case the impulse response analysis can only be used to 
examine the effects of a one-period increase in aid, whereas in the case of the VEC model used for Uganda and Malawi, only a 
permanent increase in the level of aid is feasible (as the model is run with differenced variables) (Fagernäs and Roberts 2004a:33).
104 p ven the FRM literature is relatively unclear on this issue. Mavrotas (2002), for example, finds that project aid has been less likely to 
displace other sources of government funding as compared to untied forms of aid, supporting the conclusion that tying aid to specific 
projects may help to limit the adverse effects of fungibility, whereas program aid can be more easily treated as a fungible addition to 
government resources. Ouattara (2006), on the other hand, suggests that simply providing debt reduction could be a more effective 
policy tool than additional aid in financing pro poverty expenditure as well as public investment.
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In practice, development orientated expenditures often involve a large pordon of recurrent 
costs. Personal emoluments of teachers and doctors are a good example of this, as is road 
maintenance. Likewise, development budgets are not necessarily comprised of expenditure 
which may be considered pro poor or even pro growth. This issue is raised in Feeny 
(2007:448), who argues that ‘donors financing items such as the wages of health and 
educadon workers is arguably no less developmental than the construcdon of schools and 
hospitals.’ In addidon, aid has also often led to a need for higher levels of ongoing 
recurrent expenditures, particularly in Melanesia, which has received large proportions of 
foreign aid in the form of projects (Feeny 2007). This chapter adopts an alternative method 
of allocating expenditure priorities, using a sectoral rather than functional basis. As shall be 
discussed shortly, development sectors are said to include health, education, infrastructure, 
and law and order.
Another limitation of the VAR literature has been its treatment of aid as a homogenous 
good. As discussed in Chapter 4, a key motivation for the shift in Australian financial 
assistance from budgetary support to project aid was the perception that untied financial 
support had been encouraging the growth of unproductive consumption expenditure and 
had reduced the motivation for domestic tax collection. Scaling-up the proportion of grants 
given as project-based aid was thus seen by Australia as a method of ensuring that allocated 
funds were used on pro development activities rather than general government 
consumption. Whether or not this has impacted on the fiscal behaviour of the PNG 
Government has, however, not been systematically reviewed. Another issue which this 
chapter seeks to address is whether different types of aid delivery have led to different 
fiscal outcomes in post independence PNG.
5.3 Estim ation M ethod and Issues
VAR models can be broadly classified as a multivariate extension of Granger causality 
testing, where each of the dependent variables is a function both of lagged values of 
themselves and a number of other endogenous explanatory terms (Enders 2003). In its 
most basic form, a two-variable VAR model can be written as:
X, = c10 + Z auXhi + Z oc2Yti + e
i= i  i= i
„ „ (5.1)
y, = c20+ y. oc3ix tmi+ z  oc^ y, . + e
1=1 «=1
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where the q ’s capture the impact of each of the jointly determined (endogenous) Xt and 
Y' variables. The equation is estimated with a data set covering the periods t = l,...,T which
gives a white noise error term equal to £, with £(£;) = 0. The f s measure the degree to 
which each of the fiscal variables are jointly determined not only with the other variables 
but with lagged values of themselves. In the current case, this approach allows the 
estimation to capture the effect of current budgetary decisions being influenced by the 
current fiscal situation as well as lagged impacts of previous periods’ outcomes.103
VAR analysis does, however, require some assumptions to be made about the nature of the 
time series being estimated. Most importantly, each of the variables must be stationary 
(Hamilton 1995:651). Non stationary time series are defined by a stochastic process which 
has a mean and/or variance which changes over time causing the covariance structure to be 
time dependent (Gujarati 1995:792). However, in the case that each variable is non 
stationary, and it also satisfies the requirement of being integrated of the same order, 
typically 1(1), then this analysis can be extended to a VECM framework. In this case, each 
of the variables is first differenced to establish stationarity, and then these differenced 
variables are applied to the VECM framework via Granger’s representation theorem (Engle 
and Granger 1987). The linear combination of these variables may then be interpreted as 
long run relationships, or, in economic terms, as static equilibrium relations (Johansen 
1988; Johansen and juselius 1990). In this case the estimation of the variables given in 
Equation (5.1) can be written as:
AX, = c,o + W ,  + S  «„AX,., + 1  «„AF + S„
i=l i=l
=  Go -  <*rVr* + 1  os,.AXH + ±  a4iAYt i +  eYt
(5.2)
where A is the difference operator such that AX, — X t — X t_x and i again refers to the
number of lags in the model. O f central interest are the &xVxj-\ and ^ yWyj-i ‘error 
correction’ terms which represent the stationary linear combination of the cointegrated 
variables (Johansen 1988). The coefficient on the error correction term ,# , thus represents 
the speed of adjustment to a disequilibrium in any of the fiscal variables. As such, the larger
105 This representation treats aid and fiscal behaviour as interdependent, where a shock to the aid variable will have follow-up impacts on 
the fiscal variables and vice versa. In the case of foreign aid, this is intuitively appealing due to its likely lagged effects on the budgetary 
process. For example, a fall in domestic revenue may generate the need to increase aid inflows. In exchange, there are also feedback 
effects from aid— the availability of aid may reduce the need to adjust revenue sources or budgeted expenditures. Thus aid and fiscal 
policy can be said to interact in a dynamic manner.
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the coefficient the greater the adjustment of the dependent variable to the deviation from a 
long run equilibrium in the previous period (Dolado et al. 2001:638).106
The estimated coefficients of VECM do not, however, incorporate the full flow-on effects 
of changes in each of the variables, given that they are linked both contemporaneously and 
with a lag. The coefficient of a shock to aid on government revenue, for example, will 
capture the direct impact but will not capture the possible effect that this aid shock might 
have if it leads to an increase in expenditure, and the subsequent effect that higher 
expenditures might in turn have on revenue collection and so on.
These flow-on effects of changes in foreign financial assistance are captured with the use of 
IRFs (Pesaran and Shin 1998). IRFs have the advantage of showing the complete time 
profile of the effect of a shock to one variable (this study will focus on shocks to aid flows) 
both on the current and future values of all other endogenous fiscal aggregate variables. In 
doing this, they capture both the direct feedback effects caused by the endogeneity of the 
variables over time (Osei et al. 2003:13).
The impulse is made through the residual in the aid equation with a one standard error 
shock. Given that the VECM is estimated in first differences, a shock or impulse to aid is 
expected to have a persistent impact on the levels of other variables, as the shock itself is 
permanent in nature (Pesaran and Shin 1998). Whilst the shocks are permanent, the 
impulse responses—provided that they meet standard stability requirements— are 
eventually expected to converge to a level that is consistent with the estimated long run, 
cointegrating relationship estimated in the VECM.107
Like FRMs, the VECM procedure also has limitations. This includes the potential to over 
parameterise the model with limited degrees of freedom, given that each of the variables is 
deemed to affect the others both contemporaneously and with lags (Fagernas and Roberts 
2004a:31). Results obtained with both VAR and VECM have also been shown to be 
sensitive to the number of lags chosen for the analysis (Stock and Watson 1993), although 
this can minimised by using a number of tests to determine appropriate lag length. Another
106 For example, if each of the fiscal variables is cointegrated, then each of the disequilibrium error terms will be stationary. This means 
there is a force pulling the residual errors towards zero, with previous departures from equilibrium being corrected by changes in some 
or all of the fiscal variables.
107 Another limitation of the IRF approach is the potential under identification of the estimated system given that all effects of omitted 
variables are thus assumed to be incorporated in the innovations. In light of this, the coefficient estimates are likely to represent 
Granger causality rather than pure causality (Engle and Granger 1987).
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limitation of this approach is the lack of confidence intervals for the IRFs. As such, the 
impulse responses can only be generally interpreted as indicative of the actual impact, 
which may be within a range of that estimated (Fagernäs and Schurich 2004:24).
5.4 D ata  Collection
5.4.1 M easu ring  Foreign  G rants
A number of options are available to measure the amount of foreign grants received by 
PNG in the post independence era. The first is through the OECD DAC database which 
provides information on both donor commitments and disbursements to PNG between 
1974 and 2006.108 A case can be made for the use of aid commitment data in fiscal impact 
studies, given that this data reflects the amount of aid that recipient countries expect to 
receive, making it more likely for the data to influence recipient countries’ budgetary 
decisions. As can be seen in Chart 5.1, however, in the case of PNG the aid commitment 
data is lumpy with large fluctuations across relatively short time periods.109
In contrast, the alternative aid disbursement data tends to be less volatile and reflects the 
actual amount of aid transferred by donors to the recipient. A limitation of this data is that 
because it is recorded via donor reporting it need not necessarily be channelled through the 
recipient government’s budget process. Chart 5.1, for example, also compares the amount 
of total grant disbursements received by PNG recorded by the OECD DAC with the 
amount of grants which have appeared within the PNG national budget. The OECD 
disbursements data is almost always larger than those receipts recorded through official 
government grant receipts, indicating that not all official aid recorded with the DAC is 
channelled through domestic budgetary processes.
108 OECD DAC (2007) defines an aid commitment as a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, 
undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. Bilateral 
commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of 
disbursements. The definition of aid disbursements on the other hand is defined as the release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or 
services for, a recipient. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at 
the cost of the donor.
109 Whilst not explained within the database, a potential explanation of this is the tendency of donors to make announcements over large 
commitments to foreign aid in a particular year which are then evened out over a number of years given the practicalities of 
implementation.
119
Chart 5.1: Foreign Aid Receipts in PNG— OECD DAC vs. Official Budget Data 
(1973-2008)
Kina, millions current
......... OECD Disbursements Grant ODA OECD Committments Grant ODA Budget Grants
Source: OECD DAC (2008) and author’s calculadons (see Appendix 5.1).
Indeed, on average, 21 per cent of grants recorded with the DAC have not been recorded 
within the official budget figures (see Appendix 5.2). One explanation for this is that 
donors have often found it less onerous to carry out aid projects without channelling funds 
though the national government (Feeny 2007:442). This circumvents the need to use 
existing government systems and avoids potential conflict with recipient officials. This 
point is highlighted by the growing divergence between the amount of aid that was being 
declared to the DAC and which was appearing on official budget documents during the 
late 1980s and 1990s when the shift from direct budgetary support to project aid was taking 
place. Another reason could be the widespread deterioration in economic mismanagement 
which occurred during this period (Chand 2002:6) and a corresponding decline in the 
quality of fiscal reporting.
Given that the primary interest of this analysis is the impact of aid on aggregate fiscal 
performance, the decision is made to use those aid flows which appear on-budget. In 
PNG, public sector officials are typically unlikely to be aware of the amount of spending in 
off-budget aid activities and it is therefore assumed that they do not incorporate them into 
their expenditure and revenue raising decisions. In addition, a large portion of PNG grant 
aid is received by various non government organisations and other aid charities so would
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be unlikely to affect budgetary decisions. The underlying assumption of this chapter then is 
that public sector agencies and officials respond to on-budget aid flows rather than off- 
budget ones.
This chapter draws on aid data (disaggregated between budget support and 
project/program aid) collected from official PNG Government budget documents from 
1974 to 2008 (see Appendix 5.1 for a full explanation). This 35-year data set matches or 
exceeds the degrees of freedom offered in most other papers within the literature.
5.4.2 M easu ring  D evelopm ent and  N o n  D evelopm ent E x p en d itu res
Papers seeking to assess the impact of aid on the quality of public expenditure have 
typically used the recurrent and development (capital) budget classifications (Fagernäs and 
Roberts 2004a; Fagernäs and Schurich 2004; Sugema and Chowdhury 2005). This chapter 
seeks to extend this analysis by focusing on the classification of government expenditure 
according to its function. This requires an extensive data collection exercise involving a 
number of steps. In the first instance, the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) 
(2008) database was used to allocate spending to four development expenditure 
categories— health, education, infrastructure, and law and order. All remaining spending is 
then placed into the ‘general’ category. The choice of these sectors reflects their importance 
in improving the country’s development performance and the key role they play in PNG’s 
prospects of lifting its rate of achievement against the MDGs (World Bank 2007; World 
Bank 2008).
Secondly, to fill in a number of years of missing data between 2002 and 2008, the 
functional allocations from volume II of the PNG national budget were also used to 
allocate recurrent expenditures into the same classification system as used in the IMF GFS 
database. These data were then added to the expenditure from the IMF data set and 
classified into two categories, development expenditures and general expenditures. A full 
listing of these recurrent budget allocations can be found in Appendix 5.1.
A difficulty of this approach is that functional allocations are not available for development 
budget expenditures. These expenditures were allocated from departmental records 
available in volume III of the budget documents. In this case, development expenditure for 
departments involved in the delivery of each of the four development categories was added
121
to the recurrent budget allocations to generate total development and general expenditure. 
A full listing of these development budget allocations can be found in Appendix 5.1.
5.4.3 M easuring  D om estic  R evenue and  P ublic  D eb t Levels
For consistency, domestic revenue and public debt data is also taken from PNG national
budget documents. Domestic revenue includes all revenue derived from company tax, 
personal tax and VAT as well as import and excise duties. Public debt includes the sum of 
all domestic and foreign debt liabilities owed by the government to both private and 
concessional lending sources. Net borrowing levels are then calculated from annual 
changes in this public debt data.110 All variables are measured in constant 2006 Kina and 
taken as a percentage of GDP.
5.4.4 D escriptive Statistics
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables (1974-2008)
V a r ia b le D e s c r ip t io n :  A l l  
V a r i a b l e s  E x p r e s s e d  
a s  a  P e r  C e n t  o f  G D P
O b s M e a n S td .
D e v .
M in M a x
ex T o ta l E x p end itu re 35 3 1 .365 3 .710 24 .248 38 .634
ex_d T o ta l D ev e lo p m en t 
E xpend itu re
35 11 .683 2.491 7 .352 15.949
ex_g T o ta l G enera l 
E xpend itu re
35 19 .683 3 .558 13.407 28 .668
d r D om estic  R evenue 35 2 2 .0 3 8 4 .927 10.472 33 .169
gr G ra n t R evenue 35 7 .6 8 2 3 .434 2 .448 14 .672
g r-b s G ra n t R evenue—  
B udget S upport
35 5 .728 5 .035 0.000 14 .6 7 2
gr- P r G ra n t R evenue—  
P rogram  S u p p o rt
35 1.954 2 .618 0.000 8 .406
pd
D .p d _ d
Public D e b t 
D om estic  financing o f
35 4 3 .7 8 4 12.715 24 .779 71.771
budge t deficit 
(D om estic  B orrow ing)
35 0 .2 8 4 3 .089 -8 .716 5 .956
Table 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics of each of these variables along with their 
respective abbreviations. The average level of total government expenditure is 31 per cent 
of GDP. From this, approximately 12 per cent of GDP has been allocated to what have 
been termed development expenditures with the remaining 20 per cent of GDP being 
allocated to the general category. PNG’s deficit bias can be seen by comparing the sum of 
average domestic revenue and grant revenue levels with total expenditure levels, which 
leaves a difference of approximately 2 per cent of GDP. The average level of public debt is 
43 per cent of GDP, peaking at almost 72 per cent of GDP in 2002. O f this Government 
debt 67 per cent has been held by foreign creditors on average whilst the remaining 33 per
110 As shall be explained shortly, domestic borrowing is emphasised here because external financing of the budget deficit is taken as the 
excluded variable to estimate the system of fiscal equations.
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cent has been held domestically. The largest decline in domestic debt liabilities which 
occurred in a single year is 8.7 per cent of GDP whilst the biggest increase in domestic 
borrowing is 6 per cent GDP.
5.5 E stim atio n  R esults
The first step in the analysis is to establish whether the variables are stationary or non 
stationary. For this purpose, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron tests 
are used. The two tests produce supporting results. The ADF test results are presented in 
Table 5.2.111 The results show that all the variables are found to be stationary at the 95 per 
cent significance level in their first difference form with the assumption of a constant only. 
All variables are non stationary and integrated of order 1,1(1). It is therefore appropriate to 
estimate models that include variables in their first differenced form through the VECM 
procedure.
Table 5.2: Stationarity Test for Key Fiscal Variables
V a r ia b le A D F
T e s t
S tat
A D F
C ritica l
V a lu e
A D F
P -
v a lu e
A D F  
T e s t  
S tat  
a fter  
I s« D i f f
A D F  
C ritica l  
V a lu e  
a fter  I s* 
D if f
A D F
P -
v a lu e  
a fter  
I s« D i f f
S ta tio n a ry
ex -2 .242 -2 .975 0.191 -6 .120 -2 .978 0.000 1 0 )
ex _ d -1 .605 -2 .975 0.481 -6 .815 -2 .978 0.000 1(1)
ex _ g -1 .565 -2 .975 0.501 -5 .637 -2 .978 0.000 1(1)
d r -2 .073 -2 .975 0.255 -6 .872 -2 .978 0.000 1(1)
gr -2 .060 -2 .975 0 .260 -5 .776 -2 .978 0.000 1(1)
g r_ b s -1 .802 -2 .975 0 .379 -4 .143 -2 .978 0.001 1(1)
gr-pr -0 .896 -2 .975 0.789 -7 .0 9 0 -2 .978 0.000 1(1)
D .p d _ d -1 .543 -2 .975 0 .512 -4 .784 -2 .978 0.001 1(1)
5.6 M odel I— Fiscal A ggregates
The first model incorporates the system of equations derived in Equation (4.11) into the 
VECM framework shown in Equation (5.2) to analyse the impact of grant flows on 
domestic revenue collection, aggregate expenditure and levels of domestic borrowing. For 
the purposes of estimation, external financing of the budget deficit is taken as the excluded 
variable from the system of equations. This is to avoid the estimation of an identity which 
would render any of the VECM results meaningless (Fagernas and Roberts 2008:38). This 
approach also places the focus of the results on the impact of aid grants rather than donor 
loans. This choice reflects that aid flows to PNG have been largely dominated by foreign 
grants rather than loans and are likely to continue doing so into the future, hence the
111 Phillips-Perron test results available upon request.
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results will have more practical policy implications.112 Given this the following model is 
estimated:
n n
A DR, = c,0 + 1 + Z a uADR,, + Z a, AY,. + eDR,
A D.PD_d, =c20 + i a t^ iJ_l +ta, ,AD.PD_dH+ f ,a iAY,, +£,D.PD _ d t
n n
(5.3)AGR, = cx + Z  a , + 1  AG/?,., + Z  AY,., + eCR,
where DRt is domestic revenue collection at time /, D.PD _ dt is domestic borrowing, 
GRt is grant revenue and EX ( is total government expenditure. For expositional 
simplicity, Ytj equals a vector of the other three non dependent variables such that for the 
DR, equation Yt_.t —D. PD _ dt_t , G R and EX ti , where i is the number of lags chosen 
within the model. The Ykj-\ term represents the cointegrating equation residuals so that
the CXk terms represent each of the adjustment coefficients. The optimal lag lengths of the 
model are shown by r and n, and chosen by standard diagnostic tests. Each of the error 
terms is assumed to have the normal white noise characteristics.
Appropriate lag length is chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQIC) (Gujarati 2003:537). 113 In the current 
case, both AIC and HQIC are minimised with the use of 2 lags (Table 5.3, Appendix 5.3). 
The Johansen trace statistic test is then used to determine the cointegrating rank of the 
model.114 The trace test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors but fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of 1 cointegrating vector. That is to say, that there exists one 
linear combination of the variables (Table 5.4, Appendix 5.3). The results of the 
cointegrating relationship amongst the variables within the VECM framework are 
presented in Table 5.5.
112 As discussed in the final section, the focus of this analysis thus rests on the impact of foreign grants on the management of fiscal 
aggregates in PNG. This also stands as a significant limitation of the analysis with a comparison of the effects of foreign loans being a 
fruitful area for further research.
113 It is also standard practice to test for evidence of residual serial correlation which will be done following the VECM estimations.
114 This process is based on Johansen’s trace test statistic which states that if the test statistic is greater than the Johansen critical value, 
the null hypothesis that there are v cointegraung vectors is rejected in favour of the alternative that there are more than v (Johansen, 
1988; Maddala and Kim, 1998:211).
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Table 5.5: Cointegrating R elationships for M odel I
N o rm a lis e d  o n C o e ff ic ie n ts
D o m e s t ic
B o rro w in g
D .p d _ d 1
1.715***
g r (0.377)
0.973***
(0.227)
-1.097***
ex
(0.241)
S tandard  erro rs in paren thesis. * p < . l ;  **
p< .05 ; *** p< .01 . Jo h an sen  norm aliza tion
restric tion  im posed o n  public debt.
In accordance with the VECM procedure, the cointegrating relationship is normalised, in this 
case with net domestic borrowing taking on a unitary value (Lutkepohl 1991). Because the 
variables show a long run equilibrium identity which is equated to zero a positive coefficient 
for one of the variables estimate suggests a negative ceteris paribus long run relationship with 
the normalised domestic borrowing variable. Likewise, a negative coefficient estimate 
suggests a positive ceteris paribus long run relationship with the normalised domestic 
borrowing variable.
A number of important results are found. Grant revenue has a highly significant positive 
coefficient estimate, suggesting that over the long term it has tended to act as a substitute for 
government borrowing. Similarly, higher levels of domestic revenue collection are also 
associated with reduced levels of domestic borrowing. Lastly, the expenditure variable is 
negative and also highly significant indicating that higher long run levels of government 
expenditure have been associated with higher levels of domestic borrowing. As explained, 
these cointegrating relationships do not reveal the direction of causality between each of 
these relationships. Indeed, although grant inflows appear to have acted as a substitute for 
domestic taxation it may still be possible for grant inflows to have a positive long run effect 
on domestic revenue collection, so long as each of the other variables also adjusts to balance 
the long run relation shown in Table 5.5. This could be the case for example if domestic 
borrowing also fell in response to the grant inflow. These flow-on effects are considered 
shortly with the use of the IRF analysis.
Table 5.6 presents the results of the VECM coefficients. The estimated coefficients for the 
error correction term reveal which of the variables adjust to correct imbalances in the fiscal 
situation whilst the variable coefficients show the short run effects of changes in the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable.
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Table 5.6: VECM Results for Model I
1 /  D _ p d _ d 2 /  D _ d r 3 /  D _ g r 4 /  D _ e x
L .D .p d _ d 0.081 -0 .076 0 .066 -0 .163
(0.203) (0.150) (0 .078) (0.165)
L .g r -0 .285 -0.571 0 .0 9 3 -1 .175**
(0.570) (0.421) (0.220) (0.462)
L .d r -0 .130 -0 .173 0 .157 -0 .497
(0.367) (0.271) (0 .142) (0 .299)*
L .c x -0 .144 -0 .005 0 .0 2 3 0.381
(0.306) (0.226) (0.118) (0.250)
L.Tt -0 .751** -0 .049 -0 .1 0 5 0.438*
N o r m a lity
T e s t
(Jarq u e-
B era )
(0.317) (0.234) (0.122) (0.258)
X2 0 .965 3 .805 0 .0 5 7 1.509
(P ro b >  y 2)
A l l -
(0.617) (0.149) (0 .971) (0.470)
N o r m a lity A u to c o r r e la t io n - Lag 1 ~ - L a g  2  —
X2 3-.937 X2 10.747 13 .020
(P ro b >  x 2) (0.137) (P ro b >  x 2) (0 .824) (0.671)
p c . l ;  ** p < .0 5 ; *** p < .0 1 . A ll the e stim ation s are m ade w ith  an unrestricted
con stan t in the m od e l. A u tocorrela tion  tests  H°: n o  au tocorrela tion  at lag
order. A s such  fail to  reject the null h y p o th esis  o f  ino au tocorrela tion .
The Jarque-Bera method is used to test for normality assumptions. This technique tests 
the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution where a rejection of the 
null indicating that the data are not from a normal distribution (Jarque and Bera 1980).11:1 In 
each case, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal 
distribution at a 95 per cent confidence level. Similarly, the tests for residual autocorrelation 
in each of the equations as well as for the entire model fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation.
Adjustment to fiscal imbalances have occurred primarily through changes in the 
expenditure equation, and to a lessor extent domestic financing of public debt. In both 
these cases the lagged error correction terms, L.7t, are significant, whereas the domestic 
revenue and grant revenue coefficients are insignificant at a 90 per cent confidence level. 
As discussed, these variables capture the adjustment of the relevant variables towards the 
long run equilibrium. Hence in this representation, expenditure and domestic borrowing 
are the key variables which adjust in the short term to correct budgetary imbalances 
according to Equation (5.3). As shall be discussed, this is an intuitive result, with 
expenditure and borrowing being the most flexible and easily adjustable fiscal instruments 
at the government’s disposal.
115 This null hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero, since samples from a normal 
distribution have an expected skewness of 0 and an expected excess kurtosis of 0 (which is the same as a kurtosis of 3). The definition 
shows that any deviation from this increases the value of the Jarque Bera statistic (Jarque and Bera 1980).
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A further insight from these results is that the insignificance of the grant aid variable in the 
domestic revenue equation suggests that grant levels have been relatively unresponsive to 
changes in domestic revenue collection. This indicates that efforts by the PNG 
Government to increase donor grant disbursements during periods of fiscal pressure have 
tended to be either limited or relatively unsuccessful. This result may also reflect the 
tendency of donors to respond to significant revenue shortfalls with additional donor 
financed loans rather than grants—which are not captured by the estimations. Some 
pertinent examples of this being; the $50 million IMF and World Bank led bail out package 
in 1990 following the fiscal pressures created from the closure of the Bougainville mine in 
1989; the Australian backed US$111 loan facility offered to the PNG government in 1994 
following a signficiant revenue shortfall; and, the structural adjustment loan made again by 
the World Bank following the 1999 public debt crises.
Whilst the VECM results estimate the direct impact between each of these variables in 
practice, there are likely to be important flow-on effects occurring within the budgetary 
cycle. The total long term impact of an increase in grants is now assessed with the use of 
the IRF analysis discussed. This approach captures both the direct and indirect effects as 
well as those attributed to the error correction mechanism.
Chart 5.3: M o d el I IR F — D o m e stic  B orrow ing, E x p en d itu re  and D o m e s t ic  R even u e
/  ..* •* ...................
----------  irf of gr -> D_pd_d
------------irf of gr -> ex
.............  irf of gr -> dr
Source: Author’s calculations.
Chart 5.3 illustrates the impact of an increase in grants on domestic borrowing, expenditure 
and domestic revenue collection. Here the one standard deviation shock to grants leads in 
the first instance to a unanimous decline in all three of the response variables. Following
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this the effect of the grant impulse continues to have a sustained negative impact on levels 
of domestic revenue. This suggests that grant aid has acted as a substitute for domestic 
revenue collection, with a one standard deviation impulse to aid leading to an 
approximately half sized fall in taxation receipts after 5 years. The negative impact of grants 
on spending is short lived, with the effect eventually stabilising after approximately five 
years at a near zero value, after a short positive period. The concurrent negative impact of 
aid on domestic borrowing however suggests that a large portion of the grant impulse is 
also allocated towards lowering the public debt burden. In this sense, once all of the knock 
on effects within the fiscal system have stabilised the shock to grants acts primarily to 
replace domestic revenue collection and lower public debt levels, rather than augment 
levels of government expenditure.
Each of these long term relationships are also presented in the cumulative impulse 
response functions shown in Chart 5.4 (Appendix 5.4) which give the cumulative sum of all 
of the response values to the given grant aid shock from all previous periods. These results 
further show the weak impact of aid on total spending and its negative relationship with 
domestic revenue and domestic borrowing. In terms of domestic revenue this supports the 
earlier contention that foreign aid may have acted as a significant disincentive for the PNG 
Government to expand its own domestic revenue sources. Another explanation for these 
results may also be due to some indirect ‘conditionality’ effects of aid. As discussed in 
Chapter 4 aid grants to PNG were routinely made conditional on the implementation of 
public sector reform and reduced public spending as a means of controlling public debt. 
Some of the most notable examples of this were the major donor interventions following 
the 1991, 1994 and 1999 financial crises, which all imposed expenditure reduction targets in 
the immediate post crisis periods.116
5.7 M odel II— Fiscal Aggregates and Expenditure Com position
The second model now considers the impact of grant revenues and domestic revenues on 
the composition of fiscal expenditures between the development and general expenditure 
categories. The model estimates the following relationships:
116 Another explanation for this result is that that the provision of donor grants, say in the form of technical assistance, may have 
contributed to reforms which lowered or removed many trade tariffs, hence lowering overall revenue collection.
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*-• j=i i=l
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*=1 i=l i=l "  '
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i=i ;=i
AD.PD_d,=cx + Z a ky k,_ ,+ ia„AD.PD_d, ,+ ±amAY,_l +eDFD 
*=1 1=1 1=1
where EX _ Dt is the development expenditures category, EX _ Gt is the general 
expenditure category, DRt is domestic revenue collection, GRt is grant revenue and 
D.PD _ clt is domestic borrowing. Again, Yl_i simply equals the vector of the other four 
non dependent variables and Ykj-\ represents the cointegrating equation residuals so that 
the ak terms represent the adjustment coefficients. As usual, each of the error terms is 
assumed to have the normal white noise characteristics.
The AIC and HQIC again suggest that the model should again be estimated with two lags 
(Table 5.7, Appendix 5.3), whilst the Johansen procedure rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vectors but fails to reject the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector 
(Table 5.8, Appendix 5.3). The cointegrating relationships amongst the variables after again 
being normalised on domestic borrowing within the VECM framework are defined in 
Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: C ointegrating R elationships for M odel II
N orm alised  on Coefficients
D om estic
Borrowing
D .pd_d 1
gf 1.310***
(0.335)
dr 0.609
(0.206)***
ex_d -1.107***
(0.244)
ex-g -0.508*
(0.270)
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p< .l; ** p<.05; 
*** p<.01. Johansen normalization restriction 
imposed on public debt.
The results support those obtained for the cointegrating relationships in Model I. Both 
grant and domestic revenues have a highly significant negative association with long run 
levels of domestic borrowing, whilst both of the expenditure variables have a highly 
significant positive impact on long run levels of domestic borrowing. In short, over the
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long term more fiscal resources have led to lower levels of debt accumulation whilst higher 
levels of spending have had a positive relationship with debt levels.
The short run VECM coefficients are now presented in Table 5.10. The results again show 
that expenditure levels have been a key adjustment mechanism to imbalances in the fiscal 
system. O f the two expenditure categories however, those related to development activities 
have been the major source of these adjustments.
As in the previous model, the adjustment parameter in the domestic borrowing equation is 
again significant and positively signed. This suggests that the PNG Government has tended 
to favour varying levels of public debt in order to adjust to short term fiscal imbalances. 
The implication here is that government has found it easier, or has been more willing, to 
incur variations in levels of domestic debt than it has for each of the other fiscal aggregates. 
This may have occurred for example by absorbing shortfalls in domestic revenue collection 
by increasing the deficit rather than reining in expenditure levels.
Table 5.10: VECM Results for Model II
1/ 2 /
D2_pd_d
3 /
D2_dr
4 /
D_ex_d
5 /
D_ex_g
L.D.pd_d 0.053 0.046 -0.135 -0.009 -0.188(0.078) (0.199) (0.152) (0.088) (0.133)
L.gr 0.223 0.023 -0.539 -0.220 -0.658*(0.235) (0.601) (0.459) (0.267) (0.400)
L.dr 0.162 -0.064 -0.269 0.027 0.614
(0.145) (0.372) (0.284) (0.165) (0.248)**
0.112 0.130 0.125 0.073 0.452**L.cx ^
(0.131) (0.336) (0.257) (0.149) (0.224)
L«cx d -0.192 -0.690 -0.187 -0.119 0.014(0.204) (0.523) (0.399) (0.232) (0.349)
0.0358 0.251** -0.046 -0.059 0.099
j u . j I
Normality Test 
(Jarque-Bera)
(0.040) (0.103) (0.079) (0.046) (0.069)
X2 1.712 0.167 2.133 2.004 2.897
(Prob> x 2)
All -  Normality
(0.424) (0.920)
Autocorrelation
(0.344)
■ Lag 1 -
(0.367)
- Lag 2 -
(0.234)
X2 8.913 X2 28.882 25.746
(Prob> x2) (0.540) (Prob> x 2) (0.268) (0.421)
p< .l; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. All the estimations are made with an unrestricted constant in the
model. Autocorrelation tests H°: no autocorrelation at lag order. As such fail to reject the null
hypothesis o f no autocorrelation.
These results support Chapter 4’s historical analysis which illustrated the government’s 
reluctance to reign in expenditures even during period with substantially lower revenue. An 
example of this was in the early 1990’s when the closure of the Bougainville mining
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operations left a large hole in domestic revenue collection. Rather than cutting expenditures 
during this period to adjust to the fiscal imbalance, development expenditures remained 
relatively constant and the general expenditure category increased. Given the relatively 
constant grant revenue sources this period thus also saw a surge in public debt levels— 
illustrating a broader PNG Government tendency to use borrowing as a ‘shock absorber’ 
to imbalances in the fiscal situation.
Each of the long term relationships between the fiscal and aid variables are now again 
shown with the use of generalised and cumulative IRFs which illustrate the full knock-on 
effects of an aid impulse. Chart 5.5 shows the impact of a one standard deviation shock to 
grant revenue on domestic revenue, public debt and both expenditure categories, whilst 
Chart 5.6 (Appendix 5.4) illustrates the cumulative version of the IRF.
Chart 5.5: Model II IRF— D om estic Revenue, D om estic Borrowing and 
Government Expenditure
------------ irf of gr -> D_pd_d
--------------irf of gr -> ex_g
.............. irf of gr -> ex_d
--------------irf of gr -> dr
Source: Author’s calculations.
The results for domestic borrowing and domestic revenue are comparatively similar to 
those established within Model I. A one standard deviation shock to grant aid leads to a 
decline both in levels of domestic borrowing and in domestic revenue mobilisation. Again, 
this suggests that while a portion of aid is treated as a substitute for further government 
borrowing that it has also encouraged the PNG Government to place a lower tax burden 
on its domestic constituents.
Both the general and development expenditure variables also follow a similar time path to
that shown for total expenditure in Model I with an initial small decline followed by an
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eventually stabilisation at approximately zero. In this case however, both the variables are 
slightly positive although this effect is too small to be deemed significant in the absence of 
reliable confidence intervals.
Also of note is the larger initial decrease in the general expenditure category than the 
development expenditure category, suggesting that in the short term at least the provision 
of foreign grants helps to improve the composition of PNG Government expenditures 
towards key development items. The cumulative IRF shown in Chart 5.6 (Appendix 5.4) 
illustrates however that this impact is eroded over time with a return to the original 
expenditure composition after approximately seven years.
One of the most plausible explanations for these results is that initially, aid is effective at 
improving the composition of government expenditures towards key development sectors. 
Conditionality and incentive effects help to constrain general expenditures whilst a large 
portion or project and program aid sticks to the development category. Then, over time, 
the recipient bureaucracy incorporates these additional financial flows into its budgetary 
decision-making process. Following this, a reallocation of domestic funds occurs which 
leads to an expenditure composition comparable to what existed prior to the aid inflow. In 
essence, donor attempts to improve the composition of PNG expenditures are successful 
in the short but not the long term.
5.8 Model III—Fiscal Aggregates, Expenditure Composition and Aid 
Modalities
The third model now separates the grant aid variable into two components—budgetary 
support and project or program aid to determine whether these components have had 
differential impacts on the contribution of grant aid to each of these fiscal relationships. 
The final model estimates a six endogenous variable system consisting of the following 
relationships:
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k = l 1=1 1=1
(5.5)
i i i i
A GR _ PR, = c x  + L + i  a,AGR _ PR,_, + £  amAY,, + Ea
* =1 i= l  i= l
AD.PD _ d  = c + i  or, + £  a, _ £  or|2,A ^  + £ ,
*=• i= l i= l
D.PD _d,
where EX _ Dt is the development expenditures category, EX _ Gt is the general 
expenditures category, DRt is domestic revenue collection, D.PD _ dt is domestic 
borrowing, GR _ BSt is grant revenue given in the form of budget support and GR _ PRt is 
grant revenue given in the form of project and program aid. All other variables are as 
defined previously.
The HQIC criteria suggests that the model should be estimated with only a one year lag 
structure, whilst the AIC suggests that it should be estimated with a three year lag (Table 
5.11, Appendix 5.3). The decision is made to use the one year lag structure both to preserve 
degrees of freedom within what is potentially an over-paramatised model, given the six 
explanatory variables. This decision was also made on the basis that the one lag model 
produces a trace test statistic supporting one cointegrating relationship amongst the 
variables (Table 5.12, Appendix 5.3), whilst the three lag model suggests that there are 
three.117 Nevertheless, without any base results to compare them to, the impacts of budget 
support vis-a-vis project and program aid on each of these fiscal variables should still be 
taken as preliminary rather than conclusive.
117 This provides some evidence that the three lag model adds to the problems of inconsistency in results when VECM models suffer 
from over-paramatisation.
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Table 5.13: Cointegrating Relationships for Model III
1/Norm alised on 
Domestic Borrowing
Coefficients
D.pd_d 1
gr_bs 2.546***
(0.843)
g r-P r -1.353
(1.009)
dr 1.902***
(0.560)
ex_d -3.364***
(0.811)
ex- g -0.515
(0.606)
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.l; ** p<.05; *** 
p<.01. Johansen normalisation restriction imposed.
The cointegrating relationship is again normalised on domestic borrowing. In this case, 
disaggregating the grant aid variable suggests the budget support component has been the 
major contributor to reduced levels of domestic borrowing, with the project aid variable 
recording an insignificant long run cointegrating coefficient. Both expenditure categories 
also again both have negative coefficient estimates, supporting the results of the previous 
two models that higher levels of spending have a positive relationship with domestic 
borrowing. Also in line with the previous two models, higher levels of domestic revenue 
have a negative relationship with debt levels. This indicates that increases in domestic 
resources are not entirely allocated to higher levels of expenditures, but rather to also lower 
domestic borrowing. Table 5.14 presents the VECM coefficients to analyse the short run 
dynamics of the model.
Table 5.14: VECM Results for Model III
1/D_dr 2/D _gr_bs 3/D_gr_pr 4 /  D2_pd_d 5/D _ex_d 6 /D  ex g
L._cel -0.012 -0.027** 0.044** -0.097
0.067***
(0.025) -0.066(0.047) (0.013) (0.020) (0.067) (0.043)
Normality
Test
(Jarque-
Bera)
Chi-2 0.692 2.825 1.191 1.250 0.677 0.117
(Prob>Chi2) (0.707) (0.243) (0.551) (0.535) (0.712) (0.943)
A ll-
Normality
Chi-2
(Prob>Chi2)
6.753
Autocorrelation
Chi-2
- Lag 1 -
34.343
- Lag 2 —
37.930
(0.873) (Prob > Chi-2) (0.547) (0.381)
*p<.l; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Autocorrelation tests H°: no autocorrelation at chosen lag order. As such fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.______________________________________________________
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Given the model is estimated with one lag, only the error correction terms are presented. 
These coefficients once more reveal that expenditure has been a key adjustment 
mechanism within this system of fiscal equations. It also appears that the majority of this 
expenditure adjustment has occurred through the development expenditure variable with it 
recording a highly significant positive coefficient estimate whilst the general expenditure 
variable is insignificant. In addition, with the disaggregation of aid flows, the estimation 
results show that both project aid and budgetary support have responded to short term 
imbalances in PNG’s fiscal position. For instance, this may occur when shortfalls in 
domestic revenue and looming public debt crisis are met with injections of additional 
donor assistance. Chart 5.7 now shows the impact of a one standard deviation shock to 
budgetary support on each of the fiscal variables.
Chart 5.7: Model III IRF— Impact of Budgetary Support on Dom estic Revenue, 
D om estic Borrowing and Government Expenditure
----------  irf of gr_bs -> D_pd_d
------------ irf of gr_bs -> e x j
.............  irf of gr bs -> ex_d
------------ irf of gr_bs -> dr
Source: Author’s calculations.
As in the previous two models, the shock to foreign grants (in this case through budgetary 
support) has an unambiguous negative relationship with levels of domestic borrowing. In 
this case however, rather than eroding tax collection budget support is shown to have an 
almost benign impact on levels of domestic revenue. Budget support also has a significant 
impact on improving the composition of government spending by increasing the 
proportion of funds going to key development sectors whilst reducing the amount of 
spending in the general expenditure category. This will be discussed in more detail shortly.
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Chart 5.8 shows the impact of a one standard deviation shock to grant revenues in the 
form of project and program aid on each of the fiscal variables. In contrast to budgetary 
support, project and program aid have encouraged higher levels of spending in the general 
but not development expenditure category. In fact, the aid impulse has an almost 
insignificant impact on the amount of government funds allocated to key development 
activities. Also in contrast to budgetary support, the project aid impulse raises levels of 
domestic borrowing, with the effect stabilising after approximately seven years, with a close 
to zero long run impact on domestic revenue collection.
Chart 5.8: Model III IRF— Impact of Project and Program Aid on Domestic 
Revenue, Domestic Borrowing and Government Expenditure
----------  irf of gr_pr -> D_pd_d
------------ irf of gr_pr -> ex_g
.............  irf of gr_pr -> ex_d
------------ irf of gr_pr -> dr
Source: Author’s calculations.
One explanation for this is that earmarked aid modalities have encouraged the PNG 
Government to undertake more than proportional resource allocations away from donor 
financed development sectors and towards general government consumption expenditure. 
This may be a result of the effect described previously as ‘aid illusion’ (McGillivray and 
Morrissey 2000). This is the situation within which with imperfect information flows and 
weak expenditure management systems aid inflows can be accompanied with 
misperceptions or ‘illusions’ regarding either the real or nominal value of the aid inflow, 
and the spending conditions attached (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000:3). In the case of 
PNG for example, weak budgetary processes may overvalue the contribution of aid to a 
specific project. As a result, the presence of increased donor activity within a sector may 
encourage the PNG Government to concentrate more of its own resources elsewhere. 
Higher levels of expenditure for general consumption activities may then subsequently
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drive the need to increase the government’s recourse to domestic borrowing to fund its 
deficit financing.
Another explanation for this effect is that the large increase in project and program aid 
during the 1990s coincided with the deteriorating fiscal discipline of government and a 
rapid build up in public debt. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4 one of the most 
significant peak increases in project and program aid, following the Bougainville crisis in 
1989—90, occurred during a period when the government was rapidly withdrawing 
resources from development sectors of the economy and allocating them towards conflict 
related expenditure. This led to a situation whereby despite increasing total expenditure and 
an increasing effort from donors to earmark their assistance to specific activities, resources 
for key development sectors such as health and infrastructure remained stagnant and for 
education even fell. This eroded any potentially positive impact this shift in aid policy may 
have had on improving the composition of PNG Government expenditures.
5.9 D iscussion  and C onclusion
This chapter has sought to assess the impact of foreign grant aid on the fiscal behaviour of 
the PNG Government since independence. The study has been motivated by a need to 
increase donor understanding of how foreign financial assistance interacts with public 
sector behaviour to influence aggregate fiscal outcomes. Understanding the complex web 
of interactions between foreign aid and the management of fiscal aggregates can thus serve 
as a key tool in enhancing the effectiveness of foreign assistance which PNG receives.
The analysis drew upon the VECM approach to estimate these relationships which was 
found to be appropriate with the use of Granger’s representation theorem and the non 
stationary nature of the data. This approach has also offered a number of advantages over 
traditional FRMs which have had difficulties in determining appropriate target variables 
and which are limited in their ability to consider long run dynamics. This is the first study 
to apply these methods to PNG with an extensive data collection exercise, allowing for an 
analysis of the relationships between grant aid, domestic borrowing, domestic revenue and 
development expenditure allocations. This is also the first such study to use this approach 
to consider the potentially divergent impact of budget support grants vis-ä-vis project aid 
grants on the fiscal behaviour of government. In doing this, a number of important results 
are found with a summary provided in Appendix 5.5.
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Firstly, there is consistent evidence that expenditure and domestic debt have acted as key 
shock absorbers within the PNG fiscal system, whereas domestic revenue collection and 
grant aid have tended to be independent of the prevailing fiscal situation. In particular, the 
PNG Government appears to have been most willing to adjust levels of expenditure in a 
number of key development sectors in response to fiscal imbalances. This suggests for 
example that during periods of expenditure contraction, the PNG Government has tended 
to give less priority to what has been termed development related expenditure, whilst 
maintaining those classified in the general category.
Secondly, aid has had an unambiguous negative effect on the accumulation of additional 
domestic debt. A positive shock to grant aid lowers domestic borrowing in both the short 
and long term. This suggests that foreign grants have acted as an important substitute to 
government borrowing across the post independence period.
Grant aid has however also been associated with lower long term levels of domestic 
revenue mobilisation. As a result of this Government preference for using aid grants to 
substitute for borrowing and to replace domestic revenue collection, the net effect of aid 
grants on aggregate expenditure levels was close to zero. To an extent, this result supports 
the contention of the many critics of aid to PNG who have argued that aid has undermined 
the government’s incentive to tax domestic constituents or to create a more vibrant private 
sector which can serve as a revenue base for government expenditure.
Preliminary evidence was also presented to suggest that these effects have varied 
considerably across different types of grant aid delivery. Budget support in particular has a 
strong relationship with the lower domestic revenue and lower domestic borrowing effects, 
although it also supports higher rates of expenditure in the development expenditures 
category. In addition to the grant inflow, this was financed from budget support’s impact 
on lowering the proportion of funds being allocated to general government spending items. 
Project aid on the other hand has a strong positive relationship with higher rates of general 
government expenditure which also corresponds with a positive impact on domestic 
borrowing and revenue levels, although both of these are comparatively small.
These results add further insights into a number of the contentions discussed at the
beginning of this chapter. The accusation that grant aid, and in particular budget support,
has undermined the PNG Government’s incentive to expand its own tax collection appears
well founded. Higher levels of grants are strongly associated with lower levels of domestic
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revenue mobilisation, reflecting a preference by the PNG Government to continue 
drawing on foreign resources rather than tax its own constituents. The claim that grants 
have supported higher overall levels of unproductive government expenditure are however, 
not supported by the data. The PNG Government has displayed a clear preference for 
using additional grant resources to lower its levels of domestic borrowing rather than 
funding new expenditure items.
There are some caveats worth noting about the reliability and usefulness of these results. 
As discussed, the VECM approach has a number of limitations including the potential to 
over parameterise the model which can lead to sensitive results in terms of lag length. This 
is particularly the case for Model III, which included six endogenous variables each 
interacting contemporaneously and with one lag for a 35-year sample. This level of 
disaggregation in both the expenditure and aid variables may place an excessive burden on 
the explanatory power of the data. It is for this reason that these results are referred to as 
preliminary. Nevertheless, the consistency of the results across all three specifications adds 
a degree of confidence to the core findings of this chapter.
The results reveal that there is much scope for foreign financial resources to be managed 
more effectively by both donors and the PNG Government. PNG’s continued narrow tax 
base adds significance to the tendency of grant aid to lower the government’s domestic 
revenue collection efforts—potentially highlighting that priority should be placed on 
supporting taxation collection in addition to the current focus on improving the quality and 
composition of expenditure. The preference for using grant inflows to lower domestic 
borrowing requirements rather than spending also highlights the impact of aid on 
increasing aggregate availability of resources depends first and foremost on the behaviour 
of the PNG Government, not on the priorities of donors.
Delivering aid which increases, rather than replaces, the availability of resources in key 
development sectors is also a key area of concern. Australia’s renewed focus on supporting 
an expansion of basic service delivery necessitates a renewed need to engage in a 
productive dialogue with the PNG Government surrounding their development objectives 
and where donor funds can be used to support these targets. In the absence of real 
cooperation foreign aid is likely to continue having a limited impact on financing 
development outcomes in PNG. The practicality of addressing these issues shall be 
discussed in the final policy implications section in Chapter 8.
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Finally, it is important to note that this analysis has not determined to what extent aid 
allocated to specific activities has remained within its respective sectors. Making these types 
of estimates within the current framework would be problematic, given the large number 
of aid and fiscal variables required to analyse these inter sectoral effects of aid. In fact, 
when preliminary estimates were carried out with disaggregated expenditures, the model 
failed standard stability tests and produced nonsensical parameter estimates. In order to 
assess the inter sectoral fungibility of PNG aid, a new model is developed which 
incorporates a static Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation technique. This 
technique has the disadvantage of ignoring the dynamic properties of these fiscal 
relationships but imposes a much lower burden on the degrees of freedom available in the 
estimation of the model. This is the subject of Chapter 6.
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C hapter 6: Foreign Aid and Sectoral E xpenditu res in PN G
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6.1 In troduction
PNG’s continued slow rates of progress towards achieving key social welfare targets such 
as the MDGs reflects poor rates of access by large pordons of the population to essential 
public services such as health, education and national infrastructure networks. Helping the 
PNG Government to improve access to these basic services is thus a central challenge for 
PNG’s major bilateral and multilateral donor partners, particular as they increasingly focus 
their efforts towards MDG targets.
The previous chapter sought to analyse how foreign financial assistance has influenced the 
aggregate availability of government resources which are utilised to achieve these 
outcomes. This analysis showed that at the aggregate level it was the PNG Government’s 
response to the aid inflow, rather than donor priorities, that determined its overall impact 
on financing additional spending on pro-development activities. In particular it highlighted 
that large portions of foreign aid had been highly fungible, with a weak overall impact on 
improving the amount of resources made available to pay for key social service delivery 
items within the PNG budget. This analysis was, however, limited in its ability to consider 
how foreign aid had influenced sectoral expenditure levels by not accounting for the 
proportion of aid which has actually been delivered to those sectors.
Government decisions about how much it will let donor-funded resources augment its own 
expenditure allocations and how much it will treat these resources as fungible will play a 
key role in the ability of aid to help finance improved progress towards welfare targets such 
as the MDGs. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, one of the key justifications of the switch 
between budgetary support and project aid was that not enough donor resources were 
being allocated to pro development activities. However, despite these changing aid 
modalities, it was also shown that expenditure levels in a number of key development 
sectors have continued to deteriorate. The most dramatic of those has been in education, 
where total funding levels have fallen from K135 per capita in 1990 to less than K40 per 
capita in 2007. Likewise, health spending has fallen from K50 per capita in 1990 to just 
under K40 per capita in 2006, while infrastructure spending dropped from K45 per capita 
in 1990 to almost K10 per capita in 2001, although it has subsequently recovered to 1990 
levels.
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This chapter seeks to build on the analysis of Chapter 5 by addressing two additional 
questions. Firsdy, what impact has foreign aid had on total funding levels for three core 
service delivery priorities— health, education and infrastructure—in relation to the funding 
of general government consumption expenditure? Secondly, to what extent has the shift 
from general budgetary support to earmarked aid modalities such as project and program 
aid improved the amount of funding being provided to these three key service delivery 
sectors?
Calculations of fungibility parameters in PNG are complicated by the fact that between 
1975 and 2008 it has received approximately 57 per cent of its foreign assistance in the 
form of direct budgetary support. As such, this chapter extends the literature by calculating 
three different sets of parameters to measure the impact of foreign aid on sectoral 
expenditure levels. The first measures the extent to which project and program aid has 
augmented or replaced PNG Government funding to that sector. The second measures the 
degree to which budget support also increased funding to these sectors vis-ä-vis other 
budgetary responses and the third combines the first two sets of parameters to measure the 
aggregate impact of a dollar increase in foreign aid allocated at its mean historical values 
across these two types of aid delivery.
A number of authors have outlined their opposition to the focus on the existence of inter 
sectoral fungibility as a means of assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid (White 1998; 
Holmqvist 2000; McGillivray and Morrissey 2000; McGillivray and Morrissey 2001a; 
McGillivray and Morrissey 2001b). These authors highlight that from a theoretical 
standpoint there is little a priori reason to believe that fungible aid will be any less effective 
than non fungible aid. Indeed, all that is required in order for fungibility to exist is a simple 
difference in the expenditure priorities between donor and recipient. This issue was 
analysed by Peterson (2007) who showed that despite an average of 65 per cent of sectoral 
aid being spent outside of its intended sector, there was no evidence that non fungible aid 
works better at encouraging growth than fungible aid (Peterson 2007:1081).
This is an important point and it should be noted at the outset that this chapter does not 
seek to judge the effectiveness of aid flows in PNG on the basis of fungibility, nor would 
the existence of fungibility constitute a justification for a reduction of aid flows. Rather, 
this chapter uses the categorical fungibility framework to analyse both the impact of aid on 
sectoral expenditure levels and on the ability of earmarked aid vis-a-vis budgetary support 
to induce higher expenditure in priority development sectors of the PNG economy.
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Understanding how these two competing forms of aid delivery influence sectoral spending 
outcomes can offer some important insights into the design of future aid modalides.
6.2 Literature Review
The categorical fungibility literature is concerned specifically with how aid funds have 
influenced the total availability of resources within sectors of the recipient economy. In 
particular it seeks to determine to what extent the recipient government has altered its own 
sectoral expenditure in response to foreign resource inflows. Two approaches have been 
taken to measuring this sectoral fungibility.
6.2.1 Utility Maximisation Studies
The first approach to measuring the sectoral fungibility of aid derives a set of simultaneous 
linear expenditure equations from a recipient government that, it is assumed, maximises its 
utility function by distributing resources across each sector of the economy. Using this 
approach, Khilji and Zampelli (1991) find that in the case of Pakistan aid has indeed been 
highly fungible. However, instead of financing unproductive expenditure types the majority 
of freed up resources are transferred to lower the tax burden on domestic constituents.118 
Studying the effects of foreign aid on intergovernmental financing in India, Swaroop et al. 
(2000) find that foreign aid simply acted as a substitute for spending that the government 
would have undertaken anyway—with freed up funds almost entirely reallocated to non­
development activities such as defence and public administration. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) 
then consider a panel of 38 aid recipients for the period 1970—90 and find that for three of 
the five sectors examined foreign aid has led to insignificant increases in funding for those 
sectors.
One criticism of the method adopted in papers such as Feyzioglu et al. (1998) is that 
because individual recipient bureaucracies respond in vastly different ways to aid inflow, a 
panel data approach is likely to aggregate important heterogenous impacts of aid, resulting 
in a loss of important information. Another criticism of papers such as those by Feyzioglu 
et al. (1998) and Swaroop et al. (2000) relates to the utility specification which they adopt 
for government preferences. Their approach distinguishes between two types of 
expenditure— those to which aid is allocated and others which receive no aid. Authors such 
as McGillivray and Morrissey (2000a:421) have argued that this assumption is acceptable 
only if there is reason to believe that these two types of expenditure can be separated
118 Khilji and Zampelli (1994) also find that aid flows had been highly fungible with a large portion of the assistance being used to finance 
higher levels of private sector consumption and allowing the government to lower aggregate tax collection efforts.
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within the government’s utility function such that aid funds can only affect government 
consumption decisions through the fungible portion of aid. Indeed, as Feyzioglu et al. 
(1998:34) highlight, this requires that ‘aid affects the government’s choice [over all public 
goods] only through the fungible portion; public goods purchased from the non fungible 
part do not affect this choice’. Given the inter related nature of all these expenditures, 
however, there is little reason for this to be the case. In fact, one of the central features of 
categorical fungibility highlights that if aid funding of one sector increases, then the 
fungible portion of that aid allows government to increase all other expenditures.
6.2.2 Community Indifference Curve Studies
The second method of calculating categorical fungibility also focuses on estimating a 
system of interdependent fiscal equations following an inflow of aid. In this case, however, 
government choices are made via indifference curves which express preferences for 
combinations of expenditure, subject to budget constraints which include both domestic 
revenues plus foreign aid (Pack and Pack 1993:259). While this approach is more ad hoc 
than the previous, it does have the advantage of allowing the impact of aid receipts to 
affect government expenditure allocations across all areas of the budget, both aid-receiving 
and non aid-receiving. As shall be explained, this approach also has the added advantage 
that it can help distinguish between types of aid which are allocated to specific sectors 
(project and program aid) and those which simply augment general government revenue 
(budgetary support). For these reasons this chapter adopts this approach.
Pack and Pack (1990) provide one of the earliest examples of this literature. The authors 
estimate the impact of aid inflows on a number of development and non development 
(current) expenditures for Indonesia between 1966 and 1986. They find that aid has tended 
to increase development expenditures, with funds remaining within those sectors for which 
they were intended. Additionally, they find that aid has tended to stimulate rather than 
reduce domestic revenue collection, alleviating concerns about the ability of aid to 
undermine the government’s incentive to tax domestic constituents. Cashel-Cordo and 
Craig (1990) study a panel of 46 countries between 1975 and 1980 to determine what 
impact total aid flows have had on the size and composition of government expenditure by 
focusing on expenditure categories which distinguish between defence and non defence 
spending. They find that, in general, aid has had a stimulatory effect on public spending but 
that little to none of this has spilt over into the defence budget.
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Pack and Pack (1993) follow a similar method to their earlier paper in analysing the affect 
of aid on the Dominican Republic between 1968 and 1986. In contrast to the findings of 
their earlier paper, the authors find that the receipt of aid by recipients had been followed 
by major shifts in allocation from development expenditures to deficit reduction, debt 
service and, to a lesser extent, own-source revenue reduction.119 This shift in allocation, 
they conclude, has dramatically thwarted donors’ attempts to increase funding levels to key 
development sectors of the economy which the authors say may also be why cross-country 
analyses have found that aid contributes little to GDP growth (Pack and Pack 1993:264). 
Likewise, Van de Sjipe (2004:30) finds that after controlling for both on and off-budget aid 
flows for a panel of 105 countries between 1990 and 2003, education aid has had no 
discernible effect on education spending, while the effect of health aid on public health 
spending has been much smaller than the additional aid resources.
Tiwara (2007) then replicates the model developed in Pack and Pack (1990) to study the 
effects of aid fungibility in Nepal between 1976 and 2001. The author finds that aid 
intended for a particular sector has, by and large, been spent within that sector and, in 
some cases, has induced the government to augment its spending. Tiwara (2007) proposes 
that this corroborates the evidence on the flypaper effect of aid not just at the aggregate 
level but also at the sectoral level. The author also finds that aid has enhanced the 
government’s revenue effort but not to the extent that would enable the government to self 
finance the inflating government consumption.
6.2.3 R esearch  Gap
Various degrees of fungibility exist within sector-allocated aid delivery and these effects 
vary considerably at the country level. Given the diversity of institutional, economic and 
political circumstances in developing countries, this is intuitively appealing. Public sector 
bureaucracies operate in vasdy different ways and are thus likely to respond to aid flows in 
a heterogeneous manner. Applying these methods to a case study of PNG will thus 
generate important insights into how aid interacts with public sector behaviour to influence 
sectoral expenditure outcomes.
One limitation of the previous community indifference curve studies has been its treatment 
of what are termed ‘residual’ aid flows. The approach taken in all of these studies has been
1,9 Notably, the authors do find some evidence of the flypaper effect in the agriculture, public works and social services sectors. 
However, this effect did not appear to translate into more than proportional increases in government expenditures at the aggregate 
level (Pack and Pack 1993:264).
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to select a number of sectors, /, for which fungibility is a concern (typically pro poor 
expenditure sectors such as health and education). All the residual, non /th sector 
expenditures are then placed into an ‘other’ or ‘general’ expenditure category. Likewise, aid 
flows are then classified on a similar sectoral basis such that all non /th sector aid flows are 
also included in a ‘general’ aid category. However, the assumption here is that project and 
program aid intended for other sectors not included in /, and other forms of aid delivery, 
such as non earmarked budget support, are treated equally by the government in its 
decisions over inter sectoral transfers. The weakness with this assumption is that project 
and program aid not included in any of the /-sectors has still been allocated to a specific 
activity whereas aid delivered through budgetary support has simply augmented domestic 
revenue collection.
As outlined previously in Equation (4.4), this means that budgetary support will be 
allocated entirely on the basis of government preferences whilst the portion of the residual 
project aid which is transferred will depend upon the degree to which the recipient 
government perceives it to be fungible. Given this, the inclusion of budgetary support in 
the residual project and program aid variable is likely to lead to an over estimate of the 
amount of fungibility taking place from these residual aid allocations. This issue is 
particularly important in the case of PNG which has received approximately 57 per cent of 
its total foreign assistance in the form of budgetary support in the post independence era.
In its analysis of PNG, this chapter extends the literature by considering a model which 
allows for divergent impacts between each of these different types of aid delivery. In 
addition to reducing the potential for an upward bias of fungibility estimates, this model 
also facilitates a comparison of the impact of budgetary support and project/program aid 
on key development sectors of government spending.
6.3 T he  M odel
The basic model to be estimated builds on Peterson (2007) and Pack and Pack’s (1990; 
1993) model, to which is added the disaggregation of foreign grants into project aid and 
budgetary support. This creates a number of differences in the fungibility calculations 
which are discussed in the text. This chapter also focuses on three categorical expenditure 
items— health, education and infrastructure. The decision to consider these three sectors 
was made on the basis of data availability and on the basis of the prominent role that each
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sector plays in PNG’s ability to achieve a large number of its MDG targets.120 All remaining 
project and program aid flows and expenditure are included in a general expenditure/aid 
category.121 From Equation (4.11) the basic model to be estimated then consists of a system 
of interdependent fiscal relationships of the form:
ED,, = f  {gdp, , ADi t , AO, , , BS,) (6.1)
EGt = f{gdp ,,A G ,,A O Gt,BS,) (6.2)
REV, = /  (gdp, , A, , BSt) (6.3)
where EDi t is government expenditure on development sector i at time t. ADt t is project 
aid allocations made to development sector i at time /. AOit is the remaining project aid 
allocations made to all development sectors other than sector i at time t. EGt is general 
government expenditure made to all other non development sectors at time /. A 0 Gt is aid 
allocations not made to the general category at time t. A^  is total project aid allocations to
all sectors which is equal to ^  ADj , + AG, . BS, is non sector or activity specific budget
support grants at time t and REV, is domestically generated revenue. Because of the static 
nature of the estimation process and the need for consistency with the literature, the fiscal 
system also includes a measure of GDP per capita, gdp, , to control for the impact of the
economic environment on spending and revenue levels. All variables are measured in per 
capita natural logarithms in constant 1999 prices.
As described in Chapter 4, the Bougainville crisis was a traumatic episode for the political, 
economic and fiscal management of PNG. To control for this event and to determine 
whether it has had any structural effect on the expenditure and revenue management of the 
PNG economy, a dummy variable (dum) is also included in the estimations. This variable 
takes the value of zero for 1974—88 and one for 1989—2006. This leads to the estimation of 
the following system of equations:
120 For example, four of the eight MDGs are primarily concerned with health and educadon. These include MDG2: Achieve universal 
primary education; MDG4: Reduce child mortality; MDG5: Improve maternal health; and MDG6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
other diseases.
121 A desire to preserve degrees of freedom within the model also prevented a more detailed analysis of within-sector fungibility to 
complement the cross sector fungibility results.
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In EE, =  ß 0EE +  ß \ EE In G D P , +  ß 1EE ln  A E , +  ß 2 EE ln  AO EE t
ßt,EE ln  B B t ßs,EE^Llm ^EE,t
(6.4)
ln  EH, =  ß 0 EH +  ß  EH ln  G D P, +  ß 2 EH ln  AH, +  ß 3 EH ln  A O EH,
ß$,EH ln  BBi ßs,EH^llm  £EH,t
(6.5)
ln  E I, =  ß 0 EI + ß  El ln  G D P , +  ß 2EI ln  A I, + ß 3 EI ln  Ä O Elt
ß 4,El 1° B B t ßs,EI^Um FEl,t
(6.6)
ln  EG, = ß Q EG +  ß  EG ln  G D P , +  ß 2 FG ln  A G , +  ß 3 EG ln  A G eg, 
Ä ,£G  B B t ß$'EG^U™ T  Feg ,
(6.7)
ln REV, = ß Q REV +  ß]REV ln GDP, +  ß 2REV ln A,
ß'h'REV ln +  ß ,^REV^Um A" £reV,i
(6.8)
In each period the government must satisfy an inter temporal budget constraint equal to:
REV, + AE, + AHr + AIt + AGr + BS, + DEF,
= EE, + EH, + El, + EG, + DS,
Which upon aggregation of the project aid and expenditure variables simplifies to:
REV, + Y , A,/ + BS, + DEF, = Z  Ei,t + DS> (6.10)
/=i i=i
where DS, is debt servicing costs and DEF, is the government’s budget deficit or surplus. 
As has become standard in the literature, debt servicing is assumed to be exogenous and in 
this case included in the general government expenditure category, both to preserve 
degrees of freedom and to keep the model tractable. As is also standard in the literature, 
the budget deficit is taken as the excluded variable from the system to estimate the jointly 
determined Equations (6.4—6.8).
Equation (6.10) implies that the identities shown in Equations (6.4—6.8) are jointly 
determined and hence not independent of one another. This situation violates the OLS 
assumption of zero error term correlation and will lead to any OLS coefficient estimates 
being both biased and inconsistent. To deal with this issue, a systems estimation procedure 
known as SUR is utilised. SUR is a version of multivariate linear regression developed by 
Zellner (1962) which solves the minimal error variance for the estimated parameters
149
through the simultaneous estimation of the system of equations.122 This procedure corrects 
for the correlation across the error terms in each equation, improving the efficiency of the 
coefficient estimates123 (Wooldridge 2002:144).
For each of the development expenditure Equations (6.4—6.6), a • positive elasticity 
coefficient on the respective aid allocation variable ( ß 2 Ki > 0  i = E, H , /  ) would indicate
that an increase in aid funding results in increased categorical expenditures for each 
respective sector. On the other hand, a positive elasticity estimate on the other aid 
allocation variable (ß3 Ei > 0  i = E , H ,7) would indicate a transfer of resources from other 
aid funded activities to that expenditure category. Likewise, a positive elasticity estimate on 
the budgetary support coefficient (ß4 Ei > 0  i = E, H , I ) would indicate that an increase in
un earmarked aid funding leads to an increase in expenditure for that development 
expenditure category.124
The aggregate impact of fungibility on expenditure allocations will then depend on all three 
of these estimated coefficients. This total affect of aid will determine the degree to which 
fungibility has distorted, if at all, final expenditure allocations for each sector. This 
approach builds on Pack and Pack (1990:192) and simulates the effect of a percentage 
increase in total foreign aid per capita (project aid and budgetary support) on each of the 
expenditure categories.
To do this, the elasticity coefficients together with the historical averages of each of the 
categories for aid are used to calculate the change in each of the expenditure categories, as 
well as own-revenues, which results from a simultaneous change in each of the categories
of foreign aid. The initial categorical levels of foreign aid are equal to where A is total
foreign aid and a. is the average level of foreign aid given to category i across the period. 
For Equation (6.4) the elasticity effect with respect to education aid is equal to:
122 Seemingly unrelated regression estimates are obtained by first estimating a set of non linear equations with cross-equation constraints 
imposed, but with a diagonal covariance matrix of the disturbances across equations. These parameter esdmates are used to form a 
consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the disturbances, which is then used as a weighting matrix when the model is re 
estimated to obtain new values of the parameters. These estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal and, under some 
conditions, asymptotically more efficient than the single equation estimates.
123 Notably, estimating a system of equations simultaneously only improves the efficiency of the coefficient estimates if there is some 
connection between each of the equations of interest (Kennedy 2003:314).
124 It should be noted that from a theoretical perspective it is also required that the sum of the budgetary support coefficients across all 
the expenditures not exceed 1.
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d ln EE
= Adin EA
where given that EE and EA are measured in natural logarithms, 0 2yy represents an 
elasticity coefficient. This elasticity of education expenditures with respect to education 
project and program aid can thus be written as:
AEE. AE.
0 2  EE
= >
AAE' EEt 
AEE. „ EE.
2r = ß.ME, ' 2££ AE,
Multiplying this term by the proportion of an overall aid per capita increase which is 
allocated to the education sector based on historical averages gives:
eeJ ^
AAE' PlEE AE' A
where A is total foreign aid and AE is the average amount of total aid given to the education 
sector. This can then be rewritten as:
—dAEdEEEA, — 0 2  EE
where dEEhA t is the total change in education expenditure from a prorated change in
project aid allocated to the education sector. Completing the same process for the other 
project aid and budgetary support variables then gives the total effect of an increase in aid 
on education expenditures. This can be written as:
- - FF , FF - EE
dEE,= ß2EE-J -d A E  + ß}EE— ^d A O  + ß iEE-± d B S  
AE, AOee, BS,
(6. 11)
where dEEt is the total change in education expenditures from an increase in foreign aid of
all types—project aid given to education, other project aid and budgetary support— 
allocated at historical averages. Equally, the total effect of an increase in aid for the other 
expenditure and revenue items considered in Equations (6.4—6.9) can be written as:
FH FF! FH
dEH, = ß w — j-dA H + fan  — ^-dAO + ß ,EH (6.12)
AH, AOeh, b s ,
dEl, = ßm ^ d A I + f c B -% -d A O + ß t a ^ d B S  (6.13)
AI, A0„, BS,
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dEG,=ß2El^ - d A G  + ßm - ^ - d A G  + ß4E, ^ - d B S  (6.14)
AG, AOfc, BS,
-  -  RFV -  RFV
dREV,= ß2REV — —L dA + ß}SEV — — dBS (6.15)
A B S ,
This model thus has a number of important features which are useful in the analysis of the 
fiscal effects of aid in the PNG context. Firsdy, it distinguishes between ‘other project and 
program aid’ and ‘general budgetary support aid’, which has typically been included in the 
‘other aid’ category in the literature. Secondly, it allows aid to all expenditure categories to 
influence the consumption choices of government in all, even non aid-receiving, sectors of 
the economy. Thirdly, it distinguishes between government expenditure and aid revenue 
according to their function rather than the recurrent and development classifications used 
in much of the literature. This distinction gives a more relevant assessment of the 
contribution of fiscal policy settings to key welfare targets such as the MDGs. Lastly, the 
SUR estimation procedure accounts for the interdependent nature of these fiscal 
relationships, which allows the estimation procedure to correct for any simultaneity bias 
which may have occurred within a non simultaneous equation framework.
6.4 D ata  Collection
As is typical within the literature, the OECD DAC database was used to obtain sectoral aid 
flows. Optimally, this aid data would record disbursements by sector; however, the 
database only has a sufficiently complete time series of categorical expenditures on a donor 
commitment basis—with aid disbursement data only available at an aggregate level. To 
overcome this, Petterson’s (2007) method is followed— sectoral commitment data is used 
to calculate the share of project and program aid going to each sector as well as the share 
being given as budgetary support each year. These proportions are then applied to the total 
disbursements data to give aid allocations by sector and by type (project and program aid 
vs. budgetary support). Whilst there is little a priori evidence to suggest that certain types of 
aid would be disbursed more than others following donor commitments, a fundamental 
assumption of this chapter is that aid disbursements by sector are allocated in the same 
proportion to which donor commitments are made.
GDP and expenditure data is obtained from the same sources as used in the previous 
chapter (Appendix 5.1). This chapter also uses the same methodology as established in the 
previous chapter for the allocation of government expenditure by sector, with the IMF 
GFS database being used for pre 2002 expenditure data and government budget 
documents being used for post 2002. This chapter does, however, require a more detailed
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matching up of aid allocations with sectoral expenditures. The IMF GFS and OECD DAC 
databases are not directly comparable and require an element of discretion on the author’s 
behalf as to which expenditure is allocated to which sector. A full description of this can be 
found in Appendix 6.1.
The general budgetary support variable measures commodity aid and general unallocated 
program assistance. This includes contributions for general development purposes without 
sector allocation, with or without restrictions on the specific use of the funds (and 
irrespective of any control by the donor of the use of counterpart funds). Funds supplied 
on the general condition that they be used for capital projects at the recipient’s choice, but 
not subject to agreement by the donor, are also included (OECD DAC 2007). Project aid, 
on the other hand, is defined by the direct participation of the donors in the design and 
implementation of a developmental project with a specific purpose. This data is measured 
in US$ and converted into Kina with period average exchange rates. All nominal data are 
deflated into 1999 constant prices with the consumer price index and measured in per 
capita natural logarithms. A summary of this data in is presented in Table 6.1.
It should be noted that in some ways this data contradicts that used in the previous 
chapter. In the previous chapter, for example, project aid flows only began in 1989; the 
current data has sectoral allocations, albeit relatively small in comparison to budgetary 
support, beginning in 1974. This reflects the use in the previous chapter of on-budget aid 
flows whereas the OECD DAC database records aid flows from the perspective of the 
donor. Prior to the 1990s, little attempt was made in PNG to incorporate project aid flows 
into the budgetary process.12:1 In part, this was because project aid comprised such a small 
proportion of total foreign assistance. It is also likely to be a reflection of the lower priority 
that aid donors placed during this period on strengthening local institutional and 
bureaucratic processes, with aid delivery channels often circumventing domestic budgetary 
processes. Nevertheless, it is this inconsistency in the available data which is exploited to 
facilitate the current analysis.
125 It was not until 1996, for example, that the PNG Government decided to include project aid flows as part of its revenues in the 
national budget (World Bank 1999:25).
153
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables— Per Capita Values in 1999 Values 
(1974-2007)
V a r ia b le D e s c r ip t io n O b s M e a n S td  D e v M in M a x
g d p p c G D P  p e r  cap ita 33 2,323 .44 334.20 1,634.80 3,417.37
a_h H ealth  sec to r 
p ro je c t aid
33 7.11 7.77 0.00 24.39
a_e E d u c a tio n  sec to r 
p ro jec t aid
33 11.32 13.14 0.00 42.16
a_in In fra s tru c tu re  
sec to r p ro je c t aid
33 23.22 17.50 0.00 66.78
a- g All o th e r  genera l 
p ro je c t aid
33 47.66 40.97 4.69 225.87
a _ p r T o ta l p ro je c t aid 33 89.83 48.90r 9.04 251.83
a_bs N o n  sec to r 
a llocated  a n d /o r  
b u d g e ta ry  
su p p o r t aid
33 125.54 119.94 0.00 458.22
e_ h G o v e rn m e n t 
ex p en d itu re  o n  
h ealth
33 52.75 14.43 25.00 73.79
e_e G o v e rn m e n t 
ex p en d itu re  o n  
ed u ca tio n
33 106.66 33.30 29.93 145.56
e_ in G o v e rn m e n t 
ex p en d itu re  o n  
in fra s tru c tu re
33 58.85 30.08 12.92 130.26
e- g All o th e r  genera l
g o v e rn m e n t
e x p en d itu re
33 450 .79 58.69 325.58 553.42
e T o ta l g o v e rn m e n t 
ex p en d itu re
33 669.05 103.85 425.05 853.40
rev D o m estic
rev en u e
co llec tio n
33 489 .84 78.28 366.99 637.79
N o te :  A ll variab les in  the  tab le  are m easu red  in  c o n s ta n t 1999 p e r cap ita  
tra n sfo rm e d  w ith  n a tu ra l lo g arith m s fo r e s tim a tio n s.
K ina. D a ta
6.5 Results
6.5.1 SUR Estimation Results
Table 6.2 presents the results of the simultaneous estimation of Equations (6.4—6.8) using 
the SUR estimation technique. Each of the equations is well identified with adjusted R2 
values ranging from 0.74 for the education equation to 0.54 for the revenue equation. The 
only exception is the general expenditure category, which records an R2 of 0.25, most likely 
reflecting the much greater degree of aggregation of both the project aid and expenditure 
data for this category.
Although the above coefficient estimates do not take into account the full effects of
foreign aid fungibility as described through Equations (6.11-6.15), a number of important
inferences can be made. Firstly, it can be seen that the budgetary support variable has a
significant and positive impact on each of the expenditure and revenue equations. The size
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of these elasticities ranges from 0.162 in the education equation to 0.026 in terms of 
revenue collection. In addition, the size of the budgetary support coefficients is much 
larger for the education, health and infrastructure equations than it is for the general 
category, indicating that a majority of this financial assistance has tended to be allocated 
towards these three core development priorities.
Table 6.2: SUR Estimation Results for Categorical Expenditure_____________
S U R (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
In E E In E H In E I In E G In R ev
In gd p 1 213*** -0.306 0 .302 -0 .032 0 .174
(0.351) (0.260) (0.511) (0.178) (0.170)
InA E 0.057* - - - -
(0.029) - - - -
In A H - -0.051* - - -
- (0.030) - - -
InAI - - 0 .015 - -
- - (0.051) - -
InAG - - - 0.001 -
- - - (0.024) -
InOAi* -0 .034 -0.044 0.093 0.043 -
(0.074) (0.055) (0.086) (0.032) -
InBS 0.162*** 0.112*** 0.102** 0.034** 0.026*
(0.033) (0.024) (0.048) (0.017) (0.014)
InA - - - - -0 .095**
- - - - (0.042)
D u m 0.137 0.023 -0.534*** -0.038 0.344***
(0.123) (0.101) (0.175) (0.063) (0.057)
C o n sta n t -5.448** 6.142*** 1.133 6.090*** 4.951***
(2.578) (1.925) (3.793) (1.319) (1.242)
O b s 33 33 33 33 33
F -S ta t 20.47 16.55 10.54 2.51 9.45
(P -v a lu e ) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000)
A dj. R -S q 0.743 0.697 0.616 0 .248 0.537
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. +
InOAi measures total project aid allocations less aid allocations from the dependent variable category (/).
Note: For the purposes of estimation, the origin is re-based to +1 by adding one to each observation. A 
number of variables in a number of years have observations which are close or equal to zero. Taking the 
natural logarithm of these values would thus lead to them turning negative and also result in the low values of 
aid and expenditure allocations becoming more dispersed whilst the higher values become more compressed. 
In the estimation, this would give undue weight to the lower valued aid and expenditure observations which is 
likely to cause a bias in the results. Adding one to each of the observations also has the added advantage of 
allowing the inclusion of the zero valued aid and expenditure observations and allowing all values to remain 
stricdy positive (Van de Sijpe 2007:36).____________________________________________________________
The positive budgetary support coefficient and the negative total project aid coefficient in 
the revenue equation provide further evidence for the results obtained in Chapter 5. In this 
case, the estimations were only able to distinguish a close to zero net effect for both types
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of aid delivery on domesdc revenue collection, despite overall grants having an 
unambiguous negative effect. These results suggest however that it has in fact been project 
aid that has been responsible for a large portion of the negative impact of grants on 
domestic revenue collection.
The positive coefficients of the categorical aid variables for education and infrastructure 
indicate that in the first instance an increase in aid to these sectors leads to an increase, 
albeit small, in total expenditure levels for their respective categories. The negative 
coefficient on the health foreign aid variable indicates a diversion of aid from this category 
to other purposes.126 The degree to which this has taken place will be discussed shortly.
It also appears that there has been a limited amount of redirection of categorical aid 
amongst each of the development expenditures. For example, education and health have 
negative coefficients for their other aid variables whilst infrastructure has a positive 
coefficient, although none are significant. The positive coefficient estimate suggests that a 
redirection of categorical aid from other expenditure categories has occurred towards the 
infrastructure sector. In contrast, the negative coefficient estimates arise when there has 
been a diversion of categorical aid from each of the categorical expenditure items toward 
other expenditure items. This could include, for example, an increase in debt servicing or a 
reduction in tax collection.127
O f particular interest are the highly significant negative and positive coefficient estimates 
for the dummy variable in the infrastructure and revenue equations respectively. The 
former result suggests that in the post Bougainville crisis era, there has been a significant 
structural reduction in the financing of infrastructure development after controlling for 
changes in the GDP level and both budgetary support and project aid receipts. This finding 
supports the conclusion that the crisis has had long lasting impacts on fiscal management 
and the government’s ability to finance critical national infrastructure development projects 
well beyond the immediate 1991 revenue collapse and the following foreign currency 
shortages experienced in 1994 (as discussed in Chapter 4).
The latter result also suggests, however, that in the post Bougainville crisis era, the 
government has sought to augment its domestic revenue collection. This may, for example,
126 This could include, for example, the financing of a tax reduction or repayment of government debt.
127 As argued by Pack and Pack (1993:262), ‘negative coefficients may arise in the other foreign aid coefficients when there is a diversion 
of categorical aid from development investment toward, for example, debt service’.
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reflect an inherent preference by the government not to rely on aid receipts as a source of 
revenue in order to avoid a replication of the early 1999s, when the Australian 
Government’s decision to switch from budgetary support to project aid exacerbated an 
already stressed fiscal situation.128
Table 6.3: PNG PDA Allocations by Development Expenditure Category
Sector 0)
Prorated 
change in 
foreign aid
(2)
Change in expenditure/revenue
&EXP,=ßr  j -
(3)
Total change 
in
expenditure/
revenue
E ducation y
/  A
ßi
Ei/Ai'29 A  EXP;
a) AE 0.056 0.057 8.741 0.0279
b) AO e 0.369 -0.034 0.191 -0.0024 (2a+2b)
0.0255
c) BS 0.575 0.162 0.851 0.0793 (2a+2b+2c)
0.1048
H ealth
a) AH 0.036 -0.051 6.628 -0.0122
b) AO h 0.389 -0.044 0.631 -0.0108 (2a+2b)
-0 .023
c) BS 0.575 0.112 0.425 0.0274 (2a+2b+2c)
0.0044
Infras tructure
a) AI 0.110 0.015 2.471 0.0041
b) AOi 0.315 0.093 0.866 0.0254 (2a+2b)
0.0295
c) BS 0.575 0.102 0.473 0.0277 (2a+2b+2c)
0.0572
General
a) AG 0.221 0.001 9.283 0.0021
b) AO g 0.204 0.043 10.119 0.0888 (2a+2b)
0.0909
c) BS 0.575 0.034 3.570 0.0910 (2a+ 2b+ 2c)
0.0182
D om estic
R evenue
a) A 0.425 -0.095 5.260 -0.212 (2a+2b)
-0.154
b) BS 0.575 0.026 3.879 0.0579
To determine the full impact which foreign grants have had on levels of sectoral 
expenditure, it is, however, necessary to aggregate the impact of both aid given to each of
128 Given the congruence of timing between the crisis and the major switch between aid types, this coefficient may also reflect a desire by 
the government to generate additional own-source revenues in order to maintain funding to expenditure areas which were not being 
supported by project aid receipts.
129 Such that for the education equation the following calculations are made for rows 1-3 respectively: 1) e_e/a_e 2) ee/a_e_o 3) 
e_e/bs.
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the categorical sectors as well as the influence of other categorical aid and budgetary 
support. Column 1 in Table 6.3 shows the prorated foreign aid allocations which measure 
the historical average of aid allocated to each of the relevant sectors. Column 2 shows the 
individual effects of each type of aid on each expenditure and revenue item calculated 
according to the method shown in Equations (6.11—6.15). Column 3 then shows the total 
change in expenditure or revenue expected from a one dollar increase in total aid flows 
allocated according to its historical mean.
6.5.2 Impact of Project Aid Allocated at Historical Averages (2a+2b)
For every dollar of foreign aid given since independence, 42.5 cents has been in the form
of sector allocated project aid. Of this 42.5 cents, 5.6 cents has been allocated to the 
education sector. The results show that the direct impact of this education aid has been to 
increase education expenditure by approximately 2.8 cents. The negative result on the other 
project aid variable, however, indicates that there has also been a diversion of categorical 
expenditures away from this sector. In addition to debt and revenue responses, this 
diversion of funds may be suggestive of the existence of aid-induced flypaper effects 
occurring in other sectors of the economy, whereby an increase in funding for other 
project aid sectors tends to draw government resources away from the education sector. In 
this case, however, this effect is relatively small such that the total impact of project aid on 
education funding is still equal to 2.5 cents for every 5.6 cents of education aid. Whilst a 
degree of fungibility has taken place, approximately half of the allocated funds appear to 
have remained within the sector and have not been diverted to other uses. As a result, aid 
funds have managed to substantially increase the availability of resources in the sector— 
albeit at a less than one to one ratio.
In contrast to this result, project aid allocated to health and other project aid appear to 
have had a negative impact on overall expenditure levels within the sector. Here it is 
observed that the historical average of a 3.6 cent increase in health aid leads to a 1.2 cent 
decrease in total health expenditures. When combined with the additional diversionary 
effects of the other project aid variable, this then leads to a total 2.3 cent decline in health 
expenditure for the additional 42.5 cents of project aid allocated at a historical mean.
As discussed, observations of negative fungibility are in general un intuitive as there is little 
theoretical reason to believe that an inflow of aid resources to a sector would induce the 
recipient government to subtract more than that amount of their own funding from the
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sector. However, one plausible explanation for this result is the use of aid to pressure the 
PNG Government to scale-back spending in pursuit of fiscal balance or to increase debt 
repayments (as found in Chapter 5). Compliance with these conditions requires a decision 
over which sectors of the budget will receive reduced funding, and in the event that these 
funding cuts are greater than the inflow of aid, there may be a net outflow of funds from 
the sector. Another explanation of this effect is the tendency of project aid to reduce 
domestic revenue collection, which in turn may lower the aggregate availability of domestic 
resources, which in turn results in reduced funding for the health sector. More broadly, this 
result also supports the general observations made in Chapter 4 that, despite an increasing 
amount of donor resources allocated as project and program aid, total per capita 
expenditure levels in the health sector have continued to fall throughout the past two 
decades.
O f the three development sectors, infrastructure has been the largest recipient of 
categorical aid flows, receiving 11 out of every 42.5 cents given as project aid. O f this, only 
a small portion appears to have remained in the sector, with expenditure increasing by just 
0.4 cents for each 11 cents of infrastructure aid. In this case, however, there is also a 
positive diversion of other project aid funds into the sector equal to approximately 2.5 
cents for each additional 31.5 cents of other project aid. This leads to a total increase of 
infrastructure funding equal to just under 3 cents for each additional 11 cents of 
infrastructure project aid.
This result appears to be counter intuitive. Why would the PNG Government withdraw 
resources given directly to the sector and then allocate resources freed up from project aid 
in other sectors back into infrastructure? There are at least two possible explanations. The 
first is an issue of timing. These results represent historical averages and the years in which 
the PNG Government perceives infrastructure funding to be inadequate and the years in 
which donors tend to increase or decrease their funding to the sector need not necessarily 
overlap. As a result, the estimates may be observing the transfer of funds between time 
periods.
The second explanation relates to the within-sector priorities of recipients and donors. In
the case of PNG, for example, donors have, particularly in the past, focused a majority of
their road building and maintenance attention on highly visible projects with large scale but
generally diffused economic benefits, such as the Highlands Highway. The PNG
Government may, however, place a higher priority on funding other roads which generate
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more political benefit, such as those connecting regions within their particular electorate. 
One response of the PNG Government to this circumstance could then be to reallocate 
freed up resources from the donor funded road project to its other expenditure priorides 
and then divert funds made available from other project aid back into the infrastructure 
sector to fund its own road building preferences. In any event, both of these arguments 
highlight the point that sectoral funding levels of the infrastructure sector have been 
predominately determined by the public sector fiscal behaviour of the PNG 
Government— despite the high levels of aid being channelled into the sector.
In the general expenditure category, it is again observed that large scale inter sectoral 
fungibility has taken place, but that the effect of project aid on the sector has remained 
positive. For every 22 cents of project aid allocated to the general category, expenditure has 
increased by just over 9 cents. The majority of this increase has, however, occurred as a 
result of a positive diversion of funds from other sectors into the general category.
Finally, project aid is shown to have had a large negative impact on domestic revenue 
collection, consistent with the results of the previous chapter. For each additional 42.5 
cents of project aid, domestic revenue collection has, on average, declined by 
approximately 21 cents.
6.5.3 Impact of Budgetary Support Allocated at H istorical Averages (2c)
Despite not being tied by donors to any specific activities, budgetary support is shown to 
have a positive impact on each of the development expenditure categories and on general 
expenditures. O f the 57 cents of each additional aid dollar allocated as budgetary support, 
there is a requisite 7.9 cent increase in education funding, 2.7 cent increase in health 
funding, 2.8 cent increase in infrastructure funding and a 9 cent increase in general 
government expenditure. To an extent, these results reject the concerns raised in Chapter 4 
by various authors about the tendency of budgetary support to fund general government 
consumption rather than productive investment activities. Every 13.4 cents out of 57 cents 
given as budgetary support has been allocated to the three development sectors, whilst just 
9 cents is allocated towards general expenditure— despite this general category accounting 
for just over 67 per cent of total government expenditures. Translating these effects into a 
situation whereby an additional dollar of aid was given entirely as budgetary support also 
reveals that education expenditure would increase by roughly 14 cents, health and 
infrastructure would both increase by 5 cents and other general expenditures would 
increase by 16 cents.
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Budgetary support is also shown to augment domestic revenue collection, with the 
additional 57 cents of non allocated aid leading to an average 5.7 cent increase in domestic 
revenue collection. As shown in Equation (6.16), the total change in donor resources for 
budgetary support (ABSt) in any period /, must equal the sum of the total change in
4
expenditure for the four expenditure categories ( ^ A En ) plus the change in domestic
i = i
revenue (A7)) and any change in the government’s debt liabilities (where 
AD, = ADD/7, + ADSt ).
4
ABS, = £  AD., + A7) + AD, (6.16)
i= i
Assuming a constant level of project aid, it can be said that the effect of the 57 cents of 
budgetary support will be to fund an additional 22.4 cents of expenditure and generate an 
additional 5.8 cents of domestic revenue, which, by implication, also means that it funded a
40.4 cent reduction in the government’s deficit/debt liabilities.130
6.5.4 Total Impact o f Foreign Aid Allocated at Historical Averages 
(2a+2b+2c)
For each spending category, an additional dollar of foreign aid leads to a positive impact on 
expenditure levels. Only in the case of the education sector, however, does the increase in 
categorical expenditure meet or exceed the increase in categorical aid flows. For every 
dollar of aid, about 5.6 cents has been allocated to the education sector, which when 
combined with the positive impact of budgetary support, has led to an increase in total 
education funding by just over 10 cents.
In contrast, for every additional dollar of aid, about 3.6 cents has been allocated to the 
health sector. This additional 3.6 cents of directly targeted assistance has, however, 
managed to increase total funding for the sector by only approximately 0.44 cents. 
Likewise, despite the infrastructure sector receiving approximately 11 cents in each aid 
dollar since independence, the resulting increase in total funding to the sector has only 
increased by approximately half that amount, at 5.7 cents. For these last two categories 
then it is clear that there has been a substantial diversion of funds by the government away 
from the intended donor expenditure patterns. In the general expenditure category, for
130 It is worthwhile to note here the consistency of these results with those observed in the previous chapter, which also found that a 
majority o f budget support had been used to reduce debt obligations whilst also leading to marginal increases in expenditure.
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each additional dollar of grant aid, of which 22 cents per aid dollar has been allocated 
towards general expenditure, there is a relatively small 2 cent increase in expenditure levels 
for the sector.
Finally, as discussed, the 57 per cent of aid allocated as budgetary support has tended to • 
have a positive impact on domestic revenue collection, whilst the 43 per cent allocated as 
project aid has had a negative impact. The positive effect of budgetary support is, however, 
approximately one-quarter the size of the negative impact of project aid, which leads to an 
overall negative impact of aid on revenue collection equal to 15 cents for each additional 
dollar of aid allocated. These results are also consistent with Feeny (2007) who found that 
aid to the Melanesian region as a whole has had a limited impact on encouraging growth in 
rural areas, partly as a result of the negative effect of aid on domestic revenue collection 
efforts.131
6.6 D iscussion  and C onclusion
This chapter has analysed a variety of issues related to the impact of aid on sectoral 
expenditure in post independence PNG. In particular, it has sought to assess the relative 
impact of budgetary support vis-ä-vis project-based aid on increasing aggregate expenditure 
levels in three key development sectors of the PNG economy—health, education and 
infrastructure. It has also analysed the extent to which funds allocated to these sectors have 
been diverted to general government consumption activities. In total, aid has made a 
positive contribution to the overall funding levels of all expenditure categories in PNG 
since independence. This result does, however, mask a number of important differences 
between project aid and budgetary support across sectors the results of which are 
summarised in Appendix 6.2.
Firstly, there is significant evidence for project aid showing that large scale fungibility has 
taken place across a number of sectors of the PNG economy, with expenditure increases 
far below the allocated project aid amounts. According to historical averages, for a given 
increase in education funding, total resources to that sector increase by about half that 
amount whilst total infrastructure spending increases by approximately one-third of the
131 This shifting impact of aid on revenue may also reflect the changing quality of governance observed in PNG during this period. 
Gupta et al. (2003), for example, find that whilst foreign aid has in general tended to have only a relatively small dampening effect on 
the revenue collection efforts of recipient governments, in countries plagued by high levels of corruption, the decline in revenues tends 
to completely offset any increase in grants. The widely acknowledge decline in governance and bureaucratic quality experienced in 
PNG, especially during the 1990s may in part then help to explain why budgetary support has been more effective at stimulating an 
increase in domestic revenue collection.
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amount allocated as project aid. Likewise, just under half of the project aid allocated to the 
general category has remained in the sector. In contrast, project aid by itself appears to 
have had a negative impact on overall expenditure levels within the health sector.
Secondly, approximately half of the budgetary support has been used to finance higher 
levels of government expenditure. O f this increased expenditure, 60 per cent has been 
allocated to the health, education and infrastructure sectors whilst the remaining 40 per 
cent has been allocated to the general government expenditure category. This is a relatively 
positive result, especially given that this general category accounts for two-thirds of total 
government expenditures. The remaining budgetary support funds have been used 
primarily to achieve a reduction in the government’s deficit and debt liabilities.
Thirdly, in terms of revenue collection, the majority of the negative impact of foreign 
grants appears to have occurred during the project aid rather than budgetary support 
period. An explanation for this result is that even though during the budget support era the 
PNG Government was receiving far greater levels of foreign assistance, there was a clear 
mandate provided by Australia for a reduction in aid flows—on average budget support 
declined by 8 per cent per annum in real per capita terms between 1975 and 1989. In 
contrast, the project aid period, whilst contributing less to overall government resources, 
has experienced relatively stable real per capita funding levels—imposing less pressure on 
the PNG Government to find domestic resources to replace aid funds.
The significant reduction in the financing of infrastructure in the post Bougainville era also 
supports the conclusion that the crisis has had long lasting impacts on fiscal management, 
well beyond the immediate 1991 revenue collapse and the following foreign currency 
shortages experienced in 1994. These results also support those general correlations 
observed in the data from Chapter 4 as well as the fiscal response coefficients obtained in 
Chapter 5—in particular, with regards to the relatively benign impact which the shift from 
budgetary support to project aid has had on aggregate expenditure levels in each of the 
core development sectors. This adds an additional degree of confidence in the results, 
especially as they have been derived from aid commitment data rather than actual 
disbursements.
The results offer a number of important policy implications as donors seek to help PNG
reach its MDG targets. Firstly, it must be said that the existence of fungibility is not a
sufficient condition to establish the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of foreign aid per se.
163
Rather, it offers an important insight into how foreign aid interacts with public sector 
behaviour to influence aggregate fiscal outcomes. In particular, these results highlight that it 
is the way in which the recipient government responds to an aid inflow that matters most 
in determining the effectiveness of that aid in improving service delivery to specific sectors. 
The lesson for donors here is that efforts to alter how they give aid in order to control its 
usage will almost inevitably be circumvented by a government who wishes to fund other 
priorities. The focus of development discourse therefore must remain on establishing a 
productive dialogue between donor and recipient to determine mutually agreeable 
expenditure priorities and not on increasingly tying aid to specific activities which the 
donor finds appealing. This approach aligns with the commitments made by the Australian 
Government following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the Accra 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008. Both of these agreements emphasised the 
importance of allowing the recipient country to direct the allocation of financial resources 
as a means of establishing country ownership and ensuring that aid funds were aligned with 
national priorities (ODI 2008).
This evidence also disputes the notion that PNG health, education and infrastructure 
outcomes can be improved simply by aid agencies choosing to re-align their aid allocations 
towards these sectors. This highlights the point that achieving the MDGs rests not with the 
provision of donor-funded resources to a particular sector but rather with the PNG 
Government’s desire and, just as importantly, ability, to effectively resource and implement 
programs in each one of these sectors. Hence, the effectiveness of aid should not be judged 
on how stringent the expenditure controls are or how tightly aligned aid-funded 
expenditures are with donor priorities but rather how useful that assistance has been in 
promoting improvements in the recipient government’s own expenditure management 
systems, processes and outcomes.
Finally, as Australia seeks to increase the performance orientation of its aid program, it may 
consider opening up the potential for using alternative un-earmarked aid modalities— such 
as budgetary support. The results have shown that tying aid funds to specific expenditure 
priorities has given donors a false sense that their aid allocations can influence aggregate 
spending outcomes. Loosening the grip which donors have placed on their funding in 
return for specific expenditure behaviour may thus prove to be a productive way forward 
for the Australian aid program in PNG. How this may be implemented is discussed in the 
final policy implications chapter.
164
165
C hapter 7: Foreign Aid and Public Sector Efficiency in 
PN G — A H ealth  Sector Case Study
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses how the public spending allocations discussed in the previous two 
chapters have influenced social welfare outcomes in PNG. It also seeks to determine 
whether foreign aid, and in particular technical assistance, has helped or hindered the 
efficiency of the PNG public sector at translating this public spending into social welfare 
outcomes.
Chapter 3 illustrated that the challenges facing AusAID, and other donors, as they seek to 
help the PNG Government improve the quality of public service delivery are by no means 
unique. Global evidence of the impacts of technical assistance continues to highlight its 
limitations as a means of enhancing the capacity of recipient agencies. Bräutigam (1999) 
and ODE (2008b:32), for example, both quote a World Bank vice-president in saying that 
technical assistance has been ‘a systematic destructive force which is undermining the 
development of capacity’. Likewise, Kapur et al. (1997:421) claim that in countries with 
weak institutions, interventions to strengthen state bureaucracies have tended to actually 
‘delay the development of effective, self-reliant cadres and institutions’.
Chapter 3 also illustrated that foreign aid and in particular technical assistance decreases in 
its ability to help strengthen government effectiveness as recipients decrease both in size 
and as they move into the fragile states classification. Whilst PNG is well above the 
population threshold at which the total impact of foreign aid becomes negative, its low 
absolute levels of administrative capacity, close patronage relationships within its 
bureaucracy and limited human capital suggest that it may be particularly susceptible to the 
costs which foreign aid can place on a recipient bureaucracy—in terms of crowding out 
domestic capacity, creating an excessive administrative burden and soaking up scarce 
institutional resources to meet donor reporting and design requirements.
To address the questions above this analysis relies on a case study of the PNG health 
sector. The PNG health sector serves as a useful case study for a number of reasons— 
firstly, because it has stood at the forefront of many Australian aid initiatives in PNG. The 
health sector was the first to receive a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) funding arrangement 
from Australia, and most recently it developed a Capacity Building Service Centre that 
works with the PNG Government to determine appropriate forms of technical assistance 
(Land 2007:14).
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PNG’s health sector has also acted as a focal point for many of the criticisms of technical 
assistance in the country. In particular, concerns have been raised over the volume and 
coordination of advisory support, particularly within the National Department of Health 
(DoH). Following an evaluation of donor support to PNG’s health sector, ADB (2003:26) 
argued that technical assistance had encouraged ‘a very costly workforce, whose objectives 
and expected results are not formally agreed upon; which may not always provide capacity 
building; which sometimes simply substitutes for local staff; whose performance is not 
measured by DoH; and...whose presence may de-motivate national staff. The report links 
this to ‘unilateral planning and implementation practices of donor partners— the very 
practices which the SWAp arrangement hopes to curtail’. Likewise, Cammack (2008) 
highlights that the PNG health sector has been one of the most dysfunctional, poorly 
coordinated sectors of the PNG bureaucracy. Cammack (2008:52) also argues that attempts 
by donors to harmonise their support mechanisms have ‘been discouraged by the PNG 
government, which views this as donors “ganging up” rather than as a positive move to 
coordinate aid.’
To conduct the analysis this chapter draws again on the VECM technique to estimate the 
identities derived in Equations (4.18—4.19) across a 33 year time span of data. Key findings 
include that public health spending has been a key determinant of public health outcomes 
in PNG. Technical assistance given to the health sector has, however, lowered the marginal 
effectiveness of public spending at improving health outcomes. In this sense, technical 
assistance has had a lower per Kina impact on improving health outcomes than other types 
of spending. This result highlights the need for AusAID and other donors to look at new 
mechanisms for providing support to the sector— perhaps with a greater focus on the 
funding of goods and services rather than the provision of expensive technical advisors.
7.2 Literature Review 
7.2.1 Past Studies
There are a number of strands of literature which relate to this study. The first such area 
has studied the impact of public spending on social welfare outcomes, in particular, health 
outcomes such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates. The results of this research 
have been varied. Some studies have found that heath spending has had an insignificant 
impact on standard measures of health outcomes. This was the case for Deolalikar (2005) 
who studied a panel of provinces within India between 1980 and 1999, as well as for Kim 
and Moody (1992), Musgrove (1996) and Filmer and Pritchett (1999) who all studied large
cross sections of developing countries over varying time periods. These studies also find
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that a number of other factors have been much more influential in determining health 
outcomes, including, for example, income levels and inequality (Deolalikar 2005), levels of 
education—particularly those of females (Kim and Moody 1992), as well as social 
determinants such as ethnic fragmentation and the quality of domestic governance 
(Musgrove 1996; Filmer and Pritchett 1999).
In addition to these factors, many other studies have found a strong positive association 
between public spending and health outcomes. Hojman (1996), for example, found that for 
a number of Caribbean and Central American countries, health spending had a significant 
impact on improving a wide range of health status indicators. The World Bank (1995) 
found similar results for public health spending in the Philippines, except that this effect 
was only found to hold for the poorer regions of the country. At the cross-country level, 
Bidani and Ravallion (1997) and Gupta et al. (1999) found that for a sample of 50 and 70 
developing countries respectively, public health spending had a significant impact on 
reducing child mortality. Gani (2009) also provides a study of Pacific island states between 
1990 and 2002, finding that on average, a 10 per cent increase in per capita health 
expenditure leads to a 6.6 per cent reduction in infant mortality rates.
These contrasting results suggest that it is a country’s individual circumstances which 
matter most for the transformation of public expenditure allocations into productive 
investments that contribute to positive health and development outcomes. A key question 
for donors then is what determines whether a recipient bureaucracy is capable of, or how 
efficient they are at, translating public spending into improved health outcomes.
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) examine the role of domestic governance in influencing 
public sector efficiency at improving the quality of education and health outcomes. The 
authors find that for a panel of 98 countries in 1990 and 1997, the quality of domestic 
governance—measured via indicators of corruption and bureaucratic quality—was a key 
determinant of whether increases in spending translate into improved social welfare 
outcomes.
Feeny and Rogers (2007; 2008) provide the only study to direcdy assess the contribution of 
foreign aid to these outcomes, focusing in particular on how SIDS compare to other
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developing countries in this regard.132 Analysing a panel of developing countries between 
1990 and 2004, the authors find that both governance and literacy levels have been 
significant determinants of public sector efficiency, although, even after taking these factors 
into account, SIDS still persistently underperform compared to other developing countries. 
Foreign aid is found to have had no impact on life expectancy during this period, an effect 
which they attribute to the heterogeneity of aid flows, much of which is not targeted at 
improving life expectancy. The authors also find considerable diversity across sectors, with 
the efficiency of aid and public sector spending at improving life expectancy deteriorating 
during the 1990s but increasing for school enrolments across the same period.
7.2.2 R esearch  Gap
This chapter seeks to augment the available evidence on these issues in a number of ways. 
Firsdy, whilst previous studies have focused almost exclusively on cross-country 
comparisons, this chapter seeks to conduct an analysis of the PNG health sector to gain 
more specific insights into how aid impacts on public sector efficiency at the country level. 
To do this estimates are made which determine the impact of foreign aid on inter temporal 
changes in public sector efficiency within PNG.
Secondly, the chapter seeks to delineate between those types of aid which may have some 
impact on public sector efficiency and those which are targeted at simply filling in resource 
gaps by providing funds for additional goods and services. This issue is particularly 
pertinent in the case of PNG as the large volumes of budgetary support which the country 
has received have neither been targeted at, nor have been likely to impact on, the efficiency 
of public sector expenditure. In contrast, the more recent focus on improving governance 
and administrative systems with the use of technical assistance has been aimed directly at 
these issues. This issue was raised in Feeny and Rogers (2008:535) who state that ‘[a] 
potential explanation for the finding of no impact of foreign aid on life expectancy is that 
foreign aid consists of heterogeneous flows, many of which should not be expected to have 
an impact on life expectancy’. In addition, however, another issue is that even aid not 
specifically targeted at social sectors may have important flow-on impacts on the efficiency 
of the public sector at delivering these services. The plethora of central agency 
administrative and bureaucratic support under the ECP and SGP programs in PNG is a 
pertinent example of this.
132 To do this, the authors estimate Stochastic Production Functions for a large number of countries, including SIDS, for both life 
expectancy and school enrolments. The various levels of public sector efficiency which are calculated from this analysis are then used 
as dependent variables to determine which factors have had the largest role in explaining these levels of efficiency.
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Rather than using an aggregate or sectoral measure of aid, this chapter focuses on assessing 
the contribution of aid which has been targeted specifically at addressing institutional and 
administrative capacity gaps within the PNG bureaucracy, which is measured by the level 
of technical assistance given to the PNG public sector. Measuring the impact of technical 
assistance on public sector efficiency assumes that the remaining components of foreign aid 
have had no significant impact on public sector efficiency in the PNG health sector. For 
the 57 per cent of PNG’s total foreign aid which it has received in the form of budgetary 
support, this is a reasonable assumption. However, for the remaining components of 
project and program aid which have not been delivered through technical assistance this 
requires an assumption that spending by donors on health sector outputs has been no more 
or less efficient than the PNG bureaucracy at improving health outcomes.
Another limitation of previous studies on aid and public sector efficiency is that they have 
failed to treat each of the variables under consideration as interdependent.133 Feeny and 
Rogers (2008) made allowance for aid and public spending to have delayed effects on the 
dependent variable by including lagged values of the explanatory variables into their 
estimations. This selection of a one-year lag is, however, at best, an arbitrary choice, and as 
the authors note, ‘[tjhe issue of how to appropriately incorporate lags of expenditures into 
such an analysis is problematic and remains an important area for future research’ (Feeny 
and Rogers 2008:531).
This chapter seeks to advance these issues by adopting the dynamic VECM estimation 
method, which uses the data itself to determine appropriate lag lengths and which 
incorporates the full range of feedback effects that can occur between the aid, fiscal and 
social outcome variables. This approach also has its limitations. The most important of 
these again relates to the limited sample size, and the availability and quality of data which 
can be used in conducting a country-level analysis of PNG. To minimise the potential 
impact of these limitations, this chapter conducts another data collection exercise by 
compiling a national aggregate index of health outcomes and generating two measures of 
political instability in post independence PNG to control for variations in government
133 The interdependent nature of these relationships is emphasised in the specification derived in Equations (4.18-4.19). Technical 
assistance, for example, is designed to effect the efficiency of public service delivery, which, combined with public expenditure, will flow 
on to effect income growth. Income growth will then likely affect social welfare outcomes and public sector capacity, which again may be 
a determinant of the amount of aid received as technical assistance.
171
performance. These variables are then combined with the fiscal and aid data of the 
previous three chapters to conduct the analysis.
7.3 T he  M odel
The system of equations shown in Equations (4.16) provides the basis for the following 
analysis. Taking natural logarithms in order to linearise the first row of the system of 
equations gives:
ln* W= Z , A/ + « ln« / ^ )  + U o , + ^ - T 1) A l » ( ^ ) -  (™)
Health outcomes are thus assumed to be primarily a function of per capita income, health 
expenditure as a per cent of real GDP, an interaction term between health expenditure and 
technical assistance as a per cent of GDP as well as a vector of other control variables. 
Similarly, extending the framework to the system of interdependent equations given in 
Equation (4.19) also implies that each of the other variables is a function of the others. Per 
capita income, for example, is assumed to be a function of health expenditure and its 
interaction term with technical assistance, health outcomes and the vector of other control 
variables.
As shall be shown, each of the variables used in this estimation is non stationary, and 
integrated to the first order 1(1). As such, the appropriate estimation approach is again 
through the VECM framework outlined in Chapter 5. In this case, each of the variables is 
first differenced to establish stationarity and then these differenced variables are applied to 
the VECM framework via Granger’s representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987). 
The linear combination of these variables may then be interpreted as their long term 
relationship, or in economic terms, as static equilibrium relations (Johansen 1988; Johansen 
and Juselius 1990). The general form of the estimation of Equation (7.1) can be written as:
AX, = c l0 +Xa,,AX,, +£*,
i=l /=1
A y, = C20 -  ®,Vrj-\ + t«„AX,, + + e
i'=l i=l
(7.2)
where A is the difference operator such that AXf — X t — X,_, and i again refers to the
number of lags in the model. O f interest are the OCxl//x M and ^ yWyjl-x error correction 
terms which represent the stationary linear combination of the co-integrated variables 
(Johansen 1988). The coefficient on the error correction term, OC 5 represents the speed of 
adjustment to out-of-equilibrium movements in any of the variables (Dolado et al.
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2001:638).134 This dynamic framework will also determine whether there exists a long run 
cointegrating relationship amongst these variables, as well as how each of them adjusts to 
changes in the system of equations.
7.4 Data Collection  
7.4.1 H ealth O utcom es
To measure PNG health outcomes, this chapter develops an aggregate index comprising 
data from life expectancy, the number of infant deaths under the age of one per 1,000 live 
births and the proportion of the population aged between 12 months and 23 months that is 
immunised against diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus. All data is sourced from the 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2009). These health indicators are 
used widely as indicators of aggregate health outcomes and comprise components of the 
United Nations Human Development Index. These data are also the most reliable and 
consistent across the 33-year time span considered in this study.
To construct the aggregate index, each of these measures is first computed as an individual 
index with the inverse of infant mortality utilised so that increases in each index represent 
improvements in health outcomes. The year 2000 is taken as the base year for each index 
and missing observations are linearly extrapolated. Each of the three indexes is then 
combined with equal weighting into an average health outcomes index. This process 
generates a series shown below in Chart 7.1.
Here it can be seen that during the early post independence period, PNG recorded 
relatively stable growth in its aggregate health outcomes. This period of relative progress 
then stalled during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, coinciding with the onset of 
considerable macroeconomic and political instability. The period between 1993 and 2002 
per capita also saw a decline in health funding from K62 per capita to K25 per capita in 
real terms (Chart 4.3). In the most recent decade, average health outcomes have again 
shown signs of improvement, increasing in particular in the post 2002 period, which has 
also seen a considerable increase both in per capita income levels and per capita spending 
on health outcomes.
134 For example, if each of the variables is cointegrated, then each of the disequilibrium error terms will be stationary. This means there is 
a force pulling the residual errors towards zero, with previous departures from equilibrium being corrected by changes in some or all of 
the fiscal variables.
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Chart 7.1 PNG Health Outcomes Index (1974—2007)
PNG Health Outcomes Index (2000 = 100)
Source: AusAID (2009) and author’s calculations.
7.4.2 GDP Per Capita, Health Expenditure and Technical Assistance
GDP per capita is measured in thousands ol constant 1999 Kina. As in the previous
chapters, this data has been deflated into constant 1999 prices using the consumer price 
index. Health expenditure is also measured in constant 1999 prices and expressed as a per 
cent of real GDP. Both of these data series are sourced from the same process as described 
in the previous two chapters (see Appendix 5.1). Technical assistance data is sourced from 
OECD DAC (2009) and originally expressed in nominal US$. This data is then converted 
into Kina using annual average exchange rates sourced from annual PNG budget 
documents, deflated into constant 1999 terms with die Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
then expressed as a per cent of real GDP.
7.4.3 Other Control Variables
The first control variable included in the estimation is a measure of all remaining 
government expenditures as a per cent of GDP. This variable is included to reflect the 
ability of government expenditure in other sectors of the economy to cross-subsidise 
improvements made within the health sector. For example, higher levels of education 
spending may help to promote greater levels of community awareness over primary health 
issues. Likewise, expenditure on infrastructure or law and order may make it more feasible 
for people in remote areas to access essential health services. This variable is measured in 
constant 1999 Kina as a per cent of real GDP and is drawn from the same source as the 
other fiscal and economic data outlined in Appendix 5.1.
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The other control variables used in the estimation seek to measure the impact of 
governance and politics on PNG’s fiscal and social welfare performance. Politics in post 
independence PNG has been categorised by weak party systems and fragile coalitions 
which have been required to form government from a large number of different parties. 
This has led to a high degree of discontinuity of governments who have often failed before 
undertaking their full term in office (Faal 2007). Indeed, the electoral term between 2002 
and 2007 was the first time a government, led by Prime Minister Somare, has served its full 
five-year term in office since independence. The resulting discontinuity of governments has 
been highly disruptive to the policy-making process in PNG, reducing the predictability of 
policy regimes and the efficiency of fiscal administration. This political instability has also 
had significant impacts on the public service, which has often become heavily politicised in 
turn, reducing the efficiency of its day-to-day administration (Saldanha 2005:7).
To measure the impact of these varying degrees of government instability across the post 
independence period, two different measures of government fractionalisation are used. The 
first, measures the number of legislative parties which have been required to form each of 
PNG’s coalition governments. This variable is defined as the sum of squared seats of all 
parties within the government.
p
0 3)
p=\
where sp is the share of seats held by party p  in the government at time /, and P is the
number of parties in government. This variable is akin to a political Herfindahl index, with 
higher values of the index indicating less fractionalisation and lower values indicating more 
fractionalisation. The second measure of government fractionalisation measures the 
probability that any two deputies picked at random from amongst the government parties 
will be from two different parties. This variable is defined as:
r,=i-ix 04)
1=1
where COi t is the share of group i in the government coalition at time /. In contrast to the
political Herfindahl index, this index focuses on the amount of political influence which 
each of the coalition parties have been able to obtain through their ability to obtain deputy 
seats within the government. When T, = 0 there is no fractionalisation of parties within
government. This is likely to represent a relative cohesion of political opinion. In contrast, 
as T, approaches one there is an increasing probability that each of the government’s
deputies will come from different parties. Such a legislature is thus assumed to be more
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likely to be divided, with a lower degree of policy coherence. In this way the variable 
provides an alternative proxy for the level of political fractionalisation faced by each 
successive government. The data for both of these political fractionalisation indexes is 
sourced from DPI (2008).
Table 7.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
D e s c r ip t io n L a b e l N M e a n M a x M in St. D e v
H ealth  Index Ln(<P) 33 4.470 4.725 4.181 0.171
H ealth  E xpend itu re  
as a per cen t o f  
G D P
L n (E /Y ) 33 3.923 4.301 3.219 0.309
H ealth  E xpend itu re  
and T echnical 
A ssistance 
in te rac tion  term
T * L n (E /Y ) 33 7.946 29.451 1.591 6.289
Real G D P  per capita L n (Y /N ) 33 7.741 8.137 7.399 0.144
O th e r  E xpend itu re  
as a p e r cen t o f  
G D P
L n ((E _ 0 ) /Y ) 33 6.412 6.684 5.992 0.159
H erfindha l Index  o f  
G o v e rn m en t
G o v H e rf 33 0.538 0.828 0.230 0.252
G o v ern m en t
fractionalisation
G ovF rac 33 0.473 0.787 0.181 0.257
7.5 Results
The first step in the estimation process is to establish the stationarity of each of the 
variables. Table 5.2 presents the results of Augmented Dickey Fuller tests of each variable 
and its first differenced value. In each case, the test rejects the null hypothesis of non 
stationarity at a 99 per cent confidence interval. Following the first differencing of each of 
these variables, however, each is shown to be stationary and thus integrated to the first 
order, 1(1). It is therefore appropriate to estimate models that include variables in their first 
differenced form through the VECM procedure.
Table 7.2: Stationarity Test for Key Variables
V a ria b le A D F
T e s t
S ta t
A D F
C ritic a l
V a lu e
A D F
P -
va lu e
A D F  T e s t  
S ta t a fte r
I s ,
D iffe re n c e
A D F  
C ritic a l 
V a lu e  a f te r  
I s*
D iffe re n c e
A D F  p - 
v a lu e  a fte r
f s ,
D iffe re n c e
S ta tio n a ry
Ln<J> -0.792 -3.702 0.821 -5.196 -3.709 0.000 1(1)
L n (Y /N ) -3.167 -3.702 0.022 -5.094 -3.709 0.000 1(1)
L n (E /Y ) -1.337 -3.702 0.612 -8.032 -3.709 0.000 1(1)
T* L n (E /Y ) -3.064 -3.702 0.030 -3.875 -3.709 0.002 1(1)
L n ((E _ 0 ) /Y ) -2.081 -3.702 0.254 -4.754 -3.709 0.0001 1(1)
G ovF rac -1.600 -3.702 0.483 -6.021 -3.709 0.000 1(1)
G o v H e rf -1.596 -3.702 0.485 -5.386 -3.709 0.000 1(1)
Before applying the Johansen approach to test for the cointegrating relationships, it is 
important to first determine the optimal lag length, or order, of the VECM. Table 7.3
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presents both the AIC and HQIC test statistics which are udlised by selecting the lag length 
which gives the lowest possible value of the information criteria test (Gujarati 2003:537). In 
the current case, both are minimised with the use of two lags. Two lags are chosen for the 
following estimations.
Table 7.3: Selection Order Criteria
Selection Order Criteria
Lag AIC H Q IC
0 -2.508 -2.419
1 -7.793 -7.166
2 -8.002* -8.594*
Note: In order to preserve the limited degrees of freedom 
within the model, the maximum lag length is set to two lags. 
With the removal of this restriction the optimal lag lengths 
increases in size to three. For this reason, the core estimations 
are also replicated using this three-year lag structure to test 
whether the results are robust to this restricdon. As discussed 
in the main text, the results are comparably similar.__________
The next step is to use the Johansen trace statistic test to determine the cointegrating rank 
of the model. Again, this process is based on Johansen’s trace test statistic (Johansen 1988; 
Maddala and Kim 1998:211). The results are shown in Table 7.4. The trace test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors but fails to reject the null hypothesis of one 
cointegrating vector. That is to say, there exists one linear combination of the variables.
Table 7.4: Cointegration Tests for Model I
Maximum
Rank
H°: Number o f  
Cointegrating Vectors
(v)
Trace
Statistic
95% Critical 
Value
Eigenvalue
0 None 93.0319* 94.15
1 At most 1 56.6428 68.52 0.69082
2 At most 2 31.0823 47.21 0.56156
^denotes rejection o f  the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors at 5 per 
cent significance level.___________________________________________________________
Table 7.5 below presents the results of the long run cointegrating relationship amongst the 
variables within the VECM framework. In accordance with the VECM procedure, the 
cointegrating relationship is normalised, in this case on the key dependent variable of 
interest, with the public health outcomes index taking on a unitary value (Lutkepohl 
1991).13:1 Row 1 presents the results of the core model.
135 As explained in Chapter 5, because the variables show an identity equated to zero a positive coefficient estimate suggests a negative 
ceteris paribus long run relationship with the normalised health outcomes index. Vice-versa, a negative coefficient estimate suggests a 
positive ceteris paribus long run relationship with the normalised health outcomes index.
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Here it can be seen that the negative and highly statistically significant coefficient estimates 
on the GDP per capita variable indicate that income has been a major positive determinant 
of health outcomes across this period. The health expenditure variable also has an 
intuitively signed negative coefficient estimate; however, in this case it is statistically 
insignificant. When this term is interacted with the technical assistance variable, however, 
the estimation records a highly significant positive coefficient. This indicates that over the 
long term increases in technical assistance have been associated with a deterioration in the 
efficiency of public health expenditure in improving health outcomes. The Herfindahl 
index of government fractionalisation is also intuitively signed with a negative and highly 
significant coefficient estimate. This indicates that a lower fractionalisation of government 
coalitions has tended to lead to improved long run health outcomes.
Rows 2—5 also present a number of alternative specifications in order to test the robustness 
of these results to small changes in how the model is estimated. Row 2 re-estimates the 
core model with the exclusion of the health expenditure and technical assistance interaction 
term. In this case, the health expenditure variable becomes, as expected, negative and 
highly significant, suggesting that increases in public health spending have indeed helped to 
improve public health outcomes. The GDP per capita, government fractionalisation and 
other expenditure variables maintain coefficients of the same sign and significance.
Row 3 re-estimates the core specification with the use of the alternative measure of 
government fractionalisation. In this case, increasing the government fractionalisation 
variable leads to poorer health outcomes. This is again in line with the hypothesis that long 
run social outcomes have been negatively influenced by the highly fragmented nature of 
politics in post independence PNG. Each of the other variables maintains its sign, size and 
significance, suggesting that the results are robust to changes in how political 
fractionalisation has been measured.
Row 4 then re-estimates the core specification with the use of a three instead of two-year
lag structure. This is to test whether the initial restriction of the number of lags not
exceeding two, placed in order to preserve degrees of freedom, has influenced the results.
Each of these long run cointegrating relationships maintains its sign, size and significance
as in the core specification. Finally, Row 5 again estimates the model with a three-year lag
structure, but in this case with the alternative measure of political fractionalisation. Again,
the results are comparatively similar to that of the previous models, with coefficient
estimates shown to be robust to changes in both the lag structure and the measure of
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political fractionalisation. The consistency of these alternative specifications gives a degree 
of confidence in the robustness of the core models results.
Table 7.5: Cointegrating Relationships for Models I-V
Variable LnO L n (Y /N ) Ln(E/Y) T* Ln(E/Y) Ln((E_0)/Y) HerfGov GovFrac
Model I: Core
1. Coefficient 1 -0.611*** -0.189 0.044*** 1 529*** -0.296*** -
Standard Error (0.225) (0.183) (0.006) (0.359) (0.098) -
Model II: No Interaction Term
2. Coefficient 1 -89.257*** -39.069*** - 133.366*** -15.076** -
Standard Error (16.976) (9.020) - (25.145) (7.223) -
Model III: Alternative Government Fractionalisation
3. Coefficient 1 -0.649*** -0.220 0.042*** 1.548*** - 0.309***
Standard Error (0.220) (0.175) (0.066) (0.341) - (0.093)
Model IV: 3-Year Lag Period
4. Coefficient 1 -0.915*** -0.066 0.059*** 1.812*** -0.412*** -
Standard Error (0.138) (0.087) (0.003) (0.211) (0.041) -
Model V: Alternative Government Fractionalisation with 3-Year Lag
5. Coefficient 1 -0.917*** -0.084 0.057*** 1.763*** - 0.412***
Standard Error (0.133) (0.085) (0.003) (0.200) - (0.041)
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.l; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Johansen normalisation restriction imposed.
Whilst the core focus of this analysis has rested on analysing the long term cointegrating 
relationships amongst these variables, Table 7.6 also presents the results of the short run 
VECM coefficients. In this case, the estimated coefficients for the error correction term 
reveal which of the variables adjust to correct imbalances in the system of equations whilst 
the variable coefficients show the short run effects of changes in the explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable.
The results indicate firsdy that the majority of adjustment in post independence PNG to 
shocks in health outcomes has occurred through changes in government health 
expenditures. For the health expenditure variable, the lagged error correction term, L.ti, is 
significant and negatively signed, whilst for the health expenditure and technical assistance 
interaction term the lagged error correction term, L.ti, is significant and positively signed. 
Each of the lagged error correction terms for the other variables in the system is 
insignificant at a 90 per cent confidence level. Notably, this result also aligns with those 
found in Chapter 5, which illustrated that government expenditure has been the key 
adjustment mechanism to fiscal shocks across this period.
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Table 7.6: VECM Results for Core Model I
1 /
Ln0>
2 /
L n (Y /N )
3 /
L n (E /Y )
4 /
L n (E /Y )
5 /
H e r fG o v
6 /
ln E _ h _ o
L .ti 0 .080 -0 .082 -0 .411* 10.941*** 0 .1 0 6 0 .062
(0.060) (0.126) (0.212) (2 .119) (0.226) (0.128)
L.Ln<t> 0 .043 -0 .175 0 .296 -14 .737** -0 .378 0 .450
(0.213) (0.447) (0.755) (7.517) (0.804) (0.455)
L .L n (Y /N ) -0 .158 0 .240 0 .012 -6 .107 -0 .350 0 .160
(0.116) (0.245) (0.413) (4 .116) (0.440) (0.249)
L .L n (E /Y ) 0.114** 0 .072 -0 .573*** -2.181 -0 .321* -0 .089
(0.051) (0.108) (0.182) (1.819) (0.194) (0.110)
L .T* -0 .004 0.001 0 .013 -0 .066 -0 .007 -0 .003
L n (E /Y ) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.130) (0.013) (0.007)
L .L n ((E  ( J ) /
Y)
-0 .098 0 .042 0 .510 7.768** 0 .126 0 .142
(0.096) (0.202) (0.342) (3.410) (0.365) (0.206)
L .H e r fG o v -0 .037 -0 .068 0 .1 3 2 -0 .1 0 4 -0 .028 0 .158
N o r m a lity
T e s t
(J a rq u e -
B era )
(0.054) (0.115) (0.194) (1.936) (0.226) (0.117)
X2 8.861 2 .459 1.932 3 .935 27 .239 3.481
( P ro b >  y 2)
A ll -
N o r m a lity
X2
(P r o b >  x 2)
(0.012)
45 .097
(0 .0001)
(0.292)
Autocorrelation
X2
(P ro b >  x 2)
(0 .380)
- L a g  1 -
4 6 .4765
0 .11337
(0.139)
- L a g  2  —
4 2 .1885
0 .2 2 0 9 8
(0.000) (0.317)
* p < .l ;  ** p< .05; *** pc .01 . All the estim ations are m ade w ith an unrestricted constant in the model.
A utocorrelation tests H°: N o  autocorrelation at lag order. Fail to  reject the null hypothesis o f  no  autocorrelation.
The STATA small sample adjustm ent was used w hen calculating the estim ated variance-covariance matrix o f  the 
disturbances fo r the Jarque-Bera n o r m a l i ty te s t^
Further support for the significance of health spending on health outcomes is shown in the 
core VECM equation given in Column 1 showing the short run impact of each of the 
explanatory variables on health outcomes. This estimation shows that the only variable to 
have a significant influence on short run health outcomes is the lagged value of public 
health spending. This result is likely to represent the impact of health spending on die 
more sensitive health parameters such as child immunisation rates and, to a lesser extent, 
child mortality. For these variables, additional spending can lead to quite rapid changes in 
on-the-ground outcomes, in contrast to average life expectancy which changes more slowly 
over time. Each of the other equations show few significant short run effects between each 
of these variables, again highlighting the longer term relationships which have been the 
core focus of this study.
Table 7.6 also presents the results of the Jarque-Bera normality test (Jarque and Bera 1980) 
as well as a test for residual autocorrelation. The health outcomes index, per capita GDP, 
health expenditure, the interaction term and the other expenditure variables all have test 
statistics which fail to reject the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution 
at a 95 per cent confidence level. Similarly, the tests for residual autocorrelation in each of 
the equations as well as for the entire model fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
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autocorrelation. However, in the case of the government fractionalisation index, the 
calculated Jarque-Bera statistic is 27.239, indicating moderately skewed residuals. As such, a 
note of caution is warranted as the test rejects the null hypothesis of normal residuals at a 
95 per cent confidence interval.
One explanation for this result is the sharp fluctuations of this variable over time following 
the election of new governments or changes in the composition of governments. It may 
also reflect the poor finite sample properties of the Jarque-Bera test and its sensitivity to 
any oudying values (Lawford 2004). One option may be to remove a number of outlying 
residuals from the sample set; however, given the small sample size properties of the data, 
this would potentially result in an important loss of information. Whilst the consistency of 
the coefficient estimates across the two different measures of political instability gives a 
degree of confidence in their results, the failure of this normality assumption means that 
these results should be treated with care.
7.6 D iscussion  and C onclusion
This chapter has sought to analyse how the provision of technical assistance has influenced 
the efficiency of public health spending in delivering improved health outcomes to PNG. 
This chapter is the first to draw on the VECM framework to conduct a country-level case 
study of a SIDS. Evidence indicates that there exists a negative long term relationship 
between technical assistance and the efficiency of the PNG bureaucracy in utilising 
additional health resources. This chapter has also found evidence that higher levels of 
public health spending are associated with improved health outcomes and that per capita 
income and political fractionalisation have also been key determinants of long run health 
outcome trends.
In addition to those mentioned above, some further limitations to this analysis are worth 
noting. AusAID and its donor partners have been involved in a continual process of 
reform over how and how much technical assistance has been delivered to PNG. Evidence 
that past technical assistance efforts have had a negative impact on public sector efficiency 
need not necessarily imply that future efforts will have the same result. Further, data 
limitations mean that these results only apply to the health sector—within which technical 
assistance has been heavily criticised. As shown in Feeny and Rogers (2007; 2008), public 
sector efficiency outcomes can vary considerably across sectors. A finding that technical 
assistance has had a detrimental effect in one sector need not necessarily imply that it is the
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same across all other sectors. This chapter has also focused explicidy on the role of 
technical assistance. In practice, the delivery of project and program aid may also 
contribute, or erode, the performance of the recipient agency.
A useful extension to this study may be to incorporate these alternative aid flows into the 
analysis. Another useful extension of this analysis may be to isolate those components of 
technical assistance which have been targeted directly at the health sector. This approach 
would be complicated by the significant spill over effects of technical assistance in other 
sectors to influence public expenditure efficiency in the health sector. Improving central 
government agencies budgeting and planning processes is a pertinent example of this, and 
is also why this study utilised total levels of technical assistance. Nevertheless, allowing for 
potentially divergent impacts of technical assistance targeted at different sectors may be a 
useful area for further research.
Limitations also relate to measuring health outcomes. The availability and quality of data 
constrained the health index to the combination of just three outcome indicators. In 
practice, the health sector targets improvements across a much wider range of factors than 
those encapsulated within these measures. Each of these indicators, especially life 
expectancy, also changes slowly over time. This is likely to have contributed to the 
estimation’s limited ability to pick up short run variations in the public sector’s efficiency in 
delivering health services. It is for this reason that the estimation results have been focused 
on identifying the long run cointegrating relationships present within the data.
These limitations notwithstanding, the results presented herein raise a number of important 
policy implications. The first is the result that technical assistance in PNG has tended to 
reduce the efficiency of public spending at improving health outcomes. This is not to say 
that technical assistance has had an overall negative impact on capacity within these 
agencies or that it has contributed to poorer health outcomes. Rather, aid funds allocated as 
technical assistance to the health sector are less effective at improving health outcomes 
than the PNG Government’s own spending allocations.
The most plausible explanation for this relates to the high cost of technical assistance.
ODE (2007), for example, estimates that it costs the Australian Government between
A$340,000 and A$400,000 to place a single mid level government adviser within the PNG
bureaucracy. The additional long term efficiency which the provision of technical advisers
has created within the health bureaucracy (either through providing additional bureaucratic
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resources or expanding the capacity of existing workers) has been worth less than the cost 
of their placement. Thus a reduction in public sector efficiency is observed.
The poor value for money offered by technical assistance does suggest a need to revise 
Australia’s policy of giving more aid in the form of technical assistance than any other 
major bilateral donor. In particular, as Australia seeks to make faster rates of progress 
against MDG indicators in PNG, short term improvements in health indicators may be 
more efficiently funded via alternative aid modalities— perhaps through a greater focus on 
funding goods and services rather than providing advisers.
Having said this, PNG clearly has significant capacity constraints within its bureaucracy 
which need to be addressed. Technical assistance will inevitably be an important 
component of trying to correct this. Therefore there should also be a focus on increasing 
the marginal effectiveness of technical assistance so that its impact justifies its cost. Central 
to this task will be increasing the focus placed on delivering technical assistance to those 
areas of the PNG bureaucracy which have a demand for its presence. As discussed, the 
placement of technical advisers within PNG has been heavily criticised on the grounds that 
it has been very much a supply-led process.13<> Ultimately, however, it is the domestic 
political and bureaucratic will for change that will determine whether or not technical 
assistance can contribute to improvements in public sector capacity.
Overcoming these constraints so that technical assistance can be provided to areas of the 
PNG bureaucracy where it will be used most effectively is thus a core challenge for the 
Australian aid program both in PNG and in the other SIDS of the South Pacific. How this 
may be achieved is discussed in the final policy implications section of the following 
chapter.
136 There are many anecdotal causes for the poor levels of domestic ownership of donor technical assistance efforts in PNG. These 
include, and are not limited to, weak departmental capacity limiting the ability of the recipient agency to engage in a productive and 
timely dialogue with the donor agency about capacity needs; concerns by ministers, secretaries and senior officials over the impact which 
technical assistance may have on their power relations and discretionary decision making within the agency or department; perceptions of 
foreign, especially Australian, interference in the domestic policy-making process, reducing senior officials’ desire for assistance; lack of 
knowledge by recipient agency of where capacity needs exist; large reporting burden placed on recipients to comply with requirements of 
donor agencies; motivations of aid agencies to push ahead with program roll-out despite lack of input from recipient agency, 
departmental secretary or minister; and, a general understanding by recipients of the inability of donors to withhold funding despite a 
lack of compliance with agreed terms.
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C hapter 8: C onclusions and Policy Im plications
8.1 Summary of Findings and Contributions
This study has sought to analyse a variety of issues relating to how foreign aid has 
influenced the government and bureaucratic behaviour of the SIDS of the South Pacific, 
and that of PNG in particular. This focus was motivated by a number of factors; firstly, by 
the growing concern which Australia has placed on the threat of failed or failing states in 
the region. Secondly, although it can be debated whether Australian aid has made 
substantive contributions to specific outcomes, it is increasingly clear that foreign 
assistance has not been able to foster a growing sense of security or prosperity in the 
region. Undertaking research which explores the unique challenges of the small and often 
fragile island developing states of the South Pacific is thus of increasing importance. This 
research also coincides with a growing focus in AusAID on enhancing the effectiveness of 
its aid program, witnessed in part by the establishment of the ODE in 2006.
It is also for these reasons that this study has taken a broader approach to assessing the 
effectiveness of Australian aid in general rather than providing impact assessments of 
individual projects or aid modalities. Understanding and measuring the impact of aid on 
specific outcomes at specific points in time is no doubt important. However, in the absence 
of a well designed overarching aid framework which seeks to improve the entire public 
expenditure behaviour of a recipient government, micro level successes are unlikely to 
contribute to longer term development gains. These issues are particularly pertinent in the 
SIDS of the South Pacific which have weak public sector management and significant 
resource constraints.
This study has brought together and extended a range of empirical methods and techniques 
used within the aid effectiveness literature. Five main empirical chapters have been 
presented together with a historical analysis of PNG’s fiscal policy since independence. The 
remainder of this section will discuss the core findings and contributions of each of these 
chapters. The following section will then use these conclusions to draw some policy lessons 
arising from the analysis.
8.1.1 Australian Aid Motivations and Allocation Criteria
Chapter 2 considered the big picture of Australian aid, analysing its changing motivations
and the impact that this has had on its allocation patterns and criteria.
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M ethodological Contributions
This chapter used econometric techniques to estimate a utility maximising model of donor 
behaviour which controlled for the censored nature of the dependent variable. The chapter 
also adapted the Tobit decomposition method to give a more detailed exposition of the 
dual nature of the Australian aid allocation process. A long time series of data was 
considered which allowed the analysis of two major government reviews on the allocation 
priorities of Australian aid and also whether Australia has been increasingly influenced by 
policy-based selectivity in the current decade. This chapter justified an alternate distance 
based measure of Australia’s strategic motivations of aid which was shown to reflect the 
regional strategic and security based imperatives of the aid program. Finally, the aid 
allocation framework was used to analyse the motivations behind Australia’s increasing 
shift towards giving aid through technical assistance.
Development and Aid Policy Contributions
The results showed that whilst Australia has considered all aspects of recipient need, donor 
interest and colonial heritage in determining its aid allocations, the last decade has seen a 
declining influence of colonial legacy, a rise of regional priorities and a persistent small 
country bias in Australian aid allocations. In the post Simons Review era, there has been a 
decline in the recipient need motivation of Australian aid and an increasing responsiveness 
to good governance criteria. This chapter also showed that Australia has tended to give 
more technical assistance to countries which are smaller, geographically closer, display a 
poorer control of corruption and with which it has larger trade partnerships. These results 
challenged the claim that Australia can pursue both humanitarian and foreign policy 
priorities without compromising the aid programs ability to allocate aid on the basis of 
recipient need.
8.1.2 Foreign Aid and Government Effectiveness in Small States
The third chapter analysed the impact of foreign aid on the effectiveness of recipient
governments to provide public services and establish an environment conducive to broad 
based wealth creation. This chapter isolated the impact of Australian aid and technical 
assistance and compared them vis-a-vis other types of aid delivery and from other donors. 
The chapter sought to determine in particular whether the effect of any one of these types 
of aid was altered when given to developing states with small population sizes typical of the 
SIDS of the South Pacific.
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M ethodological Contributions
This chapter adopted advanced estimation methods which better control for the 
endogenous explanatory variables in the model than many other studies in the literature. 
The estimation process controlled for institutional persistence, which was previously not 
used in the only other study to consider the divergent impact of aid across country size. 
This chapter also collected a large cross-country data set across a 10 year panel with a large 
amount of data included for a number of small states, particularly those in the South 
Pacific. Finally, a more rigorous testing of the 2SLS first stage F-Statistic identification 
assumption was adopted, previously unused in the aid effectiveness literature.
Developm ent and Aid Policy Contributions
Strong support was found for the notion that the positive impact of aid on government 
effectiveness tends to diminish as countries decrease in population. The diminishing 
marginal returns to aid in population were shown to be most pronounced within the 
technical assistance component of aid. This reflects the larger burden which foreign aid 
places on small states in terms of soaking up scarce bureaucratic capacity, distorting 
incentives for responsible fiscal management and encouraging rent seeking behaviour. 
Illustrating the importance of this result to Australia, was also the finding that these effects 
are particularly pronounced within the Australian aid program, reflecting the large volumes 
of Australian aid which have been delivered to the SIDS of the South Pacific.
8.1.3 A History of Foreign Aid and Fiscal Policy in PNG
The fourth chapter continued the analysis of the interaction between foreign aid and 
recipient government behaviour in SIDS by introducing a country level case study of PNG. 
This included reviewing available theoretical evidence for how foreign aid can influence 
various elements of the recipient’s fiscal behaviour including the management of fiscal 
aggregates, sectoral expenditures and public sector efficiency. This chapter then provided a 
historical analysis of the interaction between each of these elements of fiscal policy in post 
independence PNG.
M ethodological Contributions
This chapter developed a model of aid and fiscal behaviour which incorporated fiscal 
aggregates, sectoral expenditures and public sector efficiency. This provided the theoretical 
basis for the following three empirical chapters.
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Developm ent and Aid Policy Contributions
The historical analysis illustrated that despite high levels of external financing, successive 
PNG Governments have continued to resort to persistent deficit financing of their budget. 
Between 1975 and 2002, this led to growing levels of public debt, and on three separate 
occasions a lack of fiscal discipline contributed to economic crises which required donor- 
funded bail-outs. The drastic switch between budgetary support and project aid was shown 
to have coincided with the fiscal pressures experienced by the government resulting from 
the Bougainville crisis. This led to significant pressures for high levels of aid fungibility to 
occur. Finally, this chapter showed that the increasing focus by donors on providing 
finance that is tied to specific activities such as project and program aid has not led to an 
improvement in the development orientation of sectoral expenditure outputs.
8.1.3 F ore ign  Aid and F iscal A ggregates in  P N G
The fifth chapter provided the first empirical case study of PNG by assessing the impact of 
foreign grant aid on the management of PNG fiscal aggregates since independence. This 
study sought to answer a number of questions raised in the historical analysis of Chapter 4 
regarding whether grant aid has encouraged less responsible debt management behaviour, 
whether grant aid has provided a disincentive to expand domestic revenue collection and 
whether grant aid has encouraged unproductive government expenditure.
M ethodological Contributions
The VECM approach used in this chapter offered a number of advantages over traditional 
FRMs which have had difficulties in determining appropriate target variables and which are 
limited in their ability to consider long run dynamics. The use of the VECM approach 
included analysing both the short and long term relationships between each of the fiscal 
aggregates and imposing a variety of aid impulses on the data. This was the first study to 
apply these methods to PNG with an extensive data collection exercise that allowed for an 
analysis of the relationships between grant aid, public debt, domestic revenue and 
development expenditure allocations. This study was also the first within the dynamic fiscal 
response literature to consider the potentially divergent impact of budgetary support grants 
vis-ä-vis project aid grants on the fiscal behaviour of government.
Development and Aid Policy Contributions
The results illustrated a clear tendency for aid to lower the PNG Government’s domestic 
revenue collection efforts. Grant aid was also shown to have had a significant impact on 
lowering levels of public debt which in turn meant that aid flows in aggregate have had a
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minimal impact on increasing levels of public expenditure. Preliminary evidence suggests 
that budget support in particular has a strong relationship with the lower domestic revenue 
and lower domestic borrowing effects. Budget support also supports an improvement in 
expenditure composition towards the development expenditures category. Project aid on 
the other hand has contributed more to higher rates of government expenditure than debt 
reduction, although the majority of this has been in the general rather than development 
expenditure category.
8.1.4 Foreign  Aid and Sectoral E x p en d itu res  in P N G
The sixth chapter focused specifically on the impact of aid on the expenditure priorities 
and outcomes of the PNG Government. In particular, it sought to further assess the 
relative impact of budgetary support vis-ä-vis project-based aid on increasing aggregate 
expenditure levels in three key development sectors of the PNG economy— health, 
education and infrastructure. It also analysed the extent to which funds allocated to these 
sectors have been diverted to other general government spending activities.
Methodological Contributions
This chapter extended the literature firstly by developing a model of inter sectoral aid 
fungibility which disaggregates foreign grants into earmarked forms of aid such as project 
and program assistance and un-earmarked assistance such as budgetary support. This 
model was then estimated with the SUR technique which provided static coefficient 
estimates to augment the dynamic analysis of the previous chapter. Unlike other studies, 
this chapter allowed for divergent impacts between each of these different types of aid 
delivery, reducing the potential for an upward bias of fungibility estimates. To conduct this 
analysis, the chapter also undertook a substantial data collection exercise to facilitate the 
sectoral analysis of PNG since it gained independence.
Development and Aid Policy Contributions
The results of this chapter supported those obtained from the dynamic analysis in Chapter 
5 and also supported a number of the general correlations observed in the historical 
analysis from Chapter 4. In particular, they explain why the shift from budgetary support to 
project aid has had a relatively benign impact on improving aggregate expenditure levels in 
each of the core development sectors considered.
In total, aid was shown to have made a positive contribution to the overall funding levels 
of all expenditure categories in PNG since independence. Since the introduction of project
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and program aid however, large scale fungibility has taken place across a number of sectors 
of the PNG economy, with expenditure increases far below the amount of aid allocated to 
each sector. In contrast, the cridcism that budget support was used to finance unproductive 
government expenditures appear unfounded. The results showed that of the 50 per cent of 
budget support that was used to finance higher levels of expenditures, 60 per cent was 
allocated to the health, education and infrastructure sectors whilst the remaining 40 per 
cent was allocated to the general government expenditure category. The remaining 
budgetary support funds were used to lower tax collection and reduce the government’s 
debt liabilities. These results illustrated that it has not been the type of aid that has 
determined the ability of donors to provide additional resources for key service delivery 
sectors but rather the behavioural response of the PNG Government to that aid inflow.
8.1.5 Foreign Aid and Public Sector Efficiency in PNG
The seventh chapter of this study considered the impact of technical assistance on the 
efficiency of public spending allocations to improve social welfare outcomes, with a case 
study of the PNG health sector.
M ethodological Contributions
This chapter extended the literature by conducting a country-level analysis of the impact of 
technical assistance on the effectiveness of public spending using the dynamic VECM 
estimation process. An index of health welfare outcomes and two new measures of political 
fractionalisation in PNG were constructed. This chapter also developed a model which 
focused explicidy on the role of technical assistance in influencing these outcomes as this 
more accurately reflected the component of aid which is likely to influence public sector 
efficiency.
Development and Aid Policy Contributions
This chapter presented evidence for public health spending being a key determinant of 
PNG health outcomes, highlighting the importance of improving per capita expenditure 
levels in key service delivery sectors of the economy. The chapter also showed that the 
delivery of technical assistance has tended to reduce public sector efficiency in the health 
sector. The high cost of technical assistance has meant that in per Kina terms, an additional 
adviser contributes less to improving health outcomes than if that money was spent on 
other items, perhaps through providing goods and services. In this way, technical assistance 
is shown to lower the marginal effectiveness of public health spending at improving health 
outcomes.
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8.2 Limitations and Areas for Further Study
In addition to those noted within each chapter, it is worth noting some of the limitations to 
the broader approach taken in this analysis as well as the areas for opportunities for further 
research.
The first major constraint relates to data quality and reliability, especially in regards to those 
chapters using the PNG case study. A number of different data collection exercises were 
undertaken to try and minimise this limitation. As much as possible, this data was obtained 
from common primary sources across the entire post independence period. However, even 
when sourced from official budget documents, much of the empirical analysis relies on 
data which is of questionable quality. Over time as more data is collected and its quality 
improved, much of this limitation may dissipate. The limited time series considered in each 
of these case studies also led to a number of the empirical results being fragile.
Another limitation of the approach taken in this dissertation has been its heavy focus on 
PNG as a case study for the rest of the region. In practice, PNG is much larger in both its 
economy and population than most other countries in the region. This has meant that it 
has been one of the lowest per capita recipients of aid in the region. PNG also has a 
relatively unique history of how it has received foreign assistance, with clear policy 
delineations between the eras of budgetary support, project aid, program support and most 
recently, technical assistance. PNG may therefore provide limited lessons for smaller, more 
aid-dependent countries in the region. In particular, micro states on the edge of economic 
viability are likely to face a different set of policy problems than these larger countries.
Each of these limitations opens up areas for future research. In particular, study may be 
usefully directed at further investigating the impact of aid on the fiscal behaviour and 
public sector efficiency of other SIDS within the South Pacific. This could include a 
comparison of results with countries such as the Solomon Islands which has recently been 
receiving assistance levels in excess of 65 per cent of GDP. Following further data 
collection, public sector efficiency studies may also be usefully extended to other key 
sectors of the PNG economy such as education and infrastructure.
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8.3 Policy Implications
Whilst the design or implementation of aid programs is far beyond the scope and purpose 
of this study, this final section seeks to briefly outline how some of these principles may be 
translated into practical policy lessons for improving the quality of Australia’s aid. In 
particular, it offers lessons for PNG; however, many of these may be equally applicable to 
the other SIDS of the South Pacific. These recommendations can be broadly classified into 
three strands.
8.3.1 Integrate Funding to an Overarching Public Expenditure 
Framework
If PNG is to achieve faster rates of progress towards goals such as the MDGs, then a 
scaling-up of both per capita expenditures for social services and the efficiency of that 
spending in improving social outcomes will be needed. This will require careful planning 
on behalf of both the PNG Government and its donor partners in the allocation of public 
spending in terms of sectoral allocation, sequencing and its macroeconomic implications.
Past approaches of tying foreign aid to specific standalone projects and even more recently 
to sector-wide programs has offered donors a false sense of having some control over what 
their assistance has ended up financing; fungibility has been rife, particularly within key 
service delivery sectors such as health and education. Aid has also undermined domestic 
revenue collection, creating a state of perpetual aid dependence as the government 
continues to draw on a narrow tax base and delays necessary reforms required to expand 
the private sector.
One method of overcoming many of these issues may be to tie foreign assistance to an 
overall Public Expenditure Program (PEP) which specifies an agreed level of adequate 
resources across the entire range of macroeconomic management and social service 
delivery sectors. At the macroeconomic level, this may include targets surrounding 
aggregate levels of public spending in lieu of revenue outcomes, as well as performance 
across debt management within a medium term macroeconomic framework. At the 
sectoral level, this could include targets for sufficient levels of aggregate spending being 
allocated to programs across all key social welfare sectors. In practice, many of these 
objectives have already been laid out by the PNG Government in its Medium Term Fiscal, 
Debt and Development Strategies (GoPNG 2005a; GoPNG 2005b; GoPNG 2006). With 
the inclusion of sectoral targets for key service delivery sectors over the medium term 
horizon, these objectives could be then be extended into a consolidated PEP. Within the
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PEP, donors would nominate the resource contribudons which they intended to make to 
each one of these outcomes, and would then be responsible for monitoring the recipient 
government’s aggregate expenditure levels across each of these sectors.137
This approach would offer donors a number of advantages. Firsdy, it would circumvent the 
ability of the PNG Government to re-direct its own resources in response to aid inflows. 
This would help to ensure that injecdons of foreign resources led to improvements in 
aggregate funding levels for key development sectors. Secondly, it would help to remove a 
tendency of donors to conduct projects outside the budget process, placing less of an 
emphasis on accounting for where aid dollars end up and placing more of a focus on how 
aid contributes to the entire public expenditure behaviour of government. The setting of 
sectoral expenditure targets would also offer a strong public accountability measure, 
highlighting the at times opaque funding levels delivered through the budget process.
O f course, recipient governments are unlikely to look favourably on having their entire 
public expenditure program reviewed on a regular basis by donors. Thus, implementing a 
performance-based system following the satisfactory achievement of each expenditure 
target, or a number of them, would also be an important component of the PEP support. 
This shall be discussed in section 8.3.3.
8.3.2 Pooling of Aid Funds for Both PEP Support and Technical 
Assistance
Minimising the bureaucratic burden which foreign assistance places on recipient 
bureaucracies is another key reform target for donors operating in PNG and the SIDS of 
the South Pacific more generally. In these environments, many of the adverse 
consequences of aid have been amplified due to small and often already weak public 
sectors which have a limited ability to cope with the administrative and bureaucratic burden 
placed on them by donors.
One method to support more effective foreign aid in these environments would be to pool 
all donor resources into a common fund to support the PEP. From this fund, donors 
would work collaboratively and with the recipient government through its domestic
137 Variations of this type of scheme have also been proposed by other authors. Most notably, Devrajan and Swaroop (1998) propose 
that instead of development agencies focusing on project rates of return the focus of assistance efforts should be placed on how this 
assistance contributed to an enure PEP. These authors propose however that the system should be implemented via a loan based 
system through what they term a Public Expenditure Reform Loan (PERL) which des external finance to the recipient achieving a 
sadsfactory outcome for its PEP.
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budgeting process to decide what levels of foreign financial support will be given to each 
sector within the PEP. According to their contributions, donors could then decide on 
which projects or programs they would carry out themselves, which would be outsourced 
to the private sector, and following the satisfactory meeting of certain conditions (discussed 
in more detail shortly), which funds could simply be given to the recipient government to 
implement via its own domestic bureaucracy. This approach would help to minimise the 
bureaucratic burden which donors place on the recipient bureaucracy with the design and 
implementation of a myriad development programs across the country.
In addition to the general PEP fund, another fund could also be established to pool all 
donor support targeted at bureaucratic and governance training. This common technical 
assistance pool could then be used to provide funds for bureaucratic support programs to 
all levels of the recipient government. Under this arrangement, however, donors would no 
longer independently design and implement technical assistance projects. Rather, funds 
would be pooled into the common facility which would require each recipient agency or 
department to complete some pre determined application process outlining their intended 
use of the technical assistance, its duration, and how it will contribute to improving the 
efficiency of public spending and the achievement of the government’s PEP framework. 
The donor agencies together with representatives from the government would then decide 
which proposals were most competitive and offer the best value for money.
Each domestic agency would then essentially be competing for the provision of donor- 
funded technical assistance. Over time, those agencies that were most capable of using, and 
have a desire for, technical assistance would become apparent and would be rewarded with 
further assistance. Those agencies which demonstrated that they did not have a strong 
desire for technical assistance would receive reduced levels of support. This approach 
highlights the fact that without bureaucratic or political ownership, technical assistance is 
unlikely to have any impact on the performance of the recipient agency, and in many cases 
is likely to worsen that agency’s performance.
Following their acceptance for the allocation of funding, agencies that demonstrated they 
were capable of using technical assistance effectively could also be given the opportunity to 
decide how much of these funds would be used to recruit technical advisers (either from 
international or domestic sources) through a competitive tender process. De-linking 
technical assistance from direct donor funding would allow agencies to reward experts and
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Consultants who have skills that are sought after by their agency and establish a more 
competitive knowledge market.
Introducing a competitive tender process whereby advisers would compete to provide 
technical assistance to various government agencies may also give a greater incentive to 
recipients to treat these resources as their own, and spend them wisely, for example, by 
searching for well-recommended and inexpensive technical assistance from South and East 
Asia. This may help to drive down the current high cost of providing advisory support. 
Alternatively, agencies should be free to defer advisory support entirely and request 
assistance which is targeted at personnel training and development of their own staff.
Ultimately, the pooling of aid funds for both sectoral support and technical assistance can 
enhance the effectiveness of technical assistance by driving down its costs and increasing 
its level of domestic ownership. Notably, this pooling of funds would also require a 
significant improvement in the ability of both donors and recipients to prioritise where 
technical assistance is most effective, and perhaps most importantly, to reject assistance to 
those areas which were not seen to have a desired impact so that resources could be 
directed elsewhere.
8.3.3 Introduce Budgetary Support into the Policy Mix
As mentioned, it is likely that recipient governments will not look favourably on having 
their public expenditure program scrutinised to the degree that would be required under a 
PEP. Offering worthwhile incentives then will be an integral component of its 
implementation.
One approach which could be taken is that if performance against the PEP is deemed to be 
satisfactory, donors may increasingly shift a portion of the pooled funding directly into the 
government’s revenue collection through direct budgetary support. This has a number of 
advantages for both donors and recipients. Firstly, it would prevent donors from having to 
appraise and finance individual projects through their own administrative systems and 
agents, replicating the costs of the recipient government. The institutional problems and 
high transaction costs that accompany multitudes of donors would be avoided. Delivering 
aid as general budgetary support also means that recipient governments maintain control 
and ownership, strengthening their own domestic institutional processes. Also, unlike 
previous attempts at offering budgetary support, tying the delivery of this aid to an entire
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PEP ensures that funds are used to finance a productive expenditure mix and encourage 
sensible macroeconomic management.
Under this system, when good leaders do emerge, they can be rewarded with aid that 
increases their ownership, legitimacy and accountability to their people for development 
performance. In the event that the recipient continues to meet the PEP criteria, then the 
role of the donor might also evolve away from delivering services and toward serving as a 
clearing house of information, or as a more competitive source of technical assistance. In 
the event that the recipient lacked the political will to meet the PEP targets then aid 
delivery would simply return to its existing modalities.
This approach would, under the appropriate conditions, facilitate the transfer of resources 
without the high transaction costs of program and project negotiations, and minimise the 
costs of technical assistance. Notably, this would also require a level of flexibility and 
adaptability not previously seen by aid donors in countries such as PNG.
The final point worth noting about the potential for budgetary support is that in the face of 
the growing regional self interest priorities outlined in this study, it is clear that efforts by 
Australia to link large aid volumes to performance-based measures will continue to suffer 
from a lack of credibility within the SIDS of the South Pacific. Offering budgetary support 
as a potential reward mechanism also then has the added advantage of the donor 
maintaining a credible threat for its reduction. For example, in the event that the PNG 
Government decides to no longer meet the targets identified in the PEP, then funding 
would not have to be reduced but rather would simply be redirected to the aid agency to 
implement via its project or program support facilities.
By altering the composition of aid rather than its levels, Australia can circumvent both the 
pressures it faces to disburse aid within the South Pacific and the institutional inertia it 
faces when trying to impose sanctions on recipient governments. This would significantly 
strengthen the credibility of an Australian-based reward system in countries such as PNG, 
helping to circumvent what has been termed the Samaritan’s dilemma.
8.4 C oncluding  R em arks
The plethora of political and administrative challenges in implementing such a wide ranging 
reform of the aid system in countries such as PNG are too numerous to mention. 
However, whether or not one believes that foreign aid has contributed to PNG’s
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development at the margins, it is indisputable that it is far from achieving its goal of 
fostering functioning and effective states conducive to widespread wealth creation and 
improving living standards. As a result, change should not be seen as an option but as a 
necessity.
Supporting an expansion of basic service delivery will continue to be a major feature of 
Australia’s engagement in PNG and the South Pacific. Breakdowns in health, education 
and essential infrastructure services not only have a significant human cost but they also 
serve to undermine the legitimacy of nation states and can provide the catalyst for 
instability. However, seeking to fund these activities in the absence of political or 
bureaucratic support is unlikely to lead to sufficient progress in these areas. As Australia 
undertakes another big push of aid delivery in the South Pacific, a much more substantial 
effort needs to be made in order to delve deeper into the various routes and transmission 
mechanisms through which the various types of aid operate. Implementing an 
economy-wide donor-financed public financial management system which pooled donor 
funds and rewarded good performance with untied budgetary support could be a core 
component of these efforts.
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A ppendices
Appendix 1.1: List of Small Island Developing States
American Samoa* Marshall Islands*
Anguilla Mauritius
Antigua and Barbuda Montserrat
Aruba Nauru*
Bahamas Netherlands Antilles
Bahrain New Caledonia*
Barbados Niue*
Belize Northern Marianas Islands*
British Virgin Islands Palau*
Cape Verde Papua New Guinea*
Comoros Puerto Rico
Cook Islands* Samoa*
Cuba Sao Tome and Principe
Dominica Seychelles
Dominican Republic Solomon Islands*
Federated States of 
Micronesia*
St. Kitts and Nevis
Fiji* St. Lucia
French Polynesia* St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Grenada Suriname
Guam Timor-Leste
Guinea-Bissau Tonga*
Guyana Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti Tuvalu*
Jamaica U.S. Virgin Islands
Kiribati*
Maldives
Vanuatu*
* Countries of the South Pacific.
Source: UN DESA (2008).
Appendix 2.1: List o f British Colonies and Protectorates
1. A nguilla 2. M alta
3. A ntigua 4. M au rid u s
5. B aham as 6. M o n tse rra t
7. B ahrain 8. M y an m ar
9. B ang ladesh 10. N a m ib ia
11. B arbados 12. N a u ru
13. Belize 14. N ig eria
15. B erm u d a 16. N iu e
17. B o tsw ana 18. P ak is tan
19. B runei 20. P a lestin ian  A d m . areas
21. C am ero o n 22. P ap u a  N e w  G u in ea
23. C aym an  Islands 24. Q a ta r
25. C o o k  Islands 26. S am oa
27. C yprus 28. Seychelles
29. D o m in ica 30. S ierra L eo n e
31. E g y p t 32. S in g ap o re
33. Falk land  Islan d s 34. S o lo m o n  Is lands
35. Fiji 36. Som alia
37. G am b ia 38. S o u th  A frica
39. G eorg ia 40. Sri L an k a
41. G h a n a 42. S t H e le n a
43. G ib ra lta r 44. St K itts  N ev is
45. G re n ad a 46. St L ucia
47. G uyana 48. S t V in c e n t
49. H o n g  K o n g 50. S u dan
51. In d ia 52. S w aziland
53. Ira q 54. T a n z a n ia
55. Israel 56. T o n g a
57. Jam aica 58. T rin id ad  an d  T o b a g o
59. Jo rd a n 60. T u rk s  an d  C aicos Is lands
61. K enya 62. T u v a lu
63. K iribad 64. U g a n d a
65. K uw ait 66. V a n u a tu
67. L eso th o 68. V irg in  Is lan d s
69. M alaw i 70. Y e m e n
71. M alaysia 72. Z a m b ia
73. M aldives 74. Z im b a b w e
Source: Institute of Commonwealth Studies (2007).
A ppendix  2.2: D ata  Sources and D escrip tions for C hap ter 2
Aid Data (1980-2005)
Description: ODA flows as used in this study are defined by OECD DAC (2007) as 
‘official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in 
character with a grant element of at least 25 per cent (using a fixed 10 per cent rate of 
discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government 
agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral 
institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral 
institutions.’
Source: OECD DAC (2008)
Azores; Measured in constant 2005 US$
Label: ODA
GDP Per Capita Growth and GDP Per Capita Data (1980-2005)
Description: GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth measured in constant 1985 
international dollars.
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2006)
Notes: A number of Pacific Island countries were not included in the Heston et al. (2006) 
database. For these countries data was taken from ADB (2008) which included Fiji, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Timor-Leste 
and Vanuatu. This GDP data was taken in nominal US$ values and then converted to real 
US$ using the PWT GDP deflator.
Label: Rgdpch and Rgdpchg respectively
Distance Data
Description: Great circle distance between capital cities.
Source: Byers (2007)
Notes: The great circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the 
surface of a sphere measured along a path on the surface of the sphere (as opposed to 
going through the sphere’s interior).
Label: Distj
Population Data
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Description: Total population of recipient country.
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2006)
N otes: Measured in ’000s of people.
N otes: As before a number of Pacific Island countries were not included in the Heston et 
al. (2006) database. For Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu data was taken from ADB (2008).
Label: Pop
Infant Mortality
Description: Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births).
Source: World Bank (2008a)
N otes: Missing values for a variety of countries where linearly extrapolated between 
observations. In cases where the most recent observation was before 2004, the infant 
mortality rate has been kept constant.
Label: Infmort
British Colony Data
Description: Those countries which were colonised, administered or which have had a 
significant colonial legacy from Britain.
Source: Institute of Commonwealth Studies (2007)
Notes: See Appendix 2.1 for a full list of countries.
Label: Brcol
Linguistic Data
Description: Proportion of the population speaking either English (Engfrac) or Western 
European (Eurfrac) languages as their mother tongue.
Source: In the first instance, data was sourced from Hall and Jones (1999). This data set, 
however, excluded a number of Pacific Island countries which are large recipients of 
Australian aid. Data was collected from a variety of sources including the Pacific Regional 
Information System (PRISM) and the CIA World Fact Book Country Pages.
Notes: As discussed, this paper uses two language variables: the fraction of a country’s 
population speaking one of the five primary Western European languages (including 
English) as a mother tongue, and the fraction speaking English as a mother tongue. This
202
allows English and the other European languages to have separate impacts. Additions 
include:
Country Engfrac Eurfrac
Cook Is. 1 1
Marshall Is. 0.95 0.96
Micronesia 0.95 0.96
Nauru 1 1
Niue 0.95 0.95
Samoa 0.95 0.951
Tonga 0.989 0.99
Tuvalu 0.9 0.9
Rule of Law Index
Description: This index is one of six indices developed to measure governance. The 
authors draw 194 different measures from 17 different sources of subjective governance 
data constructed by 15 different organisations. These sources include international 
organisations, political and business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non governmental 
organisations. The Rule of Law Index combines several indicators that measure the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include 
perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non violent crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators 
measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and 
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions. The component 
indicators are aggregated using an unobserved components model that expresses the 
observed data in each cluster as a linear function of the unobserved common component 
of governance, plus a disturbance term capturing perception errors and/or sampling 
variation in each indicator. The choice of units for governance ensures that the estimates of 
governance have a mean of zero, a standard deviation of one, and a range of —2.5 to 2.5. A 
higher positive value indicates greater rule of law.
Source: In the first instance data was sourced from World Bank (2008a). This version of 
the data set, however, excluded a number of Pacific Island countries which are large 
recipients of Australian aid. For these countries data was collected directly from Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).
Notes: Following this data collection exercise data was still not available for eight of the 
micro-Pacific Island states of Nauru, Niue, New Caledonia, Northern Marianas, Palau,
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Tokelau, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna. Each of these countries had their rule of law 
index set to zero. Each set of estimations was carried out excluding these countries rather 
than setting their rule index to zero and the results remained comparatively similar.
Label: Rule
A ppendix  2.3: G oodness of Fit M easures for C on tinuous D ependen t 
V ariable T ob it M odels
One issue which has typically not been discussed within the aid allocation literature is how 
to interpret the goodness of fit of the model when applying the Tobit estimation method. 
Whilst R2 values are not directly attainable in Maximum Likelihood Estimations (MLE), 
pseudo-R2 values are reported in most econometric software. For the present case the 
continuous nature of the dependent variable does however pose some additional problems. 
The method for calculating the discrete outcomes pseudo-R2 in MLE estimations is based 
on the formula one minus the ratio of the full model log likelihood (LLR,) and constant 
only log likelihood (LLR^).138 This can be written formally as:
Pseudo-R2 = 1 -  (LLR1/LLR0)
Given that for discrete outcomes the log likelihood is the log of a probability, and must 
therefore always be negative, this measure satisfies the requirement of being bound by 0 
and 1. For continuous dependent variable outcomes, however, the log likelihood is the log 
of a density function. Since these density functions can be greater than 1 (for example, the 
normal density at 0), the log likelihood can be either positive or negative (Sribney 1997). 
Thus it is possible that the formula given above could observe a pseudo-R2 value greater 
than one.
An alternative approach for continuous dependent variable models such as that used in this 
paper is to calculate the pseudo-R2 value as:
Pseudo-R2 = 1 - a /  a0
Where given, the linear probability model sigma is calculated as:
A = c + X*B + g *e
where A is the dependent aid variable, X is the vector of explanatory variables, beta is the 
vector of respective coefficients for each of the X, and e is the error term satisfying the 
typical assumptions. As a result, as more explanatory terms are added to the model the 
smaller the estimate of sigma becomes. As a result the pseudo R2 value is constrained 
between zero and one. This approach is preferable to the method for discrete dependent
138 This is, for example, the method used to calculate the pseudo-R2 in STATA v.9.0.
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variable estimations. The downside of this approach, however, is that this type of pseudo- 
IT value is not sufficiendy robust for an accurate depiction of the proportion of variance of 
the response variable explained by the predictors (Zimmermann 1996:21) . ’y>
Rasmusen (2005), for instance, conducts a number of tests to highlight the fact that 
pseudo-R2 values can in fact drastically understate the true explanatory power of a 
hypothesised model, concluding that ‘if you just ran a Tobit regression, and looked at the 
R2, you might think your regression was not explaining much of anything—but it is’ 
(Rasmusen 2005:1). A potentially more appropriate manner for assessing the goodness of 
fit for continuous variable Tobit models suggested by Rasmusen (2005) is to simply re- 
estimate all of the Tobit model specifications using OLS and reporting the normal R2 value. 
The approach taken in the following estimation is to report both the pseudo-R2 values for 
continuous dependent variable models as well as the typical adjusted R2 values from the 
OLS estimations.
Appendix 3.1: Chart 3.2—Technical Assistance ODA from OECD 
Donors to all Recipients (1966-2006)
US$ millions (Constant 2006)
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100,000
80,000
60,000
40.000
20.000
0
ll Technical Cooperation OCA ■ Other ODA
Source: OECD DAC (2008).
139 As the index developers advise, for instance, ‘We do not intend that our pseudo-R2 should be reported in formal write-ups of results. 
The idea of a pseudo-R2 came from economists who wanted some rough measure of explanatory power of the model. So it’s really just 
a guide for fitting models.’ See http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat Avbl.html.
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A ppendix 3.2: A ustralian B ilateral Aid R ecip ien ts by P opu la tion
C ou n try A v era g e
R e c e ip ts
2003-2007
P o p u la tio n
(2007)
C o u n try A v era g e
R e c e ip ts
2003-2007
P o p u la tio n
(2007)
Afghanistan 23.33 32,738,376 Marshall Islands* 0.80 58,316
Angola 0.47 16,948,673 Mexico 0.05 105,280,515
Bangladesh 19.17 158,571,814 Micronesia, Fed. * 1.47 110,961
Bhutan 0.91 657,401 Mongolia 1.86 2,608,412
Bosnia-Herz. 0.02 3,772,964 Mozambique 2.37 21,372,202
Botswana 0.23 1,881,432 Myanmar 9.24 48,782,825
Brazil 0.40 191,601,284 Namibia 0.08 2,080,083
Cambodia 26.81 14,446,056 Nauru* 14.91 9,258
Central Afr. Rep. 0.84 4,343,405 Nepal 3.48 28,107,592
Chad 1.71 10,763,638 Niger 0.09 14,195,085
Chile 0.06 16,594,596 Nigeria 0.33 147,982,941
China 37.10 1,318,309,724 Niue* 1.51 1,444
Colombia 0.70 43,987,000 Pakistan 12.90 162,481,399
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.04 62,399,224 Palau* 0.65 20,162
Cook Islands* 1.89 19,569 Palestinian Adm. 5.35 3,800,000
Cote d'Ivoire 0.01 19,268,303 PNG* 241.68 6,324,097
Croatia 0.35 4,435,982 Peru 0.21 27,898,182
Ecuador 0.03 13,339,580 Philippines 45.72 87,892,094
Egypt 7.98 75,466,539 Rwanda 0.27 9,735,541
El Salvador 0.03 6,853,143 Samoa* 12.08 181,293
Eritrea 0.36 4,841,773 Senegal 0.06 12,411,094
Ethiopia 2.01 79,086,894 Serbia 0.30 7,381,579
Fiji* 17.93 834,278 Sierra Leone 0.15 5,848,320
Ghana 0.21 23,461,523 Solomon Islands* 132.49 495,362
Guatemala 0.06 13,348,222 Somalia 1.39 8,695,928
Haiti* 0.15 9,611,554 South Africa 5.64 47,850,700
Honduras 0.13 7,103,786 Sri Lanka 21.82 20,010,000
India 7.95 1,124,786,997 Sudan 13.68 38,555,569
Indonesia 190.51 225,630,065 Swaziland 0.24 1,147,616
Iran 0.92 71,021,039 Tanzania 1.31 40,432,163
Iraq 134.33 28,221,180 Thailand 6.81 63,832,135
Jordan 0.03 5,718,855 Timor-Leste* 46.31 1,061,129
Kenya 0.97 37,530,726 Tokelau* 1.04 1,433
Kiribati* 6.19 95,067 Tonga* 8.22 102,214
Korea, Dem. Rep. 3.65 23,782,802 Tuvalu* 2.85 12,177
Laos 13.33 5,859,891 Uganda 1.44 30,916,072
Lebanon 3.71 4,097,076 Uruguay 0.01 3,323,906
Lesotho 0.26 2,005,826 Vanuatu* 19.45 225,898
Madagascar 0.01 19,669,953 Viet Nam 50.15 85,154,900
Malawi 1.48 13,920,062 Zambia 0.76 11,919,870
Malaysia 1.28 26,549,518 Zimbabwe 2.13 13,402,661
Maldives* 1.76 305,340 Bilateral, 263.29 -
unspecified
Source: OECD DAC (2008), World Bank (2008) and UN DESA (2008). * M ember o f the SIDS Grouping.
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Appendix 3.3: List o f Countries Included as Fragile States
C o u n try S ta r t D a te E n d  D a te C o u n try S ta r t  D a te E n d  D a te
A lban ia 1991* 1995 M adagascar 1977 1991
A ngo la 1989* 2005 M auritan ia 1977 2005
B angladesh 1977 2000 M o zam b iq u e 1985 2005
B enin 1977 2002 M y an m ar 1985 1995*
B urk ina F aso 1983 1994 N ep a l 1977 2003
B u rund i 1977 1988 N icarag u a 1977 1996
B u ru n d i 1995 2005 N ig er 1989 2005
C am b o d ia 1988* 2005 N ig eria 1985 2005
C en tra l A frican  
R ep.
1977 2005 P ak is tan 1977 1990
C had 1977 2005 P ap u a  N e w  
G uinea**
2003 2005
C o m o ro s 1978* 2005 R w anda 1994 2003
C o n g o , D em . R ep. 1977 2005 Sao T o m e  and  
P rin c ip e
1981 2005
C o n g o , R ep. 1977 2005 S ierra L eo n e 1977 2005
C ote  d 'Iv o ire 1988 2000 S o lo m o n
Is lands
1989 2003*
E g y p t 1985 2000 Som alia 1980 2005
E q u a to ria l G u in ea 1980* 2005 Sri L anka 1977 2005
E th io p ia 1977 2000 S udan 1979 2005
G h a n a 1977 1987 T ajik istan 1995* 2003
G u in ea 1977 2005 T an zan ia 1981 2000
G uinea-B issau 1992 2005 T o g o 1978 1987
G u y an a 1982 1996 T u rk m e n is ta n 1996* 2005
H aiti 1977 2005 U g an d a 1985 1998
H o n d u ras 1985 1995 U k ra in e 1997 2003
In d o n es ia 1977 1987 U zb ek is tan 1997 2005
L aos 1978* 2005 V ie tn am 1978* 1991
L eso th o 1982 1998 Z am b ia 1980 2000
L iberia 1985 2005 Z im b ab w e 2001 2005
* Data starts or ends at that date. Unless otherwise indicated, data starts in 1977 and ends in 2005. 
** Papua New Guinea added as a fragile state since 2003.
Source: Chauvet and Collier (2007).
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Appendix 3.4: Data Sources and Descriptions for Chapter 3
Aid Data (1980-2004)
Description: ODA receipts as defined in Appendix 2.2.
Source: OECD DAC (2008).
Label: ODA/GDP
Technical Assistance Data (1980—2004)
Technical Assistance (or Cooperation) ODA is defined by OECD DAC (2007) as the 
provision of know-how in the form of personnel, training, research and associated costs. 
This includes donor-financed activities that augment the level of knowledge, skills, 
technical know-how or productive aptitudes of people in developing countries; and 
services such as consultancies, technical support or the provision of know-how that 
contributes to the execution of a capital project. Technical cooperation also includes both 
free-standing technical cooperation and technical cooperation that is embedded in 
investment programs (or included in program-based approaches).
Source: OECD DAC (2008).
Notes: Measured in Constant 2000 US$.
Label: TechGDP
GDP Per Capita Growth and GDP Per Capita Data (1980-2004)
Description: GDP and GDP per capita as defined in Appendix 2.2.
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) and ADB (2008).
Label: GDP and GDPpc
Distance Data
Description: Great circle distance between capital cities.
Source: Byers (2007).
N otes: The great circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the 
surface of a sphere measured along a path on the surface of the sphere (as opposed to 
going through the sphere’s interior).
Label: Dist
Population Data
Description: Total population as defined in Appendix 2.2.
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Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) and ADB (2008).
Label: Pop
British Colony Data
Description: Those countries which were colonised, administered or who have had a 
significant colonial legacy from Britain as defined by the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies.
Source: Institute of Commonwealth Studies (2007).
ATotes: See Appendix 2.1 for a full list of countries.
Label: Brcol
Population within 100 km of Major Waterways
Description: Proportion of the population which lives within 100 kilometres of an ocean 
or major waterway.
Source: In the first instance, data was sourced from Rodrik et al. (2004). However, this 
data set excluded a number of small Pacific Island countries such as Cook Islands, Nauru, 
Niue, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Micronesia.
Notes: Given their small geographic size, all of these countries were assumed to have 100 
per cent of their population within 100 km of the ocean.
Label: Pop 100km
Distance from the Equator
Description: Distance of a country’s capital city from the equator.
Source: In the first instance data was sourced from Rodrik et al. (2004). However, this data 
set excluded a number of Pacific Island countries which are large recipients of Australian 
aid. Data was collected on the basis of comparison with other Pacific Island countries. 
Azores; The Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Tokelau, Naum and Kiribati were assumed to be the 
same distance from the equator as PNG. Samoa and the Cook Islands were assumed to be 
as distant as Vanuatu whilst Niue and Tonga were deemed comparable with Fiji.
Label: Disteq
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A ppendix  3.5: T able 3.3: Sam ple C ountries w ith  P opu la tion  L ess th an  5 
M illion— M ean Values
Country GE Pop GDPpc D isteq PoplOOkm Fragile* ODAGDP T ech
G DP
Aus
ODAGDP
Albania -0.583 3,516 4,274 41 0.880 0 1.693 0.552 0.0000
Armenia 0.000 3,314 4,766 40 0.000 0 1.092 0.649 0.0000
Bosnia- -0.900 3,977 3,491 43 1.000 0 4.749 0.928 0.0000
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.600 1,561 7,267 24 0.000 0 0.617 0.329 0.0035
C.Afr. Rep. -1.430 3,524 880 4 0.000 1 3.807 1.083 0.0000
Congo, Rep. -1.313 2,779 1,759 4 0.183 1 2.958 0.583 0.0000
Costa Rica 0.430 3,735 8,138 9 1.000 0 0.243 0.146 0.0000
Croatia 0.450 4,523 9,816 45 0.476 0 0.259 0.123 0.0002
Eritrea - 1.000 4,458 604 15 0.662 0 7.342 1.289 0.0291
Fiji* -0.190 837 4,810 18 1.000 0 1.082 0.713 0.310
Gabon -0.589 1,223 10,914 0 0.469 0 0.710 0.264 0.0000
Gambia -0.538 1,347 885 13 0.624 0 3.276 1.388 0.0019
Georgia -0.700 4,926 4,757 41 0.314 0 0.881 0.520 0.0000
Guinea- -1.138 1,263 607 11 0.812 1 10.664 3.894 0.0000
Bissau
Jamaica -0.020 2,657 4,584 18 1.000 0 0.811 0.312 0.0001
Jordan 0.120 4,683 3,874 31 0.219 0 2.132 0.705 0.0003
Kiribati!' -0.340 93 1,393 1 1.000 0 13.310 7.084 4.2715
Kuwait 0.267 1,765 29,092 29 0.964 0 0.006 0.006 0.0000
Laos -0.100 4,971 1,409 17 0.099 1 2.616 0.963 0.1784
Lebanon -0.333 3,678 5,924 33 1.000 0 0.838 0.296 0.0007
Lesotho -0.125 1,840 1,801 29 0.000 0 2.011 0.733 0.0092
Liberia -1.788 2,860 387 6 1.000 1 13.727 2.118 0.0008
Madagascar -0.300 2,063 5,252 18 0.471 0 2.253 0.719 0.0000
Mauritania -0.063 2,637 1,463 18 0.149 1 5.407 1.110 0.0012
Mauritius 0.489 1,180 14,974 20 1.000 0 0.209 0.121 0.0070
Micronesia!* -0.420 108 3,836 29 1.000 0 26.532 1.709 0.2461
Mongolia -0.325 2,584 1,497 47 0.000 0 3.268 1.572 0.0413
Namibia 0.288 1,802 5,082 22 0.047 0 1.559 0.702 0.0072
Nauru!* -1.171 12 6,307 2 1.000 0 0.011 0.001 0.0088
Nicaragua -0.633 4,652 3,313 12 0.752 1 3.235 0.768 0.0002
Oman 0.588 2,497 16,340 23 0.492 0 0.112 0.042 0.0000
Panama 0.038 2,813 7,731 8 1.000 0 0.207 0.139 0.0000
PNG!* -0.460 4,690 4,385 9 1.000 0 1.547 0.529 1.1697
Samoa!* 0.200 180 3,115 13 1.000 0 6.148 3.662 1.6241
Sierra Leone - 1.000 4,752 830 8 0.568 1 2.489 0.566 0.0017
Slovenia 1.050 1,936 20,209 46 0.598 0 0.155 0.016 0.0000
Solomon -1.200 473 2,081 9 1.000 1 5.606 3.176 2.5881
Islands!*
Togo -0.750 4,675 883 6 0.417 0 2.657 0.721 0.0002
Tonga!* -0.480 103 3,285 41.5 1.000 0 7.244 4.430 2.0991
Trinidad and 0.275 1,127 13,241 10 1.000 0 0.084 0.038 0.0000
Tobago
Turkmenistan -1.400 4,776 7,342 37 0.000 1 0.063 0.041 0.0001
Uruguay 0.500 3,346 10,199 34 0.725 0 0.096 0.064 0.0000
Vanuatu!* -0.500 191 3,021 16 1.000 0 5.765 3.919 1.9563
Countries with at least one observation recorded as a fragile state. For a full list of years during which a country is deemed as 
fragile, see Appendix 3.2.11 Pacific Island Countries. Note: AusODAGDP refers to Australian ODA as a proportion of GDP. 
Other variables are as defined above.
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Appendix 3.6: A Truncated Table of Critical F-Statistics to Test for 
Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. Based on Stock and Yogo 
(2002) and extended in Batten and Martina (2006).
The Stock and Yogo (2002) weak instruments test rejects an instrument for a 2SLS 
estimadon, if its estimated first stage F-Stadsdc is smaller than the critical value indicated in 
the table below. This critical value, gmin, is calculated as a function of the number of included 
endogenous regressors (n), the number of instrumental variables (K2) and the desired 
maximal size (r = 0.15) of a Wald test of ß = ß0, when the significance level is 5 per cent. The 
table below, taken from Stock and Yogo (2002:59) and which is then extended to the n = 3 
and n = 4 case (using the Gauss computer program provided by Motohiro Yogo and 
extended and run by Professor Heather Anderson to generate the relevant critical values), 
reports these critical gmin values.
Critical F-Statistics to T est for W eak Instrum ents
n =  2 ,r  = n =  3, r =
IIuIIC
k 2
0.1 0 .15 0.1 0 .15 0.1 0 .15
1 - - - - - -
2 6.91 4.59 - - - -
3 13.32 8.17 4.23 3.34 - -
4 16.75 9 .92 10 6.48 3.25 3.19
5 19.35 11.21 13.4 8 .23 6.68 4 .79
6 21 .59 12.31 15.98 9 .54 10.05 6.54
7 23 .63 13.32 18.16 10.64 12.61 7.87
8 25 .58 14.28 20.11 11.61 14.73 8.97
9 27 .44 15.22 21.9 12.52 16.59 9.9
10 29 .28 16.13 23.61 13.38 18.22 10.76
11 31.07 17.03 25.24 14.2 19.78 11.54
12 32.85 17.92 26.82 15.01 21 .2 12.27
T h e  full table, <coverin g  m any m o re  values o f  K 2, is available u p o n  request.
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Appendix 4.1: Table 4.1: PNG and Other Melanesia Social Welfare 
Outcomes
PN G  Fiji Solomon Is. V anuatu
Initial Current Initial Current Initial Current Initial Current
Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers (per 100 people) 
(1983 vs. 2005)
0.8 2.3 4.1 38.2 0.6 2.8 1.3 9.1
Health expenditure per capita 
(current US$) (2000 vs. 2005)
25 34 82 148 40 28 49 67
Immunisation, DPT (% of 
children aged 12-23 months) 
(1980 vs. 2006)
32 75 68 81 46 91 22 85
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 
100,000 people) (1990 vs. 2006)
250 250 42 22 292 135 94 58
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years) (1977 vs. 2006)
49 57 63 69 58 63 57 70
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 
live births) (1975 vs. 2006)
97 54 41 16 98+ 55 92 30
School enrolment, primary (% 
gross) (1991 vs. 2006)
65 55 133 100 88 100e 95 108
Proportion of population on 
less than US$1 a day (1996 vs. 
2005)
25 40 26 35* - 23 - 26Q
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2008. Initial represents earliest possible available 
data. Current represents latest possible available data. Data for 1985. p Data for 2005. * Data for 2003. 
Q Data for 1998. Poverty income data is sourced from AusAID (2008a).____________________________
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Appendix 5.1: Data Collection Method for Chapter 5140
In order to obtain a complete time series of PNG’s fiscal data, a number of data sources 
were used. On the government revenue side, data was sourced from a number of 
documents containing budget actuals data in order to obtain a complete time series for the 
period from a consistent source. Having said this it is important to note that government 
spending as recorded through the national budget documents does not include 
expenditures made by a number of publicly owned utilities and some regulatory agencies 
which obtain a significant amount of self financing through levying their own fees and 
charges. In so far, as this study is concerned primarily with how the flow of grant aid has 
influenced the expenditure priorities and fiscal behaviour of the national government this is 
only a minor limitation. However, this does mean that the study relies on the assumption 
that the behaviour of these self funding institutions is weakly exogenous to the broader 
behaviour of the national government. Further, whilst the budget actual figures are the 
most accurate data available for many years they remain a record of what was allocated to 
each of these priorities by government and not what was actually spent. It has only been 
during recent years that the divergences between government allocations and dispersions 
have been reliably reported. These budget actuals data were sourced from the following 
sources for the corresponding years.
Table 5.15: Sources for Government Revenue and Grant Data
D ocum ent Years o f Budget 
Actuals Covered
W o rld  B a n k  (1977) 1 9 7 0 -7 2
S im s  a n d  D a n ie l  (1986) 1 9 7 2 -8 2
S te in  (1991) 1 9 8 3 -8 6
1 9 9 3  B u d g e t 1 9 8 7 -9 1
1 9 9 5  B u d g e t 1 9 9 2 -9 4
1 9 9 7  B u d g e t 199 5
1 9 9 8  B u d g e t 1 9 9 6 -9 7
2 0 0 0  B u d g e t 1 998
2 0 0 4  B u d g e t 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 1
2 0 0 7  B u d g e t 2 0 0 2
2 0 0 8  B u d g e t 2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 8
In terms of expenditure, between 1974 and 2002 expenditure allocations were made in 
accordance with the IMF Government Financial Statistics Database. In this case, 
expenditure was classified into five categories. These included health, education, law and 
order, infrastructure, and other. The classifications used from the IMF database to allocate 
these expenditures are shown below.
140 Grateful acknowledgement is given to staff from the PNG Department of Treasury and Finance who assisted in compiling the data 
sources, many of which are not easily obtainable, and in defining certain expenditure classifications.
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Table 5.16: Categorisation of IMF GFS Data into Expenditure Categories
Category IMF GFS Code (Table 7)
1. H ealth 11. H ea lth
2. Education 13. E d u ca tio n
3. Law and Order 4. P u b lic  o rd e r  an d  safety
4. Infrastructure 6. A g ricu ltu re , fo restry , fish ing  and  
h u n d n g
7. F uel an d  energy
8. M in ing , m a n u fac tu rin g  and 
co n s tru c tio n
9. T ra n sp o r t
5. General 8. R ecrea tio n , cu ltu re , and religion 6. H o u s in g  an d  co m m u n ity  
am en ities
2a. P u b lic  D e b t T ran sac tio n s 10. Social W elfare  and  
P ro te c tio n
3. D e fen ce 11. O th e r  N o n  A llo ca ted  
E x p e n d itu re s
5e. O th e r  E c o n o m ic  A ffairs an d 2b. G en e ra l pu b lic  serv ices
Services (less P u b lic  d e b t 
tran sac tio n s)
The most recent 2008 version of the IMF database only covers up to 2002. As a result, 
another data collection effort was undertaken decomposing recent government 
expenditures into each of the five classifications listed above. This involved allocating 
expenditures from both the recurrent and development budgets.
Recurrent expenditures were allocated according to Volume II, Part 1, Table 2 of the 
budget which calculates recurrent expenditures on a functional basis. These expenditures 
were first allocated according to the IMF categories and then allocated into each of the five 
expenditure categories as shown in Table 16.
Table 5.17: Allocation of Recurrent Budget Expenditures to IMF Classifications
IMF Classification Budget Volum e II, Part 1, Table 2 
Classification Code
General public services 11 ,13 ,14 ,15 ,19 , 41, 51, 52, 53
Public debt transactions 5 1 ,5 2 , 53
General public services (less Public 
debt transactions)
11,13 ,14 ,15 ,19 , 41
D efence 18
Public order and safety 17
E conom ic affairs 12, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 31
Fuel and energy 33
Mining manufacturing and construction 35
Transport and communications 36
Other economic affairs 12, 32 , 34, 39
H ou sin g  and com m unity amenities 24, 25
H ealth 22
Recreation, culture and religion 27,28
Education 16, 21
Social protection 23
Other expenditure 42
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Development budget expenditures are not calculated on a functional basis. This 
component of the budget was allocated to each of the five categories through departmental 
allocations from both the National Department and Statutory Authority Tables from 
Volume II, Part 1, Section III of the budget documents. The following allocation rules 
were used.
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Table 5.18: A llocation o f D evelopm ent Budget Expenditures
Category National Department (N) or Statutory Authority (S)
1. Health 240: D e p t o f  H ea lth  (N )
241: H o sp ita l M an ag em en t Services (N) 
519: N a tio n a l A ID S  S ecre taria t (S)
520: In s titu te  o f  M edical R esearch  (S)
2. Education 235: D e p t o f  E d u c a tio n  (N )
236: C o m m iss io n  fo r H ig h e r E d u c a tio n  (N) 
512: U ni P N G  (S)
513: U m  T ech  (S)
514: U ni G o ro k a  (S)
515: U ni V u d al (S)
3. Law and Order 226: D e p t o f  C o rrec tiv e  an d  In s titu tio n a l Services (N) 
228: D e p t o f  Po lice  (N )
223: Ju d ic ia ry  Services (N )
4. Infrastructure 258: D e p t o f  In fo rm a tio n  an d  C o m m u n ica tio n  (N) 
259: D e p t o f  T ra n sp o r t  (N )
264: D e p t o f  W o rk s an d  Im p le m e n ta tio n  (N)
540: W a te r and  S ew erage B o ard  (S)
567: N a tio n a l R oad  A u th o rity  (S)
5. General AH R em ain in g  N a tio n a l D e p a r tm e n t an d  S ta tu to ry  
A u th o rity  D e v e lo p m e n t B u d g e t E x p en d itu re s
A ppendix  5.2: C hart 5.2: D ifference betw een O E C D  D isbursem en t and 
B udget G rant D ata
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0
-20 
-40 
-60
Source: OECD DAC (2008) and author’s calculations (see Appendix 5.1).
Percentage Difference between OECD Disbursments and Budget Data
216
A ppendix 5.3: A dditional T ab les for C hap ter 5
Table 5.3: Selection Order Criteria for M odel I
Selection O rder Criteria
lag AIC H Q IC
0 18.469 18.770
1 18.108 18.651
2 17.580* 18.606*
3 18.252 19.036
Table 5.4: Cointegration Tests for M odel I
Maximum 
Rank I
H°: Number of 
Cointegrating Vectors
(v)
Trace
Statistic
95% Critical 
Value
Eigenvalue
1 None 46.547* 47.21
At most 1 21.928 29.68 0.536
• At most 2 10.168 15.41 0.307
^denotes rejection o f the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors at 5 per 
cent significance level._______________________________________________________
Table 5.7: Selection Order Criteria for Model II
L a g A IC H Q IC
0 24.159 24.3926
1 21.660 21.785
2 17.595* 18.219*
3 17.947 19.076
Table 5.8: Cointegration Tests for M odel II
Maximum H°: Number of Trace 95% Critical
Rank Cointegrating Vectors
(v)
Statistic Value
0 None 64.998* 68.52
1 At most 1 39.132 47.21
2 At most 2 20.828 29.68
3 At most 3 6.673 15.41
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at a 95 per cent confidence level.
Table 5.11: Selection Order Criteria for Model III
lag AIC H Q IC
0 27.917 28.197
1 21.745 23.707*
2 21.190 24.833
3 19.489* 24.814
Table 5.12: Cointegration Tests for Model III
Maximum
Rank
Number of 
Cointegrating Vectors
(v)
Trace
Statistic
95 % Critical 
Value
0 None 77.580* 94.15
1 At most 1 49.746 68.52
2 At most 2 29.269 47.21
3 At most 3 16.7014 29.68
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at a 95 per cent confidence level.
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Appendix 5.4: Additional Charts for Chapter 5
Chart 5.2: M odel I Cumulative IR F —D om estic Borrowing, D om estic R evenue and 
E xpenditure Levels
—  cirf of gr -> D_pd_d
—  cirf of gr -> ex
—  cirf of gr -> dr
Source: Author’s calculations.
Chart 5.4: M odel II Cum ulative IR F— D om estic Borrowing, D om estic R evenue and 
E xpenditure Com position
-------- cirf of gr -> D_pd_d
--------cirf of gr -> ex_g
........  cirf of gr -> ex_d
-------cirf of gr -> dr
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.5: Summary of Results
D om estic
Revenue
D om estic
Borrowing
Expenditure Developm ent
Expenditure
General
Expenditure
M odel I N egative N egative N egative
M odel II N egative N egative N il N il
M odel III
Budget
Support N egative N egative P ositive N egative
Project
and
Program
Aid
N il P ositive N egative P ositive
N o te s : R esu lts  sh o w  lo n g  ru n  resu lts  fro m  the  IR F ’s o n c e  all flow  o n  e ffec ts  b e tw een  each  o f  th e  e n d o g en o u s  variables have stabilised . 
See tex t fo r  a d iscu ss io n  o f  th e  com p aritiv e  size o f  each  o n e  o f  th e se  effec ts.
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Appendix 6.1: Categorisation of IMF GFS and OECD DAC Databases
Category___________________ O ECD  DAC Code____________ IM F GFS Code (Table 7)
1. H ealth 120:1.2 Health 
130:1.3
11. Health
Population
Programmes
2. E ducation 110:1.1 Education 13. Education
3. Infrastructure 140: 1.4 Water 210: II.1 7. Fuel and 8. Mining,
Supply and Transport and Energy Manufacturing
Sanitation Storage and
Construction
220:11.2 230: II.3 9. Transport 10. Housing
Communications Energy and
Community
amenities
4. General 160: 1.6 Other 150: 1.5 2a. Public 4. Public
Social Government Debt Order and
Infrastructure and and Civil Transactions Safety
Services Society
920: X. Support to 930: XI. 2b. General 5e. Other
NGOs Refugees in Public Economic
Donor Services (less Affairs and
Countries Public Debt 
Transactions)
Services
310: III.l 410: IV.l 8. Recreation, 6. Agriculture,
Agriculture - General Culture and Forestry,
Forestry - Fishing, Environment Religion Fishing and
Total Protection Hunting
430: IV.3 Other 700: VIII. 3. Defence 10. Social
Multi-sector Emergency Welfare and
Assistance and 
Reconstruction
Protection
240: II.4 Banking 250: II.5 11. Other
and Financial Business and Non
Services Other Services Allocated
Expenditures
320: 111.2 Industry 331: 111.3
- Mining - Trade Policy
Construction and
Regulations
332: III.4 Tourism
600: VII. Action 998: XII.
Relating to Debt Unallocated/
Unspecified
910: IX. 
Administradve 
Costs of Donors
5. Budget Support 510: VI.l General 520: VI.2
Budget Support Developmental
Food
Aid/Food
Security
Assistance
530: VI.3 Other
Commodity
Assistance
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A ppendix  6.2: Sum m ary of R esults
D om estic
Revenue
Education
Expenditure
H ealth
Expenditure
Infrastructure
Expenditure
General
Expenditure
ODA N egative Positive Positive Positive Positive
Budget
Support Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
Sector
Specific
ODA
- Positive N egative Positive Positive
Other
ODA N egative N egative N egative Positive Positive
N otes: As defined in the text, sector specific O D A  refers to project and program  aid targetted at each o f  the specific sectors listed in the 
top  row. O the r O D A  refers all resicual project and program  aid, whilst budget support is untied financial assistance. O D A  refers to  the 
net effect o f  the three types o f  aid. See text for an explanation o f  the com parative size o f  each one o f  these effects.
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